North_NP1 Korea_NP1 seeks_VVZ international_JJ attention_NN1 with_IW uranium_NN1 claim_VV0 The_AT North_ND1 ,_, which_DDQ wants_VVZ one-on-one_MC talks_NN2 with_IW the_AT US_NP1 ,_, said_VVD it_PPH1 's_VBZ open_JJ to_II dialogue_NN1 and_CC had_VHD entered_VVN the_AT "_" completion_NN1 phase_NN1 "_" of_IO developing_VVG highly_RR enriched_JJ uranium_NN1 ._. 
North_NP1 Korea_NP1 's_GE notice_NN1 to_II the_AT United_JJ Nations_NN2 Security_NN1 Council_NN1 that_CST it_PPH1 's_VBZ on_II the_AT verge_NN1 of_IO developing_JJ nuclear_JJ warheads_NN2 with_IW highly_RR enriched_JJ uranium_NN1 appears_VVZ as_II a_AT1 grab_NN1 for_IF the_AT attention_NN1 of_IO the_AT US_NP1 and_CC other_JJ major_JJ powers_NN2 ._. 
The_AT North_ND1 's_GE expertise_NN1 in_II uranium_NN1 would_VM mark_VVI a_AT1 significant_JJ escalation_NN1 of_IO its_APPGE potential_NN1 as_II a_AT1 nascent_JJ nuclear_JJ power_NN1 ._. 
North_NP1 Korea_NP1 's_GE UN_NP1 mission_NN1 confirmed_VVD that_CST the_AT North_ND1 's_VBZ UN_NP1 ambassador_NN1 ,_, Sin_NN1 Son-ho_UH ,_, had_VHD sent_VVN the_AT letter_NN1 in_II31 response_II32 to_II33 sanctions_NN2 imposed_VVN by_II the_AT Security_NN1 Council_NN1 on_II June_NPM1 12_MC ,_, 18_MC days_NNT2 after_II the_AT North_ND1 conducted_VVD its_APPGE second_MD underground_JJ test_NN1 of_IO a_AT1 plutonium_NN1 bomb_NN1 on_II May_NPM1 25_MC ._. 
"_" It_PPH1 's_VBZ an_AT1 expression_NN1 of_IO impatience_NN1 ,_, "_" says_VVZ Kim_NP1 Tae-woo_VV0 ,_, senior_JJ fellow_NN1 of_IO the_AT Korean_JJ Institute_NN1 for_IF Defense_NN1 Analyses_VVZ in_II Seoul_NP1 ._. 
"_" North_NP1 Korea_NP1 wants_VVZ an_AT1 immediate_JJ response_NN1 from_II the_AT international_JJ community_NN1 ._. "_" 
The_AT announcement_NN1 comes_VVZ as_CSA Stephen_NP1 Bosworth_NP1 ,_, the_AT US_NP1 envoy_NN1 to_II North_NP1 Korea_NP1 ,_, is_VBZ visiting_VVG the_AT region_NN1 for_IF talks_NN2 with_IW North_NP1 Korea_NP1 's_GE neighbors_NN2 ._. 
He_PPHS1 told_VVD reporters_NN2 in_II Beijing_NP1 that_CST the_AT North_ND1 's_GE claim_NN1 was_VBDZ "_" of_IO concern_NN1 ,_, "_" but_CCB he_PPHS1 has_VHZ no_AT plans_NN2 to_TO visit_VVI Pyongyang_NP1 ._. 
History_NN1 of_IO boasting_VVG The_AT secretive_JJ regime_NN1 has_VHZ long_RR boasted_VVN of_IO producing_VVG plutonium_NN1 for_IF warheads_NN2 at_II its_APPGE complex_NN1 at_II Yongbyon_NP1 ,_, 60_MC miles_NNU2 north_ND1 of_IO the_AT capital_NN1 Pyongyang_NP1 ,_, but_CCB was_VBDZ believed_VVN to_TO be_VBI only_RR in_II the_AT early_JJ phases_NN2 of_IO developing_VVG highly_RR enriched_JJ uranium_NN1 ._. 
