


S1: okay we've got two options today, um 
SU-M: excuse me, Maureen, do you want the door open or closed?
S1: oh closed is better. see you later. um, one of them is, we could go over Kant, uh the transcendental argument. the second one is i had originally prepared a review of, the whole semester comparing the epistemology and metaphysics of all the figures. um, my section yesterday opted to talk about Kant and sort of coaxed me into having, a review session next week on, Wednesday at eleven, um, so, i'm gonna be doing the, sort of, review of all the figures at that point if you guys, wanted to come to that you could, um, or we could do it today. so 
S2: where is, the review session in? 
S1: eleven o'clock, and, it's gonna be, twenty-four-oh-two, i mean sorry that's this_ <LAUGH> um, <WRITING ON BOARD> eleven o'clock Wednesday, it's, twenty-four-forty. Mason Hall. i'm not sure what the date is on that but, next Wednesday.
S3: when's the final again?
SU-F: twenty-second 
S1: <WRITING> the final is the following Tuesday.
S2: it's April twenty-second 
SU-F: it's the twenty-second 
S1: the twenty-second? alright, um, so how many people would want to talk about, Kant today? alright that's what we'll do. um, so you guys are welcome to come to this to talk about the other part. um, so the main thing that we covered, is the transcendental arguments, in the last two lectures. and we've covered four of them. so the key first thing to do is understand, the style, of a transcendental argument, so or what it is and so this handout explains what it is, for starters. and, you guys might remember from a couple of times ago when we talked about Hume, that we talked about, the design argument, and we said, you could think of it as, an inference to the best explanation, so, <WRITING THROUGHOUT UTTERANCE> what you have in the inference to the best explanation is a kind of um, phenomenon, or, fact, that you wanna explain, and then, what you do is adduce several different possible explanations for it so we talked about God being a possible explanation, for the design in the world, or the order in the world. um, and then, i think it was i think it was in response to Eve, she said well you know aren't there other possible explanations like evolution... or another one, evolution and God... and, that's true there are always several possible explanations of any phenomenon that you're gonna try to use in an inference to the best explanation. so what happens is in the form of one of these arguments, you take this phenomenon as your premise, and then, try to argue towards one of these particular explanations in your conclusion. so like in, the original form of this argument, um, this is kind of actually an interesting historical fact the first time this came up, these guys were not even on the board, the only other possible explanation was chance, and this was in the eighteen hundreds when Paley, gave the argument. so what Paley did was say, look at this amazing design, two ways to explain it, God and chance i wanna show you that God is really the only explanation that's gonna do a good job of explaining design. um, because chance alone could never produce the sort of methodical patterns that you see in the world in the laws of nature. so what Paley did was, just ignore these guys for a moment these evolution ones, Paley said chance can't do it, there's only two possible explanations, God or chance so there must be a God. given this phenomenon that we know about. so that's a standard inference to the best explanation form. questions about that...? okay great. so basically, a transcendental argument, is just a fancy name for an inference to the best explanation. um, and so what we have, on the handout there, are sort of, several obvious facts, so take, take the second one, unified consciousness... and the idea is, Kant says look... it's an obvious fact that we have a unified consciousness by which he means, it's obvious that Maureen's thought states and beliefs and desires and mental states all kind of hang together, in a unified way inside of her in the same way that Matt's kind of hang together, inside of him, and Matt's perception of the board and my perception of the board are sort of in two separate unified consciousnesses, or not_ or consciousni(sic) <LAUGH> we're not at all <LAUGH> um tempted to think, that, we have_ that your states and my states are unified, so he he wants to explain how it is that, we just have single unified consciousness, <BACKGROUND CONVERSATION> and he says look you know, sure there are several different possible explanations for this. Jen, thanks. um so, you've got Locke, trying to do it with memory, right? and you've got Hume trying to do it, and, even, explicitly saying out loud that he fails to do it with his causal connection theory. remember his, his ah, sort of, explanation at the end of the treatise where he said, sorry i guess i wasn't able to really present to you the unity of consciousness, you've got, um, Descartes trying to do it with the soul theory... and basically, we all have already walked through the whole idea that each of these ones failed right, and Kant says look i'm gonna offer you a new explanation, one, which involves the categories of the understanding <:06 PAUSE WHILE WRITING> and it's, the best explanation, that we have for a unified consciousness. in fact, it's the only adequate explanation. so we know, the categories of the understanding exist. so see the similar structure you're trying to get to the existence of something and, in design case you're trying to get to the existence of God, in Kant's case you're trying to get to the existence of the categories... so do you guys see the structures here? this making sense...? (xx) okay. so somebody explain to me how it is, that the categories, explain, unified consciousness <P 0:12> this is pretty tricky. it involved a game... 
S4: Monopoly?
S1: yep... 
