



S1: um, the first question is, you know what is your goal of your project, how did you communicate this towards me as clearly as possible? uh second, how did you make sure that i would go along with this project and especially the class would go along, um you know what, you know what techniques did you use, to make sure that that you know we would comply with your project? and second uh, and of course this goes, goes already into the uh, um what i was gonna say, um you know what was our willingness? what were our incentives to, to comply with you? um so i mean these are some of the techniques we're gonna discuss today, in um, in the context of four concepts, one is communication, again communication of specific goals, and purposes. and, also communication of what would happen if we, did not, comply. you know what capabilities, did you have at your disposal, uh to influence us what was your credibility in making sure that we believe, um, your sincerity, and ultimately you know again, why were we willing to uh comply, in the end i mean that means, class and me. so you know we can actually fit this, i- i- in right neatly, um with the discussion of today. and, in foreign policy at least, um, probably little less interpersonal interactions cuz our class is, in world politics and international relations. usually, sovereign states individual states, you know we noted resort to, to three forms of influence, techniques. and they may do so in sequence, they may use those um individually or in some combination. so one of them of course we reviewed or discussed in greater detail yesterday, is the use of threats of force, or threats of punishment. that is, you communicate quite clearly, hopefully as cl- as clearly as possible, a goal what you want, a target. if you are the actor, what you want the target to achieve, um what you want the target not to do, um what behavior in the target do you actually seek? uh so you need to specify this cl- as clearly as possible. second, um what is gonna happen if the target fails to comply with your wishes? then you know as far as threats go, you need to make sure that it's very clear on what the punishment ultimately is gonna gonna gonna be, um, you know if the target fails to carry out, um, the demand. or comply with the demand. and um, here of course we we noted, that two items are quite critical. first of all, if you are called upon, to carry out your threat, actually to translate that into punishment, into inflicting pain and harm, then what is the size of your capabilities i request the size of, meaning, can you actually, physically, inflict harm? and can you locate the target? can you locate the target can you reach the target and then, ultimately use whatever, um, economic or, or military weapons you have at your disposal to um, to actually punish, the target. then also, you know what is the credibility, your willingness actually to carry out the threat? even if you have large capabilities say military forces at your disposal, uh, that does not guarantee that the, target believes that you're gonna use 'em. and you know how do you convince the target, that punishment ulti- ultimately is gonna come through, and that the threat is actually is carried out. you know how willing are you to use what you have? and f- l- ultimately of course is, you know what, what are the chances given all this, given the threat given the capabilities, that you need to carry out your threat? the credibility the willingness ris- with which with which you're going to do this, and ultimately, you know how does this really affect the probability that a target is gonna do what you expect it to do. and, we discussed most of the um the first three items, um, in quite some detail yesterday communication c- c- capability and credibility. um, always note when it comes to threats, as far y- as far as your goals and your punishment goals. you want make sure that, i mean if you're the actor and if you pose a threat, of doing something if a target does not comply with you, you know make sure that the demands are quite moderate. i mean you don't want to change, you know to really turn the, a target upside-down. i mean you make moderate demands but at the same time if the target fails to comply with those moderate demands, then, the punishment that is likely to follow is gonna be quite severe. so, if you use a threat, to get the target to do what you want it to do, you want to make, to to to, demand the behavior change, to be as moderate or as low as possible, um, so the target, you know does not see too much of an inf- infringement on its freedom of action, and of its own way of life, and ultimately, you know but if the target does not comply then you you say well then you, you have to fear really ultimate destruction. and, the way th- threats are usually used, i mean they're usually used in a conflictual environment when it's very unlikely that more positive inducements incentives for behavior change are likely to to take place or, that they're gonna be successful. so the environment's quite conflictual, and of course we uh, we mentioned that the, um the threats, the benefits from actually posing the threat and having to carry it out, need to exceed the costs for you as the actor to actually carry out the threat. i lo- i like to just, i like to u- for us to focus on the willingness to comply. um, because you know we only touched upon this during the last, two minutes or three minutes in class yesterday. and so today, we're gonna finish the section on threats. um, talk about what effect ultimately, the likelihood that a target is gonna do what an actor wants. so we're gonna finish this up today, and then we're gonna move, into bribes rewards and promises. positive incentives, that you give a target in order to make sure that it responds as you wish it to respond. and then from uh, more material uh tangen- um or um, um you know direct, um bribes, um and and and rewards we're gonna move into more like manipulation of the mind. of thinking. uh, persuasion. and persuasion usually takes pl- takes two forms. propaganda, is usually directed at masses, at publics, and uh, theory social some broad social economic political theory that's usually up at the leadership or the elites of states, okay? so this is where we gonna, where we, um where we hope to end up, by the end of this class today. willingness to comply. um, here, th- the likelihood that a target is willing to to comply with an actor's demands, very often also hinges upon, how much damage, the target is willing to suffer. so, the willingness to suffer, when we talk about, the willingness to comply... how much harm is a target willing to suffer, if, it does not comply, and hence if it, ult- if it ultimately invokes, or um encourages or leads the targ- the actor to carry out a threat. so if a threat has to be carried out and translated into punishment, how much punishment is, the target willing to accept? and, if, the willingness to suffer, is greater... than, what is actually demanded... so, if the target's willingness to suffer, is greater than the actor's demand, for behavior change in the target, the target is unlikely to comply and is likely to resist. okay? so, which is often the case of course if you place demands, if you place excessive demands on a target, the more the target has to change, the more likely, of course the target is to resist, and as soon as that resistance, as the the costs, from that resistance, the cost ultimately from punishment, for resistance, exceed, the costs, associated with compliance, the target's gonna resist. you know a good example you of course the war in Vietnam. um, the the uh the the North Vietnamese and then by extension the the the uh South Vietnamese but their counterparts of the Viet Cong, um, you know found it, found it quite beneficial actually to maintain their way of life to resist, U-S pressure, um ultimately military pressure in Vietnam. as it as it as it was what became clear, the the North Vietnamese, uh, ultimately were willing over what, a ten year period to absorb a tremendous amount of punishment and and and and and pain and harm and destruction. and we already mentioned the destructive potential that was unleashed during the Viet- Vietnam War. over Vietnam, um, you know, far exceeded some of the the major, the the the destructive potential that was released during some of the major battle in, battles in World War Two. so, you know why did the Vietnamese ultimately fight on? and why did the U-S ultimately withdraw? well part of this had to do because, the U-S, although in its capabilities, clearly superior. i mean, the i mean the capabilities were so far out- out- outweighed that of of of North Vietnam and and the allied Viet Cong. the credibility of the U-S to use those forces, of course from, previous behavior, uh was high. i mean the U-S of course was committed during the the Korean War during World War Two, and of course, you know it was the U-S ultimately putting, five hundred thousand troops, into Vietnam, i mean it was clearly quite a strong credi- credibility of the commitment um behind the behind the U-S. still i- still into into the long run in nineteen seventy-three the last um U-S per- personnel was flew from uh flew from uh Vietnam um flew out of Saigon, and in nineteen seventy-five of course um, you know Viet- Vietnam was unified, was united under, under communist um under communist rule. so on the U-S side the U-S willingness to suffer, damage, was far lower, that is the willingness for the U-S to accept harm, was, their tolerance was far lower than that of the Vietnam side. mkay? and, secondly we already mentioned this in the context of of communication, well it was not given quite clear specifically, what the U-S ultimately hoped to achieve, um in Vietnam. i mean it was a broad idea of, well you know preventing the spread of communism, invoking the Domino Theory, if Vietnam falls, uh ultimately Cambodia falls, if Cambodia falls, um Thailand goes, Malaysia Indonesia Australia just name it. but there was no, specific, you know more moderate narrow demand as to what, the Viet- uh the Vietnamese government the the North Vietnamese government at least was supposed to do. and of course you know we we know that you know the U-S certainly did not have full popular backing, by the Vietnamese and ultimately not by the American people, uh towards, the latter part of the war either. so, clearly the willingness on, on on the uh, on on the Vietnamese side, at least on the North Vietnamese side to suffer pain in order to maintain, its its way of life its sovereignty, um, was far greater and so the costs associated with accepting that pain, as less important