<P 0:26> 
S1: these lectures are really hard, i think... okay. um the categories are like, rules <P :05> of the understanding. and here's here's kind of the analogy is you're supposed to think about, um, just think of a Monopoly board, and think of, moves being made on the board. right, and to an alien, who's just kind of watching these moves made on the board, it looks a little, random, sort of like, there's nothing hanging together about the activity on the board except for that it's all happening on the board, but it's just sort of like moving six spaces this way and moving three spaces that way. who knows why people are doing it...? but, once, a person who's playing Monopoly or knows the rules of Monopoly looks at the board and sees what's happening, there's sort of a unified thing happening on the board. the rules unify the game. so, and it might sound a little far-fetched but actually think about it like, when you're playing a game rules really do constitute it. cuz um, like for example if when you rolled the dice, you started playing Twister on the Monopoly board instead, <LAUGH> like, you roll and then you get a six and then you think okay that means i gotta put my big toe on Park Place, and then you then you roll it again and that means you gotta put your pinky on you know, jail, or something like that, you're playing a whole different game, right? so, and that's just in virtue of having changed the rules. so the rules actually constitute and make up the game, or unify it. so in the same way, there's supposed to be an analogy here, where the rules, or the categories of the understanding, which are rules, unify, our consciousness.
S2: what is, what is meant by rules of understanding?
S1: ah right. this is a really great question. okay so remember back to last week and the Play-Doh machine? um we have... our cognitive faculties, and there were a couple fi- couple kinds right? there's the human sensibility and the human understanding
S2: we never got to that
S1: huh?
S2: <LAUGH> we never got to the human understanding
S1: right well that's actually, what we're getting to today. <WRITING THROUGHOUT UTTERANCE> but, there's the outer sense and the inner sense, and the outer sense, um, was kind of like sense perception, and what it did was impose or squish the Play-Doh, into, um, a spatial framework, and then remember the inner sense was kind of like introspection, and what it did was impose a temporal framework. <:04 PAUSE WHILE WRITING> and then, as Jen said, we never quite got over here to the <LAUGH> understanding, but um, what there are, in the same way that there's two kinds of human sensibility, two species of it, there's twelve kinds of human understanding, which are called, twelve categories of understanding. so, in effect, what Kant is trying to do in this transcendental argument, is prove to you the existence, of, the set of cognitive faculties, so make that connection cuz i think, that, might not have been clear. um, so he's really trying to show our, something about our psychology with this argument. these categories, the most important of them for us are substance, and causation, and Jen's question is well so, how is that a rule? right, how how does, how does this category constitute a way of unifying a r- a rule for our mind? here's my best way of <LAUGH> explaining it. um, remember when we had the dough, <WRITING ON BOARD> which was like the numina, and then we said basically, you process it through, the human sensibilities, and it comes out, oops, that's like a fun factory, sorry, uh, fun factory, over on this side, sensibility's over here, um and it came out all shaped up right? i think it was like a spaghetti shape, that was the one that Mark chose i think, and then, over here what you get is uh, um, sense datum, i'm really using that word roughly but it connects it to stuff, which is shaped through, shaped in terms of time and space. okay? so, you see something, well, you've got the numina you're trying to connect to it, and as you try to connect to it it gets shaped in time and space. so i start seeing things in succession, and i start seeing things at particular places, um in relationship to each other, then comes... ah, not enough room, the um, human understanding, and in a way we can think of it, as further processing, the already processed numina. so what you end up with, is sort of, processed processed numina, right, which is, numina that not only is shaped in terms of time and space, but now is gonna be shaped according to, one or more of these categories. so, now, if we just focus for a second on the category of cause. i've got this numina, i'm seeing everything in terms of time and space, and now the category of cause is gonna help me shape it further. and so, when i push this, and see it roll, instead of just thinking of that, in the way that Hume did, as a constant conjunction of events, namely in terms of my pushing being a cause and the rolling being the effect, i construe it in terms of a causal relationship, where my pushing, is a cause, and actually makes the effect occur. so in a way i'm imposing a way of understanding, my sense datum, by using, the category of causation, when, i see that thing and say hey, i just caused it to roll. yeah, Elton? 
S3: okay my question is, how do we know that the numina does not already have these, processes already involved like, could it- could have a spatial framework and a temporal framework, but since we're using our sensibilities, a fun factory if you will, we're assuming that that is causing those things to be in there where they could actually be in it already, how do we know that, it's, our
S1: contribution
S3: yes.
S1: this is the question that even, everybody was asking last week, and, um the main way we're supposed to know that is just by being convinced by these arguments, that it's us. okay? that the best explanation is the categories. [S3: wouldn't, Occam's- ] that's not really convincing what you're gonna say is, something like
S3: wouldn't it be simpler just to say that the numina already has that? i mean wouldn't Occam's Razor say, the simplest explanation is the best one, so you could just say that, the simplest explanation is not that we add something to it that it already has it
S1: mhm i see where you're going and i think it's a really good point to press him on, um
S3: too bad he's dead 
S1: pardon?
S3: too bad he's dead <LAUGH>
S1: too bad he's dead. <LAUGH> it is actually cuz i think a lot of people would have a lot of questions for this man. um
S3: (mail bomb)
S1: <LAUGH> i mean one thing to start, thinking about is that we know that in several cases we are contributing something. [S3: wha- i mean ] in terms of like say bent sticks, in water right? we know that the stick isn't really bent and that we're seeing it as bent because we, straighten things, or that we (do that in our) perception.
S3: the temporal framework (of things) if like, if you were blindfolded, and you had your hearing like stopped, and you were like locked in a dark box, pe- it's_ people lose all sense of time real quickly when they're deprived of, outside sensory information, so wouldn't that indicate that something on the outside, or some o- not the inner sense as he calls it, would contribute to our temporal framework?
S1: mm
S4: anoth- another thing is that you talk about the bent stick we know the stick isn't bent.
S1: because when you pull it out, you see it 
S4: but i mean when you see the bent stick you kind of you know
S3: well anybody who's gone spear-fishing 
S4: you know we might be imposing it (but)
S1: well that's just an example, it's true there are ways that we could figure out that it was straight, um but it's an example of the ways that we do contribute, and all i'm saying is Kant, kind of takes, that sense of we definitely contribute something we all know we contribute something and tries to order exactly what it is that we contribute. um, but i know this isn't a totally sat- satisfactory way to respond. yes?
S2: i don't understand what you mean by imposing a temporal framework.
S1: alright um... well temporal framework for starters is gonna be seeing things in terms of before and after. or in terms of succession. so, a lot of people want to say that God for instance is not in a- any temporal framework whatsoever and is in some sort of eternal now, right, in which whe- whatever you were you know like let's say you had Cheerios for breakfast and, now you're here, somehow your eating Cheerios and your being here is happening all at the same time, cuz there's no time. i mean there's no way to talk about this easily. but the idea is for us it's really hard to wrap your head around what that could possibly mean, to say every single event happens at once, right, and, Kant is trying to say, that's just, i mean, the difficulty we have with doing that, is just testimony to the fact that we see everything in terms of succession and before and after, at, just the word go, like, we don't know how to think of things any other way. and so, that's, he would say our inner sense at work in ordering our experience. does that help?
S2: yeah but it just seems that if we can't think of it in any other way, then, why do we assume, it seems like we're getting back to the same question i mean, how can he even say that we impose it if he himself can't even think of it, in any other way like, we can't understand how it could not be the way we think it is, how could we think, you know, you just, crossed your legs after i started talki- you know what i mean but, i guess i don't understand how we could've imposed that, on, the world how could we make
S1: right, you guys are rea- you're good to press on this, i mean, so for example what you're doing is saying, <WRITING THROUGHOUT UTTERANCE> one is_ this is the second one on your handout but there's this other one, which is um, an argument from some set of a priori truths in geometry, to, the existence, of the human sensibilities which include, the inner inner sense which imposes space, or imposes time on it, and what you guys are saying is but look, i mean isn't there another good explanation of this which is the existence of, time and space, right? am i hearing you guys right? so then what you're doing is playing Kant at his own game in a way you're saying, look i- i'll i'll agree with you [SU-M: mhm ] that we've got some kind of, thing that needs explanation here namely the fact that, every time we think of things we think of them in terms of time. every time we see things we, just kind of put them in space. but, we're not ready to just assume it's the human sensibilities which are responsible for this fact that we both agree on. we think actually there's a better explanation which is the actual existence of the temporal framework and the spatial framework which you're saying we impose, may be really out there. and so, basically you're_ i don't know, what Kant's reply would be, exactly. um, but, you're trying to say, <WRITING ON BOARD> that's not the one, this is the one, and Kant is trying to say, that's not the one, this is the one.
S2: but it just seems like he doesn't even take, it seems like actually saying that time and space exists is sort of the most, natural first assumption that you would make, whether it be true or not it just seems that i mean, w- i think as humans we naturally tend to think that if something seems like it's out there our first guess is to say it exists. [S1: right ] seems like he doesn't even take that into consideration. it's like his first thought is we must impose it, and then he just says that's, better than the rest and it seems like well how can he even claim to have thought this out, or have done anything, good here if you ignored, the most obvious first thought on it?
S1: do you wanna try to respond Mike and th- and then Mark?
S5: i- i'm not really responding but it just, something which strikes me as strange is in Kant's text with the rest of the people, is that there's a lot of skepticism about whether the real world exists, and i w- i was wondering maybe if that's where he gets the idea of, you know, that's why existence of time and space, isn't a real possibility because of all this skepticism. but the thing is if that was true then, he still does believe in the existence of the real world. so it's like 
S1: because he believes in the existence of the numina, you mean? 
S5: yeah. [S1: or ] the dough, whatever that is 
S1: right that's the numina, yeah,
S5: okay, yeah 
S1: okay 
S5: so, i mean it's kind of like, the one argument it seems that he would be able to use to justify, uh crossing out existence of time and space, he still holds on to the fact that there is, a real, dough out there or something with the numina.