that giving and and losing its sovereignty in in battle against against the U-S and its allies. so willingness to stop, to suffer plays an important role, okay. second what plays into, the willingness, to comply, <WRITING ON BOARD THROUGHOUT UTTERANCE> you know, not surprisingly, is the extent of resistance. and this resistance, is usually a function, of fear, and anx- and anxiety. so fear, the more, fearful you make the target of yourself, the more resistance you're likely to encounter. mkay? so, if you present yourself as as a tyrant as uh, as some kind of monster, as uh as somebody who really you know wants to destroy, um you know, a- another people or somebody else just for, for the pl- for the pleasure, um or out of some sadistic emotional, um, for on some it- s- sadistic emotional basis, i mean that is very likely to cr- to to create a tremendous anxiety and fear, on the side, of the target. so the target then fears ultimately if it caves in, then it submits to the actor's demands where is the actor gonna stop? how far is the actor gonna go in placing, demands over and over again, until you know the target is completely, um you know destroyed. so, the problem with threats is usually, that, threats have a tendency because they are negative, incentives or disincentives, um, threats usually have have the have the have the tendency of creating fear and anxiety, and actually that's what they rest on. i mean it's a fear of punishment the fear of harm, rather than the expectation, of positive gains. okay, so, the greater the fear induced, the more likely the target is to resist. and the more likely it is also ultimately to absorb, to absorb damage. um, also, the way how does the_ if the target complies, how does it comply? other threats. well what usually happens is, to the extent that behavior change occurs, it is only changed, from, one undesirable... behavior to another. so behavior change, is mostly, in the form, of type of people. type of undesirable or unacceptable behavior. so what happens? an actor places a demand on the target, and says the way you behave, your activities are not acceptable to us. well, under a threat. well the target, is gonna fear punishment and what it's gonna do, it's gonna, give in as far as a particular undesirable behavior goes but it's very likely in its resistance to substitute it, with a type of behavior, creating a new, unacceptable behavior. concretely. um, prior to World War One, towards the end of the nineteenth century and particularly during the beginning of the twentieth century, um we already mentioned that in in our historical part of of this class, we noticed that, by the end of the nineteenth century, and then, you know the beginning of the twentieth century also, you know by that time Germany had tremendously increased, its military industrial capabilities. so Germany's capabilities were rising, but Germany still sought, um sought prestige especially in Europe and also in the world. its uh colonies ultimately, and it sought to be recognized diplomatically, uh as an equal to, especially the dominate power of that at that time, Great Britain. so, Germany demanded ultimately from Britain, that it recognized Germany's prestige, equivalent with its military industrial capabilities. well, the British largely ignored that demand and they didn't really pay full attention to that prestige because, i mean Britain was still, the key dominant power in the international system. so it didn't accept Germany as, as as as m- as an equal partner with equal prestige. so instead of the Germans of course, negotiating and you know trying more subtle techniques, to win this diplomatic prestige and recognition, um, so it's not ho- i mean it's a recognition of that prestige, rather than diplomatic status of course, but in order to get Britain to recognize, Germany more or less as an equal, Germany did not resort to more subtle techniques but you know o- you know kind of, resorted more to the sledgehammer, used threats. what, how did it use its threats? it built up, it increased the buildup of its navy. of course Britain being an island island nation and um, an island state, and of course having an empire all over the world, you know it it really relied heavily on its navy. so British security depended mostly, on its navy. so Germany, you know at least set up, an implicit threat, to Britain by building up massive i- i- um, creating a massive buildup, in naval capabilities. of course that was considered, um as a threat by Britain. well, you know Britain what did it do? i mean it shifted now, um to some extent, you know it recognized, of course it feared now, German naval capabilities, and the use of those capabilities. and what did Britain do? it reacted, by building, up its own. you know further, uh modernizing and increasing its own naval forces. course what what we got into then, arms race. so, here you see that one, behavior on the side of Britain, which Germany sought to change and found unacceptable, the lack of the of of acceptance, um, of prestige, was translated into a behavior that was equally or even more unacceptable, meaning that now Germany naval forces were countered even by further military forces. okay? but here you know, why? because Germany did not, use, positive incentives you know uh try to work with Britain constructively but rather, induced fear. so they induced, Britain ultimately to resist, and to engage in behavior, that ultimately you know from from the German standpoint of course you know, it's definitely not gonna be acceptable. so, there's a tendency to switch from one undesirable behavior towards another. in the economic realm and probably more recently, we see this a lot in um, in negotiations, o- o- in trade negotiations. especially where this usually takes place now, um, is, in where where we where we see this a lot is in negotiations for the trade imports, um, automobile imports, negotiations between Japan and the United States. um, in the nineteen eighties, qui- qui- clearly um um during the Carter administration Regan administration, um the Japanese um, exported, small fuel efficient cars to the United States. and those small f- fuel efficient cars competed, with you know fuel guzzling large cars, inside the United States. so, American automobile makers were quite upset at this cuz they thought the were gonna lose market shares, so they, lobbied Congress and Congress had ultimately tried to to to get um, Presidents Carter and then Regan, uh to impose sanctions, um meaning to into to t- impose trade sanctions on Japan meaning to get Ja- to get Japan um, to lower its, exports of fuel efficient cars into the United States. so, you know uh the way Congress went about this, i mean it didn't expose direct sanctions, but instead, it used the threat of sanctions on, Japanese, exporters, if the Japanese did not voluntarily comply, and reduce the number of their fuel efficient cars, exported you know to the United States. so if the Japanese, did not use voluntary, export, constraint, then, the threat was then the the Congress ultimately would take action and legislate, um, legislate a- legislate, actually, sanctions imposed, on on what got imposed on J- Japanese fuel efficient cars. so actually the Japanese complied, and to the extent, that they reduced the number, of the fuel efficient cars, exported to the United States, they did that. so you know, everybody was happy, every- everything was nice. well the Japanese complied great. no more fuel efficient cars, oh, you know G-M Chrysler Ford you know all happy again market shares gained. no, that's not the case. what did the Japanese do? they resorted to two, alternative steps which, from the standpoint o- of U-S automobile m- makers was equally if not more damaging. what did the Japanese do? well, for one thing instead of exporting, um small fuel efficient cars, they switched to large, um, you know, luxury cars. so, you know they they they they cre- created large luxury cars which you know at least sold among people um of of of higher incomes. of course you know in other words you sell, y- you may sell fewer cars, but of higher value, which ultimately lend, you know, i- in in the end you know generate profits which may be even higher, than selling a larger number of smaller cars. at the sa- at the same time what the Japanese you know qu- quite intelligently did also, they started actually to, locate their production, of automobiles, in the United States. so Japanese companies set up subsidiaries, in the United States. of course you know hence, not, hence were reducing or eliminating their necessity to export cars from Japan to United States. so whatever sanctions would be imposed as far as trade goes, would not affect of course, production in United States. so the Japanese actually relocated, their production from Japan into the United States. still were able to produce those cars. so here you clearly see that the threat, the threat of sanction... ultimately, got the Japanese to stop or to to um, to to refrain from behavior that was undesirable before but they they they they they they look for, you know other kinds of way to still maintain their profits in the U-S, from automobile sales and created another behavior, um that was o- of course not to the pleasure, um of the uh of U-S automobile makers. um a similar, in in the in security terms again we se- also see this to some extent also in some of the negotiations over the elimination of nuclear weapons, um, you know initially, the elimination of nuclear weapons. um, or at least the the ceiling on the production of nuclear weapons, was mostly on, the number of missiles. okay? so ultimately what the superpowers did, well they placed ceilings on the number of missiles, but ins- instead of just producing missiles and single warhead missiles, you know they just put more warheads on one single missile. so you have a ceiling based, you may have one thousand missiles instead of two- two thousand missiles, but then if you if you place you know twelve warheads or ten warheads on on one missile instead of one warhead, i mean, in in in the end, i mean you have more warheads or more firepower available than you had before. so, the point here is is, under conditions of threat, there's likelihood to increase fear increase resistance, and to get the target, to just maneuver, from one form of undesirable behavior to another form of unacceptable, behavior. finally, what threats also do, they create long term animosity.... okay? bless you... okay? long-term animosity. and, because if, your demands are just based on the threat of punishment and the threat of fear, this actually you know requires for you to maintain, to watch out constantly and be constantly alert, and make sure that you are able to carry out those threats. at the same time, you, create not only short term resistance, but you know a quite you know, some animosity or hostility in the future. which may be latent which may blow up at some other point. um, but there's a lot of suspicion that grows there, and the target with a subject to a given threat or is su- subject to to suppression, and domination is just biding its time, until, the actor gets weak enough so it cannot carry out its threat efficiently anymore, and then ultimately to rebel and try to to uh to get free from underneath the sum of um, of of the actor. the classical example here of course Eastern Europe. you know, you get, Soviet dominance, over Eastern Europe, um, you know initially you know out of for for you know out of Soviet's concerns for for security against aggression from the West which was of course, you know certainly justified by its experience with invasions from uh, uh France in the early nineteenth century and particularly twice from Germany in the twentieth century. so i mean th- certainly the Soviets had their their concerns over the security. but the way they maintained it, rather than emphasizing the commonality, that they had against German aggression, i mean cuz i mean not only the S- were the Soviets subject to German aggression during World War Two but so were the Poles, um the Czechs, um, you know and of course the Hungarians and Bulgarians, i mean they were coerced into into, some form of alignment with Germany, but you know this, there were countries Eastern Europe that shared that concern. but instead of emphasizing that commonality, what did the Soviets do? they placed, coercion and they put their own troops, established their own puppet regimes, supported um by by secret police and by Soviet military forces. so they maintained their control over Eastern Europe primarily, through the threat of force. you know which clearly played out whenever, the East Europeans, uh tried to gain some form of independence, uh even still within, communist within some form of of of communist rule. um, or tried to change that communism, they tried to give it a more, uh humane face, um as the uh, as the Hungarians tried in nineteen fifty-six, the Czechs uh the Czechoslovaks in uh nineteen sixty-eight, and the Poles in nine- in uh nineteen eighty nineteen eighty-one. mkay? at each point in time whenever this happened, you know in nineteen fifty-six Soviet tanks rolled in nineteen sixty-eight Soviet and other Warsaw Pact member, troops moved in, and in nineteen eighty, um the Soviets demanded, from from the Polish, um police and and and and and P- P- Polish military, to ban and uh, subdue um, the Solidarity movement, calling for reforms in Poland. but see what we ha- what we have here, is you know ultimately you know long term animosity, and, you know a lot of people you know if you if you ask them in Eastern Europe they'll, these days i mean they're not very keen, on remembering either of course, i mean those who were older of course they're not very keen on on remembering German domination, but they're ultimately the also not very keen on when it comes well, you know um did you like the Soviet troops there? mkay. so, even these days, and of course you know, if you think about it this long term in- animosity, and anxiety and fear installed, i mean, if that wasn't there, if if the Soviets had established some you know common interest, more on legitimacy rather than based on force, f- you know, the the the the Poles, the Hungarians and the Czechs these days, or what is it a year ago or two years ago? it was last year when they were admitted to NATO? i mean that's, why, that's part of the reason why Eastern European countries these days are now very, uh you know, are very vociferous in asking for, membership in NATO and the European Union. because NATO of course is is is is led mostly by the United States, and of course they they they think they're better off, and they fear ultimately, uh um future hostilities with, Russia the core state of the former Soviet Union. so you know again, s- see this is how this long term, you know, you know, to some extent, latent bu- animosity, translates into policy decisions that are relevant today. and they manage to still be very relevant, for um, you know future relations ultimately between United States and and Russia. okay so here we have... four, effects, that can happen, if, the threat of force is used or the threat of punishment is is is invoked. you have four, reactions here, which undermine, the likelihood, the success, that a an attempt at control or infer- in- influence, um, i mean they undermine the probability that influence or control is is gonna succeed. so they undermine, the likelihood, that a target is willing, to do what, an actor demands it to do. and these four are, um, through the fear, that is created, an anxiety that is created by by by by threats of punishment, this is quite likely to to to, to in- to um, provoke resistance, on the side of the target, the target tries to maneuver tries to please, the actor to some extent, but replaces that, with with other, uh undesirable behavior. certainly creates long term animosity, and to the extent also that the, actor places you know excessive demands on the target, the target may realize, that it is less costly, to suffer the, the punishment than to comply, with the demands. especially if those demands are excessive, and really get in the heart um you know where the target fears, elimination uh total destruction, um, not only physical but also, uh in its values and culture, um, and its freedom, destruction of all those by the actor. okay? so how useful are threats? well, when would you use 'em? again they're usually used when animosity or there's conflict already. and co- the conflict level's pretty high. because then whatever animosity you further create or whatever fears you create the the fears are there already. so the marginal increase, in hostility, is not as high, if the if you already start out from a high level, of hostility. second, of course threats are are are used, tend to be used and they may be useful, if the actor, itself, perceives a threat from the target. so if in turn, the the actor, um the actor's security, or way of life is perceived as threatened by a given target, then counter-threats or initial threats um, and preemptive threats are likely, yo- you know, are likely to be used. and of course if there's a if there's a lack of trust and if there's a lack of commonality uh there to begin with, which as we will see, commonality trust and some kind of of uh of um you know denominator is important for more positive, incentives. so, in a in con- very conflictual environment to begin with, where the actor itself, or uh himself feel feel threatened and also when you have uh a tremendous lack of of uh commonality and and suspicion, uh il- and when you have suspicion lack of commonality when you have misunderstandings, um, animosity to begin with, threats are more likely to be used. of course where this played out a lot, certainly is, in the, the Cold War competition between the Soviet Union and the U-S. and that's why we have a lot_ most of the threats that occurred a large fraction of the threats even in the two centuries the nineteenth and twenty centuries, um the Cold War itself, accounts for quite a lot of them, in addition of course to the threats between between Germany and Britain and Germany and France, um Germany and Russia in, in the early part, of the twentieth century and the nineteenth century also. but you know during the Cold War if you think about it, i mean there there was a high, degree of suspicion, um you know distrust, animosity, um you know created between the Soviet Union and the U-S, um there was not much common ground, different ideologies different perceptions of trade of commerce, um you know different ways of domestic political regimes, um liberal democracy versus communist dictatorship. so, you had you know you didn't have much commonality you had a high high degree of um, again y- you know a- at least latent animosity, uh a lot of suspicion going on, um you know i- a breeding ground really for the use of threats and of course ultimately, you know in the spiral both of them were engaged in in in in an arms race nuclear arms race, that for- forced them to, um, and both of them actually, saw the other as a security threat. it was under th- under those conditions, you were more likely, to get threats because, then no matter, you encoun- you expect resistance to begin with, you expect undesirable behavior and you expect long term animosity. so you already prepare for those and discount those as as as limits on on your ca- on your ability to succeed because, they are there already. okay. but, of course in usual inter- in in in regular interactions when there's more trust, when there're more commonalities and values and preferences, um, threats are usually not very useful. because, why? because they exactly produce something which is not, there at least, on the surface. okay? when you have, when you have, um, some some some basis of trust where you have some basis of understanding, then it doesn't really make much sense to produce fear, or to produce animosity. i mean that doesn't make much sense. cuz that's counter productive. so what do you u- choose then? then you choose, um more, noncoercive, um techniques, or positive incentives. any questions still on, the use of threat and uh... okay. let me take thi- does everybody have this on the board here? okay i'll take this off then.