S1: mhm mhm
S5: so y- that part really kinda confuses me. cuz, [S1: cuz otherwise ] i mean, it seems, it seems like the only explanation of how to cross over, cross out, the existence of time and space...
S1: mhm. Laura?
S6: i was just gonna ask, going back to the whole like why everything's blue we assume though that it's not just us imposing the blue it's that the world is actually blue. [S1: mhm ] can you maybe explain that? cuz maybe that would help. like if we saw a (negative argument?) 
S1: right, well so the blue one, i mean, i was thinking about that this morning cuz i thought, (Laura's) gonna ask this question <SS LAUGH> um, you guys have such great questions but i never know the answers um, okay, one thing about the blue example, is, you're probably just not, gonna be able to get it off the ground because we're all gonna agree that that's a phenomenon to be explained. right so, so you have to be able to put it up here, in your premise, and your premise is supposed to be something that says you know, okay it's obviously true that everything is blue. right, and people are just not gonna go, yeah. <LAUGH> so that's, i mean i know that your example was not meant to be sort of, um... something we would all agree to but i'm saying, in a way, that feature of the argument is so critical that the example doesn't really fly unless it is. cuz, cuz the features, that's that's, one of the main aspects of what Kant is trying to do is pick out something that we'll all agree to, in the premise and say, that's a fact. and we're curious about why it's like that. and get us curious enough and knock out enough other explanations which he did i think more successfully in the second argument than he did in the first. um, you know get us enough curious so that we end up saying well yeah, we're open to a new explanation and actually yours does a good job of explaining it... does that help any? <LAUGH> so, so that's why the blue example isn't isn't gonna work i think. but i think the blue example is a good example of the kind of structure that's supposed to happen which is sort of like, here's something to explain and tell me how to explain it... um, okay. Adam? 
S7: this is a side issue. what are the other ten categories, of understanding? 
S1: they're in your book
S7: are they?
S1: yeah
S2: we don't need to know them do we?
S7: i just w- wanted 
S1: no you don't need to know 'em but, i can tell you the page so you can, [S7: okay ] check 'em out, um... 
S7: is it in the, which, section (is it in?) 
S1: i think it's the second part, but, it might be the first part. page forty-six. um, under the transcendental table of the concepts of the understanding
S7: oh i remember those now, yep.
S1: just so you know, that's a tricky thing that you might not have picked up, um the categories, and the word concepts of the understanding, are two ways of saying the same thing. <SS LAUGH> okay 
S2: so there're categories, concepts, and rules.
S1: yes
S7: now i remember that, chart 
S1: yes 
S7: yeah 
S1: <WRITING THROUGHOUT UTTERANCE> so categories of the understanding equals concepts of the understanding equals rules of the understanding. this is one really hard part about Kant is that, you think you've got it, and then you start realizing he's identified, two things and you've kept them separate. <LAUGH> so, just, if that helps a little.
S2: can we go over the uh, the argument for, human sensibility?
S1: sure. um, okay so that's the first argument here, um, and actually if you guys have your old handout on Kant one through three, um, get it out, if not it's coming around right now on the left side in this yellow folder... um, okay, cuz cuz basically, [S2: (cop-) yeah. ] as you can see, the first, supposedly obvious premise, <LAUGH> and one which is supposed to be as obvious as unity of consciousness or as obvious as design in the world or whatever, is the existence of synthetic a priori knowledge, which, you'll remember from the first couple of lectures was actually, contestable right, we were trying to figure out whether there was anything like that. and now Kant is assuming that, there definitely is and it's so obvious that now we can try to use that fact to explain 
S2: did he ever show [S1: something else ] why it was obvious?
S1: yeah so that's why i'm having you look at, Kant one throu- the, the first handout on Kant one through three, and, i mean i think, he tried to do this in a couple of different ways but i always thought this was the clearest one. so um, so what we're doing right now is just in service of showing you, why you're supposed to be convinced that P-one is obvious okay? so, here's why (you) should think there are some synthetic a priori truths. and here's one about geometry. think about, remember th- what synthetic means and what a priori means for starters. somebody remind me what's synthetic.
S2: it actually gives you information.
S1: okay, good. in a way, synthetic is sort of like, the garbage category, analytic is, <LAUGH> it's not analytic. and then so you define it that way and then analytic means, um, that the concept of the predicate, is in the concept of the subject. okay? so, something like bachelors are unmarried, is analytic because the concept of the predicate, namely unmarried, is already in the concept of bachelor, which is your subject. so it's gonna be_ analytic truths are just true in virtue of the meaning of the word, bachelor and unmarried. synthetic truths are not analytic. that's basically what i think they mean. <LAUGH> so you're gonna note something as synthetic just because you couldn't figure out whether it was true or not by looking at the meanings of the words. so something like Maureen has brown hair, it's not obvious from the word Maureen, that i'm gonna have brown hair. or bachelors are fun, it's not obvious from the word bachelor, that they're all gonna turn out to be fun, even though many of them are, right? <LAUGH> [SU-M: (mhm) ] so, <LAUGH> so then basically, synthetic is going to be something that's not true in virtue of the meanings of the words, and it's, it's gonna give us information they're the they're the kind of exciting truths, you don't just sit around with your dictionary to create them you have to go out and experience the world to figure them out, you synthesize something new onto the concept of the subject.