<P :20> okay. first of all we're gonna talk about, promises. and rewards... some people call bribes... sometimes also referred to as exchange... but they all fall under the same in the same category. the the key here is, that, again, you issue a demand, ca- can you see okay now? um <READING> promises rewards bribes and and uh, and exchange. </READING> um, the idea here is you again, state a goal or preference, what do you want the target to do? or what you want a target not to do? either to certain, resort to certain behavior again or to discontinue, unacceptable behavior. but what you do here, if the target does not comply, then you say, well we promise you benefits, we promise that you gonna gonna get some gain, if you actually do comply, switch your behavior th- to something that's unacceptable or desist from unacceptable behavior. if you do so we're gonna, we're gonna pay you. we're gonna you know we- we're gonna, um, we're gonna pay you either diplomatically but by um by uh you know establishing embassies, um, tighter diplomatic relationships, promises of foreign aid, um you know lower tariffs, um, foreign investment, um, you know, um, access to the World Trade Organization as the U-S is trying to do with with China, um so you pr- you promise, you promise rewards or you know even you know even further on you promise an alliance you promise military aid you promise protection, um cu- you know are it you know further at at the other end of the, you know, not so dramatic, more everyday, uh end of the spectrum you offer cultural exchange, mutual education training programs, so, you offer rewards. in some form of another, diplomatic economic political social, cultural uh military, military. so you promise rewards, in exchange for a target's compliance with your demands. so it's, it's its it's a quid quid pro quo or a tit for tat. okay? some people actually, and the reason why we have bribes on there and then that's the (Rothscath) labels it bribes, i usually prefer more the, the kinda neutral promises and rewards. the reason why they're often labeled bribes is from the target side. because, what, positive inducements, require, for them to be successful, one thing is, that the target, does not see itself, becoming a junior partner, to the actor. in other words, that the target, especially the target's government being responsible to its own population, does not see itself as a puppet being bought off, by, some e- some some other state. okay? so, what you want to make sure for, for um, promises of rewards to be successful, you need to make sure that you do not, violate too much, the target's pride. in other words, you really don't what you don't want to do, you don't want, don't violate pride, you don't want you know, rewards or your promises for rewards to take on, af- af uh take on, a notion of a bribe. you want to make sure that you communicate to the target, that if it complies, it's it's gonna get something in return. in other words, th- you wanna make sure that the target has something to offer, and in return like like a trade, trade-off, gets gets something, from the actor. rather than the actor just, sp- saying you know okay we'll just bribe you and that's it. so, what this means for communication again, i mean the four criteria we have the communication capabilities, credibility and willingness to comply, again, applying useful criteria to evaluating, the likelihood of success of promises of rewards, let's go through them. communication, again you should specify, your goal, as in as clearly as possible. probably here ow- however, you need, on the one hand you need to specify the clarity of the goal on the other hand of course, you need to leave the foundation for the exchange vague enough that it does not appear that the target, is is just gonna become, again a puppet or or or, or a s- um, some kind of, you know cheap market, for for for the actor, that the target is not gonna be bought off. so, there's a there's there's a tension here, on the one hand yeah you need to communicate your goals specifically, but on the other hand you need to leave it vague enough that you know the target still interprets it as some, as some kind of broad exchange. rather than actually, here's a goal, if you comply it then we're gonna give you something. so you you need to communicate that this is a broad range of of an exchange relationship, rather than a specific bribe. so, there's a conflict here between having to be specific as far as the goal goes, but at the on the other hand to be quite vague and broad uh to make sure that your response, for in a a ter- in in in in the context of the, the target's compliance or noncompliance that that response, does not take the form of actually, you know, feeling that the, br- that the reward is gonna be a bribe. so, that of course leaves a problem with communications, because vague on the one hand specific on the other. also it is important for communications here. and that you know, should be emphasized quite clearly. the communications work best, in in the case of positive incentives and rewards, they work best if there's, some common denominator for exchange. if, the the value systems, uh the cultures of of two societies or of the two states that try to influence one another are, you know are fairly equal are fairly homogeneous, okay? um, that of course is is quite quite important. um, so you need need to have there need to be some commonality or trust that again, that, that a positive inducement does na- not take the form of submission or bribery. so, for communication here, trust, i should put this down here. um, trust... say <WRITING> common values and trust... are critical. </WRITING> mkay...? also, in addition to, you know communication, you know, trustful communication, capabilities matter. well, if you promise foreign aid, and you don't even have the money, to provide that foreign aid, i mean, the the promise of that aid is is null and void. if you're called upon, or you know if you promise, say for example um, membership in in in a trading organization, and your other partners in the trading organization they're not willing to accept that new member, and then you are forced actually to renege on and to to deny ul- ultimate membership, you have to violate your own promise, and that really undermines your capability, to communicate to the target that you will reward the target. so if you make promises, make sure you're capable actually, of translating them into rewards. i mean it's it's similar with threats translated into punishments, you need to have the capabilities to do so, both on the negative and on the positive side. what that means of course, that you know, remember when we talked a little bit about range of resources available? states that have, quite a diversity a variety, of resources, are probably more successful, when it comes to a relationship between capabilities and compliance in conjunction with a reward. those states that have a l- have more resources, a greater variety of resources, are more likely, to be successful when using, promises of rewards. not resource poor. i mean if the, if if the U-S, the U-S tries to get get Russia to do something it's likely to be more successful, than say um, um Kazakhstan or than say, um, the U-S is more likely to be successful with Russia than say Belgium, on its own. course one of the reasons if you think about it, why the Europeans, try to_ you know why they're interested politically in the European Union, is precisely because each individual member, does not carry as much clout, does not have the capabilities as if they were united and could offer, uh both econo- uh both uh, positive and negative inducements. so capabilities matter. what also matters is credibility, of course. if you have indicated, on previous occasions that you actually not only promise rewards but actually carry then out, you're more likely to be credible than, you know if previously oh yeah we'll we'll promise you um you know, three billion in foreign aid and then, when it comes to that, previously you've shown no well we really, you know, we we can't give you that money, U-S Congress doesn't allow it. so um, here again you know, you need to have a past behavior of making good, on what you prom- a- as to what you promise. okay? so you need to have, okay you need to have um, we said um, um, large, diverse pool of resources on the capability side. and you need on the credibility side you need um, um you know, b- um <WRITING> past, record... of, making good... on promises. </WRITING> mkay? so, as we go down, th- this list here of criteria for evaluating, your influence likelihood of success for um, promises, common values trust communication, um large di- diverse pool of resources, for capabilities and a past record, making good, on promises when it comes to (time to.) of course we unearthed you know as we re- reviewed this the communications, when we said, we don't want... again you should remember here, um bribe, reward should not take the form it should not, at least be conveyed as bribes. credibility, something else is important here. it's not only the past record it also, the concurrent, behavior. what that means, if, you make a promise, of a reward, while at the same time, conducting military maneuvers, and preparing for, a punishment, then, this is likely to undermine, the promise of a reward. w- because, the reward is seen, rather, it's seen more as a prelude, to, a punishment. it's more, they the the reward takes more of the form well, you really have no choice but, to accept the reward. i mean if the reward is coupled with a threat the problem is very often, that, the target really does not have much of a choice, in rejecting, the reward. because there's the, at least the implicit threat there, if, you the target do not agree, to accept my reward, i mean it really takes more the form of bribery (if you) think so, then we resort to the alternative, and, punishing. okay? so, point here is your credibility, is greater, when, there is no, concurrent, threat. now if you think about this, that creates a little dile- dilemma because, what this suggests here, this seems to be in contradiction, to another prescription. and the prescription that often run runs counter to to this, is foreign policy, and um, so i'm gonna <WRITING ON BOARD THROUGHOUT UTTERANCE> put this down here, counter, to, i'm gonna put the counter to i- in quotation marks, because it it's matter of degree. counter to, carrots and sticks. carrots and, sticks, approach. okay. now very often you hear it's important, to couple, promises of rewards, with threats of punishment in order to, successfully influence another state. n- n- and you hear this, um the way you know in in an example here the U-S has actually, has been trying to do this is with respect to North Korea. notice the the U-S is very interested in preventing, um North Korea, and it's not only the U-S it's also its allies um, Japan, uh South Korea, um and other states in in the in the Asian Pacific region, um are interested in preventing, North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons. how does the U-S_ and, acquiring nuclear weapons is also preventing deterring a North Korean invasion, into South Korea. so the U-S, goal here is, no North Korean invasion of South Korea, well there are two goals no North Korean invasion of South Korea and second goal uh, no acquisition of nuclear weapons, by North Korea. you have two goals. a traditional way, the way this this has been handled at least for quite a while now, is through a carrots and sticks approach. the carrot here is, U-S promised, to to supply, North Korea with, a light with with uh material to construct light water nuclear reactors, um reactors that are less likely uh more likely to be used for commercial purposes rather than for the production of nuclear weapons. um, because, North Korea, lacking, sufficient resources, um, even for building, for for building commercial reactors so the U-S promises, Japan also, they promise, uh North Korea uh to provide it with the equipment to build, to build power power plants nuclear reactors for peaceful purs- purposes. promises also foreign aid and and um and and other forms of of positive incentives are provided. but at the same time, the U-S increases its commitment to to to its military commitment to South Korea, and maintains a high level of regard of its military forces in the region. so that the carrot and stick here is, o- on the one hand, uh if South Ko- if North Korea complies, and does not proliferate, does not acquire nuclear weapons and does not, invade South Korea, um, as long as that's the case the U-S is not gonna carry out its threat it's not gonna punish North Korea militarily, and also it's gonna it says it's gonna ma- maintain its its rewards as far as financial aid, financial and economic aid. well the North Koreans these days they charge two things. um of course they're not very happy with U-S military presence, and of course they also charge that U-S has not sufficiently made good, on its promises, of especially the um, r- light water reactors um to to uh North Korea. so the North the South Koreans uh uh i'm sorry the North Koreans are suspicious of of U-S motives, and what the North Koreans see, they don't really see it so much as the carrot and stick, policy, they see precisely here that the positives inducements, that U-S provides, are more a first you know a stick in between. it's more seen, if we don't comply, the North_ from the perspective of the North Korean leadership, if we don't comply, then ultimately we have to face, military forces. so, from the U-S point of view it's a c- it's it's more of a carrot and stick, um uh combination of approaches for the North Koreans, the positive, rewards are just seen me- merely as as a prelude to um to the alternative, to the possible alternative of of punishment. okay? um, finally we're going to the willingness to comply and, before we get to this i'd like to say couple more things, more of a political nature, about um capabilities and credibility. especially when it comes to negotiations, m- mostly, now talking about trade negotiations. how many of you you have heard about, two level games of two level diplo- two level diplomacy? is that new to everybody? Rochelle? 
S2: did you say two level games?
S1: two level games two level diplomacy.
S2: oh when, when they um, people who are organizing foreign policy they have to, kinda work on two levels, one with the the other country and one like within, with the force within their, their own country.
S1: absolutely. that's exactly the point, so, negotiators and it mostly relates to diplomatic and trade relations but may be also true for um, security issues. two level games uh two level games i mean, the author, who refers to those, as two level games, is a person by the name of Robert, Robert Putnam. okay? so he w- first wrote about, so if you want to look this up, um you know feel free to do so, um, he talked about two level games. and as Rochelle said, uh very, concisely, and correctly, it means that negotiations, trade negotiations diplomatic negotiations security, n- negotiations, really take place on two levels where, <WRITING ON BOARD THROUGHOUT UTTERANCE> the negotiator is right in between. so there's where you go, i'm gonna, get out of your book then you so you, so you get the negotiator, and then of course there are negotiators from, other states... and there of course is the negotiator's domestic, constituency. i'm gonna talk about this when i'm done here. then the domestic constituency, helps the negotiator, to set, preferences to set goals. and these goals then get, negotiated, and a- and agreement, is thought is uh sought, with other states. and that agreement in turn... supposed to be ratified with domestic constituencies let me repeat this here. two level here so there're only two levels. on the one level there are, are other states. i mean there are conferences um, bilateral um, um um meetings, multilateral conventions, um conferences and then maybe you know economic security related trade environmental you just mention it. so you have, you know, negotiations going on, between states. at one level. but on the other level, there is uh one part- any particular state's domestic groups domestic constituencies. um, economic interest human rights interest environmental interests military, um i mean you just, automobile makers you just name them. so they're domestic constitu- constituencies. so the negotiator, from any one state operates, really on two levels. there's you know with respect to domestic constituency and with respect to other states. the way this this works here is, that the domestic constituencies, okay? all those, those groups within a country, help to set or define, the goals or preferences or interests, set goals, that the negotiator is supposed to communicate, to other states. and they also set not only the goals but also the, the the influence techniques that a negotiator's supposed to use, in negotiations with other states. but of course the sum, is an agreement between any one state and the other states. the agreement is sought, speaking of exchanges here, where other states get something in return for their compliance with the demands which were originally formulated, by the com- domestic constituency, within a particular state. so an agreement is sought. now what's an agreement, Mike is it? 
S3: does the other negotiator have the same thing they have?
S1: uh oh absolutely i mean they they they're all, it's it's, any negotiator all negotiators from all countries bring in
S4: it's like a mirror
S1: yeah it's i mean what, i mean this is only this is only one negotiator from one state but you're absolutely right. from all other states, you can imagine, um, maybe you could uh, mm, envision it i'm trying to, get this, i mean clear as graphic, graphically clear as possible. um, you okay this is your table here. can everybody see this here or... okay, here's your your table, let- oh let's take for example the um, what is it now, the Group of Eight. Group of Eight is meeting, um they're usually it's it's it's an annual meeting by the leader, by the leaders of um the eight most industrialized and powerful countries. these days United States, um, United Kingdom France Italy, four, Canada Japan is six France seven and Russia nowadays too, is eight. so, we can imagine they're all sitting around the table <WRITING ON BOARD THROUGHOUT UTTERANCE> here, internationally one two three, four five six, seven eight. okay? so we have eight negotiators i think most recently the, G-eight, the meeting of those to eight countries' regular annual meeting, they talk about everything really from security to economics it's it's a coordinating meeting. uh among the, to coordinate those policies among those eight, powerful actors. and, so you have those eight now at a round table i think the last meeting was in Cologne, any questions? okay. um, so they all sit around the table and then of course each of them, has to look over their own shoulders, mkay? get the point here? um, these are, they have to look over their own shoulder back to their own countries' constituencies. you see see this? so they all interact at that round table, they talk to one another and try to come up with an agreement at that round table, and they communicate to one another, the goals, and interest that were originally formulated, and are supposed to represent as many constituencies in the host con- in the in the in any one negotiator's country as possible. okay? so, as Mike said said very appropriately, um this, two level thing here, you have to imagine, you'd have to project, this two level game, you know for each of these, in a kind of, in a in a in a in a clockwise way here. we have to see this here for each particular, negotiator, or representative of a particular country. mkay so, it's true i mean it's i mean all of them you know all these eight would be involved and face the same, situation, and that of course makes it quite complicated. and, so, the, the domestic constituencies formulate, of each particular state formulate, a particular, set of preferences or interests. (MESCAT) negotiated, against the interests from, the other states. once in agreement, and usually the agreements are pretty broad because, you know the more specific the item the harder it i- it is to agree on something specific than it was to agree on some broad, um, communique. so, an agreement is, you know they hope to achieve an agreement, once the agreement is reached, each of those negotiators has to go back, to their own, countries and has to get that ratified in some form or or another, be it by (polypule) well i mean (polypule) would be used if the Soviet Union was still intact, um but usually by parliaments of those countries. parliament of course are supposed to represent the pu- public interest, and so they have to go back to parliament and actually get, that ratified. so, the domestic constituency ultimately needs to, support them what is problematic is, if the, domestic constituency is, represented by national parliament of course, reject the agreements, then of course the whole process starts over again. but this is what we mean by two level games, or two level diplomacy. any questions about, where was the point? any questions still about two level diplomacy? the reason why this is critical here for capabilities and credibility... if, any one of those entities here, and let's say, i- let's say for example... the U-S, <WRITING ON BOARD THROUGHOUT UTTERANCE> negotiates with, France, well there's Germany, U-S tries to negotiate with France and Germany over agricultural subsides. now problem here, of course the U-S is when it comes to agriculture wants to you know, reduce, subsides on agricultural products, i mean wants to have a freer trade in agricultural products, the Europeans particularly continental Europeans the Germans and the French um, with strong farming interests um, support their farmers through subsides in t- in order to maintain high prices for agricultural output in order to, in- to subsidize those farmers. so the farmers are now the constituencies, within France and Germany. mkay? and the U-S probably would be consumers because they're interested in low prices and a greater variety of goods on the market. so, France and Germany, you know having those fo- strong farming interests are