S8: doesn't he distinguish synthetic, uh knowledge from, th- experience knowledge? or is that the same thing?
S1: oh he definitely does distinguish, okay and this is where we get the a priori versus a posteriori. so a posteriori is knowledge from experience. and a priori, is the garbage category. <SU-M LAUGH> it's not a posteriori. okay? [S8: okay ] which means any way that you get knowledge, except from experience.
S8: so where would synthetic fall, in both categories?
S1: these are cross-cutting distinctions, so right, you could, the big point, of a couple times ago is to show that you could get, um... <WRITING ON BOARD> uh, here's synthetic 
S2: i thought it meant more than that to Kant. i thought it was_ i thought a priori wasn't just not as- a posteriori but that it was actually necessary.
S1: nope and it's actually critical that it be, a garbage category to Kant. so, hold on a second.
S2: (well) Gold did a bad job of explaining that 
S1: so analytic and synthetic this is a distinction about, what makes the sentence true and analytic, is, basically, the relations of the concepts in the sentence, just say the concepts make it true. and synthetic is, something else, makes it true. so like in the case of bachelors are fun, you might say, the world makes it true. right, and Kant's gonna wanna say, something about the structure of our mind makes it true. so those are just examples of things that could make it true besides the concepts. then, the distinction between a priori and a posteriori, is not a distinction that's being drawn about what makes, the sentence true, but, how we came to know its truth... or came to know the sentence. <P :04> um, so, in a posteriori we come to know it through experience, and a priori is we learn it some other way, than experience.
S2: i'm confused then why does he keep making references to a priori and necessary being the same thing?
S1: oh i'm sorry i see what, ah i see what you mean. yes, yes. it turns out tha- <LAUGH> well... that's a really good question it turns out that one of the ways we can know it is through reason, and that's generally thought to be the key way, and things that you know through reason are necessary. because the only way to know something through reason, is to find out that, its opposite was a contradiction... and so... it itself, would have to be necessary if its opposite were a contradiction. cuz contradictions just can't be the case. so like if, let's say not-A is a contradiction, then A has to be necessary. so, if that's how you come to know, the truth of the sentence in hand, then the sentence you've got, is necessary. and that's why you get this kind of relationship between, a priori, and, necessity. <LAUGH> because the main way of doing something other than using experience to come to know something is reason and, that's gonna be, a necessary truth. did [S2: so then i- ] that make sense?
S2: yeah [S1: okay ] s- so so is it is it a distinction between necessary and contingent? is a posteriori a contingent truth? or is that oversimplified?
S1: <P :04> i'm not sure if you could know, a necessary truth from, experience but i guess i wouldn't want to rule it out. in which case, i'm not sure i'm ready just to write contingent down here. 
S2: okay
S1: okay?
S2: so if it's a priori it is, necessary but that_ it doesn't mean that if it's necessary it's, necessarily <S1 LAUGH> a priori <LAUGH>
S1: right, and in fact what's a little confusing about this, is that i don't think, i don't think every single a priori truth is gonna be necessary. because, here's an example. remember, another way that Descartes, but not Locke, um, but Descartes and other people think that you can come to know something, without experience is, innatism. right? so that you could come to know something by, the fact that you were born, with this thought. so, what's been puzzling me is sort of like, okay so that's another way to come to know something without, without using experience. you just look inside of yourself and introspect an innate belief or concept that you had. um, that would be a much easier way, to get to a synthetic, a priori truth than all the stuff that Kant is doing. if it turned out that there was, a synthetic truth that you innately had. but somehow that never came up in lecture so, Mike? 
S5: it seemed like something innate would be something synthetic since it's something else that makes it innate, like, that you were given that knowledge, in the beginning 
S1: try me again. remember this distinction is just based on what makes it true... it could maybe it could turn out, that you had an innate belief, like bachelors are unmarried. in fact, Locke thought, that most people confused, well most people thought that innate beliefs were reason_ they got from reason remember that part? so like when they were reasoning along and they said, <LAUGH> they said see it's innate because, when you use your reason, like you just remembered it, you r- recollected, something. um, and, and, and the idea was supposed to be, Locke was saying, well, i could have just figured it out without having it be innate, just by using my reason, just the fact that i used my reason didn't all of a sudden show that it was innate, these are separate ideas. um, but, okay. okay, so these are the distinctions, and it's a little confusing but i think the easiest way, to think about it is the way i've described where, the a priori category and the synthetic category are garbage categories. okay? so 
S2: seems like it messes a lot of stuff up, or maybe it doesn't, but it just seems like if we've been_ everything, we've done since the beginning has been in reference, to a priori meaning necessary. and if it doesn't have to be then it just seems that things 
S1: well here's, uh,
S2: i mean if it's not 
S1: here's the third thing which is gonna be, <WRITING THROUGHOUT UTTERANCE> i don't know if you guys remember Stanley writing innatism up there. <LAUGH> which is, i mean on the board he said that there was, that innate beliefs were a priori. cuz they didn't come from experience. but, maybe you're right, if you wanna [SU-F: that's i'm (see that's what i) ] think of it in terms of necessity i think it's okay for the peri- purposes of this class i just don't think it's, the way Kant thought about it. because, one of the here's one of the key things is that, Kant thought, he was gonna show us, a third way we could come to knowledge. which was, um, through, analyzing our cognitive faculties. right? [S2: alright. i'm just_ i'm looking ] and that's kinda critical.