interested in, high prices and in maintaining subsides. the U-S wants to remove them. well the thing is, how likely is it, suppose France and Germany, at, that round table, promise to the U-S, make a promise, say if the U-S in turn um, let's see, what could the U-S what could the Europeans demand of the U-S? well the U- it's the Europeans demand on the U-S please maintain, your level of troop commitment in Europe, for example. okay, there are some other concessions on on on the currency exchange or something, let let's stick to troops, okay? the U-S has an you know has domestic interest say in bringing the troops back home, in lowering the troop commitment the Europeans want the U-S to stay. to take care of their defence. naturally that's that's that's the way it's, it's been for for most of the uh, post post-World War Two period. so the Europeans say okay, well we promise, you know at that table, they promise to the U-S the French and the Germans promise to the U-S, to, reduce agricultural subsidies in turn for a U-S promise, or for U-S guarantee that the troops, U-S troops are gonna reside, in defence of France France and Germany. well, how c- credibility is, that promise? well if, it is traditionally clear, that at the domestic level there is strong resistance, by French and German farmers, farming lobbies, they're highly influential, with respect to decision making in France and Germany, the French and German promise to reduce significantly agricultural subsidies is not very credible. because the U-S is gonna know, that those negotiators from France and Germany they're gonna go back to um, to what was then Bonn and now it's it's Berlin and Paris, so they're going back now, to their capitals, you know have to pre- present the agreement reached to their parliament, well the farmers are gonna block it it's not gonna be ratified. in other words, the promise by the French and Europeans to use, reduction in agricultural subsidies, to achieve a commitment by the U-S to maintain its troops in Europe, that that that promise, lacks credibility because, of the two level scenario. of course in European case where it makes it even more complicated that even, that even France and Germany may have conflicting interests. i mean they may have common interests in, reducing in in maintaining high subsidies, but ma- you know Germany has a stronger interest in maintaining U-S troops in Europe than France because cuz France, uh France's military forces are more independent and equipped with nuclear weapons. but i mean that's that makes things even more complicated. but the bottom line here is, that the domestic support required for ratification and for support of international agreement, to make promises credible, t- to make pro- promises credible you need solid support from domestic constituencies. if that support is not there or is shaky, your, credibility of making good, of having to make, ultimately to make good on a promise, is likely to fail. okay? so, the two level scenario, domestic constituencies play an important role when it comes to credibility issues, okay? in a way we can also say that about threats and punishment, i mean if you know, if if a given population um is is is unlikely to to lend public support to a certain, um you know threat then you know the threat lake- lacks credibility. but it's certainly true for, um in in more more in the common scenario it's certainly true for, for promises. okay? now, last point here willingness to comply when is, or under what conditions is the target willing to com- willing to comply? well first of all and this really ties in, with with all of the above. first of all the target really knows, what, what is demanded of the target and what the target gets in return. okay? and which i would label here, the target needs, is more likely to comply, if it, perceives i- i- in bargaining language we call this a quid, a quid pro quo, which is Latin and basically means something for something. okay? exchange. so if the target perceives that it benefits, from the compliance if it really gets something on an equal exchange level from the actor in return for compliance. the target is more likely to comply. and of course if there, already, uh if there's credibility involved if there's clear communication involved. um, quite an interesting example in nineteen eighty-seven, speaking of compliance, in uh, in nineteen eighty-seven, um war was still going on between, um Iran and Iraq. and uh, the U-S, uh said it would protect, Kuwaiti oil tankers, would fly them under U-S flag, and protect Kuwaiti oil tankers from, Iranian attacks. basically suggesting, the Iranians attack, U-S flagged tankers, they trigger a military response from the U-S. basically in protecting those Kuwaiti tankers. it was not quite clear what the U-S expected in return. so the U-S, gave something to Kuwait protection of those tankers, um but it was not quite clear what the U-S was gonna ask of Kuwaiti or was asking of Kuwait. well, then of course, i mean they, that guarantee was given earlier but then in nineteen eighty-seven um, a U-S naval vessel U-S-S Stark, uh was attacked, uh by Iraqi airplanes. and, the Kuwaitis and also to to a lesser extent the Saudi Arabians, were asked you know in, you know trying to to to figure out you know who you know who you know what that airplane was who was responsible ultimately, and so they were, the Kuwaitis and the Saudi Arabians and the Kuwaitis who were supposed to go to, support the U-S, in in its in its response. well the Kuwaitis said well, no you know we we don't want to get involved in this we don't want to, be subject to Iraqi aggression, nineteen eighty-seven course they didn't want to be subject to Iraqi aggression three years later and that's what happened, but at that point of course, they tried to stay out of this. the U-S was actually quite bitter and, you know a- and thought well we're protecting those tankers here and we can we could expect something in return. um, well the Kuwaitis then said, well even before you protected the tankers, we already pumped more oil then we we we could have so oil prices were lower so we already did something for for U-S interest. but see what happened here there was a lack, of of communication, what was expected for the reward. okay? um, so you know, the the willingness on the Kuwaiti side to comply, to provide the quid, for the quo, um was not really cle- clear what the quid, the something was gonna be for the, something the protection of the tankers. actually the Kuwaitis it was misunderstanding the Kuwaitis thought, that they already had given the quo for the quid. okay? so clear communication is important and of course you know realize, even as far as the willing- as willingness goes, the target is more more likely and willing to comply, if it sees, its compliance in exchange, for a reward, not as a bribe but as, something equal, as a trade-off. if there is, not much suspicion, if there's not much suspicion to the extent, that the target does not think, that just giving in, to a de- to a a promise based demand is gonna lead more to a threat based demand. so in other words, for for um, promises of rewards to su- su- succeed they're most likely applied, in settings where there's already a good deal of confidence um, trust and some uh common values going on. um, if you think about it, you know going back when we talked about it you know a couple days or so ago about those different, types of world in a Western industrialized versus the non-W- Western, Western world. um, if you think about it, of course, you usually, promises of rewards they're more common, in the Western industrialized world. why? because there's close trading interdependence already we mentioned. um there are, you know fairly common interests and values both, in trade and in politics, um you know promotion of legal democracy again you know of free trading principles. so they're common values already so, the way politics is conducted there is more, in terms of um, the the rewards or the denial of rewards rather than threat of punishment. even the example we mentioned earlier, um, say you know the example here of of, automobile makers, and U-S sanctions against Japan note quite clearly, U-S and Japan are highly trade interdependent i mean they share, um common values when it comes to you know, economic development when it when it comes to security in East Asia, um you know they share, um military cooperation, and you know note quite clearly that when the U-S, did not immediately resort to full scale punishment sanctions. it still left, it up it le- it still left the initial choice, to the Japanese to voluntarily restrict, their, exports to the United States, and secondly also note that the, U-S did not sanction, all automobile, imports from Japan. it only sanctioned the ones, the small fuel efficient cars. so here even you know, there was, there was some s- tendency not to resort really to, you know to the most extreme economic threat possible and you know, U-S even tried to avoid that. but of course when it comes to, um, say when it comes to, when we look at the non-Western world, when it comes to you know Iraqi threat o- of course and then use of force against Kuwait, there's not much trade interdependence going on between Iraq and Kuwait, um you know from the Iraqi standpoint, um you know uh they thought it was better for them simply to use force rather than than to negotiate, and also then, the the relationship between, you know members of the Western world, meaning U-S for example, and Britain and and and Germany and France and Japan um, versus Iraq, i mean they impose sa- i mean a the sta- sanctions are still in place in in in Iraq. um so you know there're different techniques used in different settings under different international circumstances. um again, threats are more likely, in puni- threats of punishment are more likely in an already conflictual setting. um, promises of rewards are more likely when there are a commonalty of interest and trust, and a lower, far far lower level or even absence of of of open hos- of open uh hostilities. any questions still on the promises of rewards? um, why don't we take a five minute break then because i also want you to h- give you another hand out, The Intonation Influence Model, a article written by um David Singer, and who's gonna give the lecture, or at least part of the lecture next Wednesday and actually he's gonna talk about his own article. okay? um, so i'm go- i'd like to hand this out now, because you are s- all still here, then we'll take a five minute break, and i'm gonna prepare a little bit on uh, persuasion propaganda and and socioeconomic theory. okay? alright. 