S1: and that's kind of critical.
S2: okay but i'm looking through my notes, and he did write, he wrote, a priori is not dependent on experience, could be reason alone or innate knowledge, and then he put distinctly Kantian, is that a priori requires necessity and is strictly universal as well. so, unless i wrote the wrong thing down Gold actually said that Kant, had this dist- that a priori didn't usually include innateness, but i- for Kantian's view, [S1: ah, i see ] it was_ it required necessity and that it was universal. 
S4: well doesn't he say in uh, or in the beginning that, a priori knowledge, both kind, like, um, analytic comes from the principle of contradiction, but synthetic i- it isn't derived from it but it must not, violate the principle of contradiction?
S1: yeah so synthetic, these ones are definitely, the case. all analytic truths are gonna be necessary. and synthetic truths aren't gonna be necessary.
S4: well i- so you can't violate, 
S1: generally. although wait wait wait that's not [S4: you can't ] quite right about synthetic but 
S4: you can't violate the principle of contradiction so wouldn't it be necessary then? cuz if it c- if it's not allowed to violate it... 
S1: oh wait a minute but nothing can really violate the principle of contradiction. 
S4: alright uh i i'm probably just like, you know (xx) 
S1: what it means to violate the principle of contradiction is to have um, something be, both itself and not itself at the same time. and, and nothing in reality at least according to an analytic philosopher, does that, okay. <LAUGH> but, here's the important thing about analytic truths is that, their opposite, would, violate, that principle. and that's not the case with a synthetic truth, generally. okay. um, the reason i'm hedging on that is because, some synthetic truths are gonna be necessary, and so some of them look like their opposites would violate that. but this is getting really technical and we don't really have to know all of this stuff, in detail. and i think Jen, maybe you're right, we should just take, a priori truths to be necessary, and just kind of forget about innatism for now, and just, <LAUGH> just say necessary and just think of two ways then, for a truth to be a priori one of them, is that it's coming from reason, and the other one, is that it's coming from Kant's way which is gonna be an analysis, of the cognitive faculties okay? but recognize there's, a lot of different usages of this term, um, okay. set? 
S2: yeah, no i'm sorry (but) i just (made a) (xx) 
S1: no no i mean i think it's good, cuz it's too confusing you're right, let's just drop the innatism thing. Ben? 
S9: could i uh ask a really general (question?) 
S1: definitely. 
S9: okay uh, do you think you could, discuss the difference between a human sensibility and a human understanding cuz it seems to me that, they're kind of similar or actually, that human understanding, kind of encompasses_ one of the things that it would encompass, is human sensibility. 
S1: okay good.
S9: so do you think you can just, discuss the difference?
S1: yeah yeah yeah. um, you're right to think there's a similarity here because both of these things are imposing, frameworks on, the numina. so there's something, something really similar going on. but, the important difference is twofold. one of them is, this one, if you think about it sort of, in a very naive but, sorta accurate, Kantian way, this one processes first, and then this one processes what that one processed, so in a sense what happens is you've got your numina, and it comes down and processed first by your sensibilities. you get output number one. which is, a sense datum that's organized in terms of space and time. then, it's processed next by your human understanding, and you get output number two, okay? which is gonna be, not only processed by space and time, but also processed by the categories of the understanding.
S9: alright so, if we could just go back to the Play-Doh for a second. [S1: yeah ] so, is Kant saying that, when i sense or, so by using my uh, when a- my eyes when i see, the Play-Doh, is he saying that at that point i don't understand, it? and then, then it has to go to my human un- then it has to go to my, understanding?
S1: yeah so that's a nice way to think of it. i mean so basically what happens is you have
S9: i don't understand what i just said. <SS LAUGH> no seriously i 
S3: wou- would this work better?
S1: no no 
S9: wait how do you_ how can you possibly,
S1: think of it sort of like this 
S9: so, so let's say i'm touching a fire for example [S1: okay ] and i burn myself. [S1: yeah yeah ] at that point that i burn myself, [S1: yes ] i don't understand that it hurts? <SU-M LAUGH> is that_ i mean
S1: you wouldn't_ yeah maybe that's a good way to_ but that's like such a
S4: is that (ignorance?) you might know that 
S2: i thought it happened more instantly than that, 
S4: you might know that you're like hurting yourself but
S2: it's not like i'm seeing something let my mind tell me what it means now.
S4: you know that you're hurting yourself but you wouldn't know the fire's hurting you, you know unless you had understanding right? 
S1: let's take the less spicy example first. 
S4: (what if you) 
S9: okay, what if we go back to the Play-Doh (xx) 
S4: what's going on with the Play-Doh? what if you 
S1: okay, hold on a second 
S9: if we go back to the (it's all) i'm looking at the Play-Doh, and i see its color, or i feel its texture. [S1: okay ] so at that point when i'm using my sense perceptions, do i not understand
S1: you wouldn't know that it's a_ here's here's like a really obvious thing you wouldn't know like that it's, a building, right? until, you start organizing, like right now let's just say i'm, i've, processed this numina outside me, um, right out there, and, i've used my human sensibility and what i know is that it's like, at a certain distance from me, and it's right now, at that distance from me. okay? then, i'm gonna use my understanding to start, putting on some more layers of concepts onto it. building is not one of the twelve categories, <LAUGH> cuz it's it's, a concept that'll become_ that's less, um, universal, but, just think of it as an example of something that the human understanding does at some, later stage in the process of being at work on your sense data. and then i'll say hey, this sort of reddish brownish object twentyish feetish from me, is a building, right? and i can't do that until i start thinking about my sense datum. and in this sense i guess i've always liked Kant cuz i feel like, he's the only one who's sort of distinguishing, sort of pure sense datum inputs that you might get at an earlier stage from more organized ones, which are really interpreted, right? and, <POINTS TO BOARD> so in a sense these guys are a little bit more, fine, or something and these guys are, really prior and really elemental in basic ways of processing. does that kind of_ okay Mark and Elton
S8: okay i've got an example maybe, [S1: yeah ] like if you're playing basketball, and, you have like, people that are on your team and people that are on the other team, like initially, you process it as, okay there's like shapes and basketball player, somebody with socks on, but when, but y- when you start distinguishing it between, opponent and teammate, that's something that, it's not there but y- that would be your understanding, when you make that distinction, but the the, when you view it as just like, people and colors and shapes and, [S1: mm ] that would be your sensibility.
S1: no even people colors and shapes are gonna be the understanding cuz all your sensibility does is space and time. okay? 
S8: okay.
S1: um, but, you might, right now be sort of showing that there's tons of different levels of interpretation which are gonna happen, and think of the twelve categories, as the most basic of those additional, levels of interpretation beyond space and time. 
S8: mkay.
S1: but that's good, um
S3: in my example, you're like, next to the biggest mountain of Play-Doh, you have a knife with a clock on it, and you cut off a chunk of the of the Play-Doh so that's like your sensibilities, and that gives you a shape and a time when you did it, and you stick it in the fun factory and get the shape out which would be your understanding, and then that's what you perceive, what comes out the spaghetti-like Play-Doh. would that work?
S1: uh so wait, you're doing the, fun factory twice then?
S3: yeah, in a sense would that 
S1: yeah, that's that's good, yeah. but the second time it's a little different, [S3: right ] it's got a different sort of shape (um) okay, just to, really quickly finish up this thing cuz i know, um, we've gotta have E-L-I come back up here for just a minute, um, okay so this was all an attempt to explain synthetic a priori distinctions so that we could understand, why premise one of this argument was supposed to be really obvious, just take a quick look at this argument. think of a straight line, is, the shortest distance between two points. a straight line is your, subject, shortest distance between two points is your predicate. is the predicate already in the subject?
S2: no.
S1: <LAUGH> oh no the answer's supposed to be no. Mike thinks it's yes but 
S5: well i had a problem with that in general, i mean even does the seven plus five [S1: yeah ] isn't really twelve, he says that's synthetic that, i mean even in more basic examples i have a, lot, of difficulty with that (but i won't, start) 
S2: (well) we don't have time 
S1: okay. okay. yeah, so that's_ let's just assume the answer's obviously, that it's not contained, okay? that it's supposed to be obvious that it's not analytic, okay? and then the other idea is so how do you come_ so it's_ whoops, sorry, so it's synthetic. and then how do you come to know it? well you don't come to know it by just comparing bunches of little lines everywhere, right? you can figure it out by using your mind and the facts of mathematic.(sic) so you don't come to know it by experience you come to know it in some other way namely by reason, okay? so then, he's trying to say look, these truths of geometry are synthetic a priori, [S2: okay. ] so that's supposed to be obvious and that's the beginning point, up here, see that? and then you're supposed to be able to find out that the human sensibilities are the best way to explain this obvious fact 
S2: but that was, that was the part i didn't, understand.
S1: right right i know, we only have two minutes but ask me at the review or else, read through this cuz it should be relatively clear, okay
S2: i read through it that's why i asked the question <LAUGH>
<STUDENTS GET UP TO LEAVE> 
S1: okay 
S1: um, we just need one more second from you guys, hold on a minute
<MICASE RELATED SPEECH NEXT 2:16> 
S1: so i'll see you next Wednesday at eleven if you wanna come but it's not required, i really enjoyed you.