<BREAK IN RECORDING> 
S1: the dilemma here is however, that, very often, you know certainly not in in in the in in in Germany of the nineteen twenties and nineteen thirties, but very often uh in wha- in in many other situations, think about it. a public is more likely to be politically active and attentive if it is, usually fairly well educated has access to a lot of information diverse information, so in other words, the politically attentive and active public, selects itself mostly out of those people who are are, educated who perceive stakes who are aware of the stakes, and who have access to information. but, if you try to capture that public which you need to capture if propaganda is to succeed to influence leaders through the public, the problem there is then, the more educated the better educated usually people are, and the more, aware they are, of of the variety of information, and especially information that contradicts, kind of the the the snake oil kind of propaganda, um, the more likely they are to realize that that propaganda is is is based, totally on distorted information is wrong. that is, the more educated they become, generally, i mean of course there're exceptions and Germany in the nineteen twenties is an exception, um, usually the more educated people become, the more aware they are, based on their information that that propaganda is wrong, the more of course that propaganda becomes, removed from their sense of reality. so in other words there's a contradiction on the one hand you want to capture those who are educated and who can make a difference but those are exactly the people who are likely to be aware, of of of the of the distortion by the pro- you know of of you know that's involved in propaganda. um, where this, conflict actually mattered um, was you know a good example here, is, in the early nineteen eighties, the... the uh the uh the West Europeans, even even in the late nineteen seventies early nineteen eighties, the West Europeans asked the, requested the United States to deploy, uh Pershing Two, and Cruise Missiles in Europe as a counterweight, to previously deployed Soviet, um S-S twenty missiles and you don't have to remember the name of the missiles here, um point here was, that the Soviet Union had previously installed, missiles that were able to target, cities in West- only cities in Western Europe not in the U-S, had deployed those missiles on the territory of the West Soviet Union and Eastern Europe so the the Soviet Union had deployed, uh nuclear missiles, capable of reaching any target within Western Europe but not of the U-S. the idea was of course to decouple, Western Europe, from the U-S. and, basically where the Soviet Union ultimately could say, well we're only interested in targeting West Europe but not the U-S so, United States stay out. of course the the Western Europeans were not very l- at least the leaderships were not very happy with this. so they then asked for a counterweight, they said well, you know if the Soviet Union hits our cities you know we wanna make sure we you know definitely, s- have a second strike capability, we talked about second strike capability yesterday, meaning you are able to retaliate after an attack, and so they asked for modernization for missiles from the U-S to be uh deployed in Western Europe. well the Soviet Union of course was not very happy with this, so what did the Soviets do? they launched a massive propaganda campaign to influe- in if possible the attentive, educated publics at Universities mostly, in Western Europe um, to get, that, attentive public to reject and put pressure on on Western European leaderships, not actually to decide, in their parliaments, to accept missiles from the U-S, uh accept missiles from the U-S. i mean the countries that were most affected by those missiles that were supposed to be deployed in Western Europe, um, England, there were four countries England Netherlands Germany and Italy. um so those four countries, um you had you found a tremendous campaign, propaganda campaign by the Soviet Union to prevent those publics, and make them make sure that those public influenced their leaders, not to accept, those counter-missiles. well, how- you know, how successful were the Soviets? well in the end the Soviets were not very successful um, of course there were some peace, the the Peace Movement was was quite active, um, the Greens environmentalist were quite active but ultimately they did not succeed. um, all governments in all four countries actually welcomed, those missiles. why? well, the reason why, the So- well the Soviet idea was, well it's only the American missiles to Soviet Union, the Mo- the M- the leaders in Moscow said that uh that are the dan- uh dan- dangerous for the peace. they said the American missiles raised the threat of war in Europe. i mean that's that's what and raised the threat of nuclear Armageddon in Europe. and that was the fear, and you know there was a slogan in in Western Europe kind of you know which said better better Red than dead. you know better live under communism than you know being evaporated. um that was kind of the propaganda but it was not, it was not believed why? because the reality was as follows, it was the Soviets who had taken the first step and actually deployed missiles, being able to target, cities in Western Europe. but the American or the West European combined with with American counter that was a counter move. the decision to in- install, American missiles was a counter-move. so it was the Soviets actually who had, taken the first step and and deployed missiles which would, ultimately threaten the peace. second, the American deployment of missiles, was put in a context of negotiations, that were supposed to eliminate all, medium and intermediate range meeting missiles see it you know, E- Europe specific missiles, out of Europe entirely. so the the Americans wanted, and also Europ- the West Europeans wanted to get rid of you know all, Soviet and American missiles. well the Soviet Union, didn't agree. so i mean the Soviet Union was, you know the propaganda was pretty hollow, for two reasons. for one thing the Soviet Union, was the one that had, started this whole process by installing its own missiles, and second the Soviet Union was the side that failed to agree or that that that that resisted, taking all intermediate range missiles out of Europe. so, the reality was, ultimately it was the Soviet Union that was perceived as a greater threat and hence the propaganda by the Soviets to say, Soviet Union is peaceful U-S is is is or the West and the United States are are warmongers and that propaganda of course, failed. you know because i mean, people weren't were fairly educated, uh to realize ultimately i mean the majority, were ultimately fairly educated that they did not vote um uh against that decision and ultimately what happened, um i- it turned out to be a smart move the the initial deployment of Pershing Two and cruise missiles i mean ultimately lead to the dismantling of all, as the Americans had or- originally s- uh uh s- sought, ultimately lead to the dismantlement, of all intermediate, range missiles, in Europe. um, so you know, propaganda here not very successful. so, notice the the bottom line on propa- of propaganda is there needs to be a moment of crisis, where uh where where some leadership, resorts to scapegoating, uh through the through some, pseudo relevant, solution. um, distorted information, mostly scapegoating against a group within the country or against another state. and the the the the problem there, the difficulty with propaganda is on the one hand you need the attentive public to influence the leadership, but the more attentive the more informed the public is, in uh in a lot of cases the more likely it is to realize that you know the propaganda is just hot hot air balloon. mkay? any questions still on propaganda? finally, uh, political and economic theory, and, mm also persuasion. well, see persuasion both in propaganda and political and economic theory, what it means it tries to, to influence, the psyche or the mind of people. so it does not get at the pocketbook it does not get at physical security, it gets at people's minds and thinking. that's what it's supposed to achieve. that's why we call it persuasion. um get people in you know get people or get at least states to do something, through persuasion either of the public or the leadership. political and economic theory is mostly target at the at the country's leadership, directly. so it appeals to leaders or elites, it emphasizes the common interest between the leaders, of the target state at the leaders of the actor, state. it emphasize some common gain so, you communicate to the target side, if you agree, to play along, with us then you know we all are gonna be better off. and you try to convey legitimacy. that is, the it's it's the the economic political order you're trying to establish, is supposed to be supported, not only by your own country but by others as well. um, you know, the probably the best example here, in political and economic theory, is um is really the the whole, international trading and political system, mostly economic system that was set up, mostly by, through sponsorship by the United States following World War Two. um, the notion of self-determination after World War One as promised by um, Woodrow Wilson is clearly a political larger, you know universal, universally aspired um, um economic and political theory people should have the right, for so- to self-rule. um, you know global spread of free trade and legal democracy. (lost) but it's very ideological, um political driven, economic free trade is important. so as World War Two came to a close, um first of_ we had two, events here. even throughout World War Two, on the one hand, we have, what's what's referred to as the nineteen forty-one, Atlantic Charter. and the Atlantic Charter, was agreed, to by, by by both the United States and and the United Kingdom. the Atlantic Charter specified that, you know of course you know it laid out plans for the defeat of um of Germany Japan and Italy, and in nineteen forty-one of course was still World War O- Two was still going on, but it laid out already some plans for a postwar, order. i mean it it soon quite clear ultimately that the that the German Japanese and Italian forces would be defeated, so it planned already for the postwar order. and, there were several universal steps, one of one was that people all over the world should be free to decide on their own government. again you know self-determination self-rule. so people should have a choice you have the freedom to choose, whatever government, they wanted. um second people, were supposed to trade freely with one another, so the principle of free trade was issued. questions? 
S5: (xx)
S1: oh i'm sorry uh which one?
S5: yeah uh just basically the first (xx)
S1: on the propaganda or?
S5: on European political order 
S1: yeah i'm gonna repeat this again. um [S5: hm? ] i- i'm gonna repeat this again. [S5: okay ] um, is everybody clear on this here on on, propaganda? i'm gonna leave it on the board even you know be- you know brie- briefly after class and, so if you still have questions, um but you know, but do yo- does everybody have this on the propaganda here? [S5: mhm ] okay, um, but i'll come back to this here, just wanna, provide some of the backdrop. the Atlantic Charter in nineteen forty-one so, free, determination of what, whatever government was supposed to be chosen, domestic politics. free trade, internationally. um also you know there should be no, changes of territory quite different now from the end of World War One, um, whatever the war outcome was supposed to be there were supposed to be you know territorial changes, without the consent of the people living there. and, but but the whole bottom line is it emphasized, you know it, well it was supposed to establish a world order that was based on freedom of choice, in both trade, both economic and political choice. the second thing then was of course not only United Nations, established, um, after World War Two, but then also nineteen forty-four, Bretton Woods. and of course we talked about Bre- Bretton Woods um arrangements earlier, basically the foundation, of an international commercial, economic regime. with institutions and rules. um sponsored again, by the United States mostly. and, and uh [S6: sorry ] sure and um, I-M-F International Monetary Fund to regulate currency, flows, um and and make sure currencies be convertible, um the uh the World Bank, as as a lending institution to make sure that that capital money for, that that money supply was was guaranteed and of course GATT the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, to facilitate, trade negotiations. okay? Bretton Woods Agreement. point here is, that, the U-S, you know, persuaded other states in the international system, to, accept, a political and and economic system sponsored by the United States. so, it appealed, so that's one on the board here now it appealed to leaders, appealed to leaders and the elites, that it was in everybody's common interest, in common gain, to accept and participate, freely, in a, in in a economic political system, set up, sponsored and and and uh uh, l- led by the United States. so the United States was so- supposed to have ultimately ge- legitimacy, for its um, you know for its influence in international system and that legitimacy was derived, from an international, economic political order that was in the common gain common interest, appeal to to most um to to as many leaders and elites in international rules, international system as possible. how successful was that? well again it depended on communication. well, the problem of course if you if you, i- invest to to communicate the benefits, of a very abstract and wide-ranging universal economic political system is often quite difficult. and again, when we talk about communication, with respect to the political and economic theory, here it's even more important, that, if you seek agreement, that there's a very common denominator. common understanding common cultures common traditions common war experience, common interest in in uh, in rebuilding societies, so there's there there there's supposed to be a very strong, commitment, common ground you need, in order to communicate, that approach. so if you want to set up a new world order, you, i mean it's easier, if your tar- your audience, you know speaks the same language so to, sp- you know so to say, and has has the common perceptions common views, common culture, or at least similar culture than if there's greater diversity. also common income levels, economic development. common threats. uh when we mentioned earlier, that especially in the Western part of the world i mean again more homogeneous was easier, we mentioned you know, after World War Two there was a general fear of war. industrialized countries were almost devastate entirely dev- almost entirely devastated through two world wars, common fear of war, common fear of communist expansion, the Cold War, um rise of the welfare state, and rise of international uh economic interdependence. we mentioned that as some of the developments after World War Two that's that was, you know some of the commonalities at least pursed by the Western industrialized countries, of U-S Canada Western Europe, Western Europe and Japan, Australia, New Zealand. so there was, some common ground some communication actually was, facilitated by those four common developments. second you need capabilities, well after World War Two the U-S emerged as by far, in all kinds of capabilities, the most superior, state in the world. and you know according to data from the Correlates War Project, roughly between nineteen forty f- between nineteen forty-six and ninety fifty, the U-S, in all, in uh, in combined demographic military, industrial, economic capabilities had about fifty, close to fifty percent, of all the capabilities in the entire international system. so the U-S certainly had the capabilities to maintain and sponsor a li- a wide, global economic order. it had, it had the capabilities to ultimately, raise the money for the Marshall Plan, to sponsor, the U-S military participation in NATO and other alliances around the world so the U-S had the capabilities actually, to support, such an order and convince other states that it was, capable of doing so. um, also, credibility. how credible was the United States? well you know, i- it was clearly committed to the Atlantic Cha- Charter, it actually made good on its promises at least you know through the Marshall Plan and and and NATO. um, so the U-S demonstrated not only in words but in deed, uh that it was gonna follow up. and of course how about no compliance willingness to comply? well, here is is a division. most of the compliance, we saw and of course from, not surprisingly we saw in those countries that, expected most to gain and actually that benefited most from that new order. those countries again you know remember from your atlas those pictures where are they located, North America Western Europe, um Japan by extension then other countries in East Asia later on, um Australia and New Zealand. Western industrialist countries tended to gain most. the Marshall Plan, um i- initially envisioned also aid to the Soviet Union Eastern Europe, um but ultimately was f- was money flow primarily in into rebuilding Western Europe. and it's par- particularly ultimately Japan and Germany getting, getting w- quite a go- a good share of that that money. so um, of course you know, those countries benefited. they benefited ultimately from free trade, because they trade uh traded under quite equal terms um, and hence of course they were, compliant and they were willing, to tolerate American leadership in throughout most of the post- uh World War Two period. um, quite differently so in the, in the less-developed countries. the less-developed countries the one thing, um the U-S and its allies you know displayed little interest, in the in in in in in a lot of those countries' development, either for lack of resources for lack of strategic interest, so you know there was there's not much interest in to begin with. on the other side, very often in those countries there was also the fear of, neocolonialism. um, economic colonialism led by the United States. so those countries, expected to benefit least, from the new system and hence were, less willing to uh, to accept um American American leadership. so, what this means to us was as, you know when we look at, at so- social and economic theory, um the the actor that sponsors this and that is presents itself as the leader, uh, needs to communicate this, this new, order quite clearly and is most likely to find, uh an ear find an audience by those, by those that are most likely to benefit and with with with actors, uh with which it shares, in a very common interest economically politically, uh, ideologically. uh the leader of of such a system needs to, have capabilities actually to provide, you know hard goods, and needs to provide the benefits for others to accept leadership. and it needs also not only to have those capabilities but also, to make good on promises. and of, and the way this of course played out, um there was large scale acceptance by those countries that benefited form it, and not surprisingly less acceptance by those, that did not, get the major benefits. okay, this concludes now, um the section on comparing coercive and noncoercive te- techniques in uh in uh, international politics. and then on Monday or Tuesday we're gonna talk specifically, um, about the material discussed in (Rothscath) chapter five, and we'll look specifically at um, coercive forms again but, focus in more on comparing economic versus military union, in terms of, transmitting (xx) [SU-M: do you have our exams? ] on Monday. 
S6: see you Tuesday 
S1: oh wow happy birthday
S6: oh thank you. 
SU-F: there's an extra one 
S1: oh okay thank you.
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