SU-F: i have a question
S1: yes 
SU-F: about (xx) tomorrow 
S1: yeah 
SU-F: i just wondered if there's any way that i can (xx) 
S1: um, (well...) no one's asked yet but um...
SU-F: like it's on, Tuesday, [S1: yeah ] at_ from four to six, i was wondering if i could take it maybe on Monday or maybe the Friday (xx) 
S1: (hang) on a minute i'll try to talk to (xx) (um, and let me know) what times on Monday, Monday would be better if that's okay with you 
SU-F: oh that's fine with me 
S1: okay. um what times on Monday would work for you, [SU-F: okay ] and then... 
SU-F: that's great. 
S1: okay 
SU-F: and also, do you have my paper?
S1: no you know what? (xx) she gave it to me? 
SU-F: um no actually i didn't_ when i emailed you i didn't realize that, (xx) on Friday morning, so i had my roommate, bring it to class. and she said_ she di- i_ no, she didn't_ she didn't stay for the class she gave it to someone in class... and, i, assumed that you had (gotten it)
S1: i looked through my stack and i was like, (i don't remember Cheryl) giving it to me and i don't remember getting it. so... [SU-F: okay ] um, cuz i don't have i don't have it in my stack of papers. and i've graded almost everything. [SU-F: okay ] um but i've also looked at everything, (xx) [SU-F: okay ] (xx) [SU-F: okay ] so can you just print it out again? 
SU-F: yeah. (xx) i'm sorry
S1: no i feel really bad that that, [SU-F: okay ] somehow it hasn't (xx)
SU-F: tomorrow in class then.
S1: yeah 
SU-F: okay. 
S1: bring it to (me.) 
SU-F: yes
S1: in person. 
SU-F: definitely.
S1: alright 
SU-F: thank you 
S1: okay. who's next? 
SU-M: i didn't go to class yesterday
S1: you didn't? 
SU-M: no 
S1: that's too bad.
SU-M: um i was asking for (xx) [S1: okay ] was it a good class? 
S1: um, it was alright.
<P 0:06> 
S8: i just wanna talk about my paper.
S1: right okay
SU-F: and i have, this recommendation sheet [S1: oh right ] although, it says typed does it really matter? can i just print it really (narrowly cuz i didn't know) (xx)
S1: (um, forget it, no) it doesn't matter 
SU-F: it doesn't? 
S1: i don't think so (xx) 
SU-F: okay, so i'm gonna go type it. i mean i'm gonna go write it right now.
S1: oh okay.
SU-F: but as far as it being this i'm gonna, call just the Law School and (xx) place here and just see what their policy on it if they care if it's general, at the Law School and [S1: okay ] i'll email you, [S1: okay ] and tell you cuz there's really no ti- i mean i'm not gonna (xx) (for a year) so, [S1: okay ] you have time to write this. <LAUGH> [S1: okay ] so i'll just email it to you.
S1: okay great.
S4: i have a quick question (on like the putting) time thing and causation together
S1: yeah
S4: like if if all times are just at once how can one thing cause another? wouldn't there have to be like a, procession, it's, things have to come_ (if) the thing that causes the other thing has to come before the other...? wouldn't there have to be a procession? if i- we might experience like, the present, [S1: mhm ] but how could um, like isn't he trying to say that there's causation outside of our mind like these objects are causally connected?
S1: well... that's debatable actually. especially given that, causation is one of the categories of understanding, it looks like we contribute causation to the world not, (causation) 
S4: so if it's irre- if it's irreversible, how can like the objects outside our mind it_ i think like Gold said, objects that are outside our mind can't be reversible?
S1: yeah, (numina)
S4: so wouldn't that be that causation's outside our mind? 
S1: well, or at least that irreversibility is. [S4: right ] right? and what happens is causation, has the same relation as irreversibility does which is an a- an asymmetrical sort of relation. [S4: right ] right? and so, it turns out that the, the stuff that we impose has a feature that the numina has but we can't really say that it has the [S4: alright ] particular feature we're imposing. [S4: alright ] see what i mean? 
S4: yeah
S1: okay.
SU-F: thank you v- very much and thanks for the cookies too.
S1: you're welcome.
S8: oh this
S1: have some have some i'm never gonna eat all of this.
S8: are you going to have office hours next week before Wednesday?
S1: um, not before Wednesday.
S8: can i meet you? 
S1: you can meet me.
S8: Monday maybe? (xx) 
S1: um, yeah... um... [S8: whoa ] yeah i'm doing that all day. how is noon?
S8: noon is perfect.
S1: in eleven-fifty-six?
S8: the, G-S-I office?
S1: yeah.
S8: are are these the ones you're supposed to bake?
S1: they do have a little microwave recipe on them. <LAUGH>
{END OF TRANSCRIPT}