Pyongyang_NP1 's_GE Korean_JJ Central_JJ News_NN1 Agency_NN1 also_RR raised_VVD the_AT specter_NN1 of_IO an_AT1 expanding_JJ plutonium_NN1 program_NN1 ,_, saying_VVG that_DD1 "_" reprocessing_NN1 of_IO spent_JJ fuel_NN1 rods_NN2 is_VBZ in_II its_APPGE final_JJ phase_NN1 and_CC extracted_JJ plutonium_NN1 being_VBG weaponized_VVN ._. "_" 
The_AT North_ND1 's_VBZ Korean_JJ Central_JJ News_NN1 Agency_NN1 ,_, reporting_VVG the_AT letter_NN1 ,_, said_VVD North_NP1 Korea_NP1 was_VBDZ ready_JJ for_IF "_" dialogue_NN1 and_CC sanctions_NN2 "_" but_CCB that_CST the_AT North_ND1 had_VHD "_" no_AT choice_NN1 but_CS to_TO take_VVI yet_RR stronger_JJR self-defensive_JJ countermeasures_NN2 ._. "_" 
The_AT need_NN1 for_IF self-defense_NN1 has_VHZ been_VBN the_AT North_ND1 's_GE rationale_NN1 for_IF its_APPGE nuclear_JJ program_NN1 through_II negotiations_NN2 beginning_VVG in_II the_AT early_JJ 1990s_MC2 ._. 
These_DD2 talks_NN2 culminated_VVN in_II the_AT 1994_MC Geneva_NP1 framework_NN1 agreement_NN1 under_II which_DDQ North_NP1 Korea_NP1 shut_VVD down_RP its_APPGE five-megawatt_JJ reactor_NN1 at_II Yongbyon_NP1 and_CC placed_VVD the_AT complex_NN1 under_II the_AT eyes_NN2 of_IO inspectors_NN2 from_II the_AT International_JJ Atomic_JJ Energy_NN1 Agency_NN1 in_II31 return_II32 for_II33 the_AT promise_NN1 of_IO construction_NN1 of_IO twin_NN1 light_NN1 water_NN1 nuclear_JJ energy_NN1 reactors_NN2 to_TO help_VVI meet_VVI the_AT needs_NN2 for_IF power_NN1 for_IF the_AT North_ND1 's_GE failing_VVG economy_NN1 ._. 
The_AT Geneva_NP1 framework_NN1 fell_VVD apart_RL in_II October_NPM1 2002_MC ,_, however_RR ,_, after_CS North_NP1 Korea_NP1 's_GE vice_JJ foreign_JJ minister_NN1 ,_, Kang_NP1 Sok_NP1 Ju_NP1 ,_, acknowledged_VVN to_II James_NP1 Kelly_NP1 ,_, then_RT the_AT US_NP1 nuclear_JJ negotiator_NN1 ,_, that_CST North_NP1 Korea_NP1 had_VHD a_AT1 separate_JJ highly_RR enriched_JJ uranium_NN1 program_NN1 ._. 
North_NP1 Korea_NP1 publicly_RR denied_VVD the_AT existence_NN1 of_IO the_AT uranium_NN1 program_NN1 until_CS earlier_RRR this_DD1 year_NNT1 ._. 
Both_DB2 the_AT United_NP1 States_NP1 and_CC North_NP1 Korea_NP1 appear_VV0 to_TO be_VBI mingling_VVG diplomatic_JJ gestures_NN2 with_IW toughness_NN1 while_CS Mr._NNB Bosworth_NP1 visits_NN2 first_MD Beijing_NP1 and_CC then_RT Seoul_NP1 ._. 
"_" What_DDQ Mr._NNB Bosworth_NP1 will_VM do_VDI is_VBZ very_RG clear_JJ ,_, "_" says_VVZ Mr._NNB Kim_NP1 ._. 
"_" He_PPHS1 will_VM continue_VVI the_AT two_MC track_NN1 approach_NN1 "_" --_NN1 that_REX21 is_REX22 ,_, holding_VVG out_RP the_AT promise_NN1 of_IO more_DAR talks_NN2 while_CS the_AT US_NP1 insists_VVZ North_NP1 Korea_NP1 must_VM first_MD return_VVI to_II talks_NN2 and_CC abide_VVI by_II agreements_NN2 approved_VVN in_II 2007_MC to_TO give_VVI up_RP its_APPGE entire_JJ nuclear_JJ program_NN1 in_II31 return_II32 for_II33 a_AT1 vast_JJ infusion_NN1 of_IO aid_NN1 ._. 
Conciliatory_JJ gestures_NN2 North_NP1 Korea_NP1 ,_, for_IF its_APPGE part_NN1 ,_, has_VHZ pursued_VVN what_DDQ appears_VVZ to_TO be_VBI a_AT1 conciliatory_JJ tack_NN1 beginning_VVG with_IW the_AT release_NN1 of_IO two_MC journalists_NN2 ,_, Laura_NP1 Ling_NN1 and_CC Euna_NP1 Lee_NP1 ,_, who_PNQS were_VBDR captured_VVN while_CS filming_VVG along_II the_AT Tumen_NP1 River_NNL1 border_NN1 between_II China_NP1 and_CC North_NP1 Korea_NP1 for_IF the_AT Current_JJ TV_NN1 network_NN1 ._. 
They_PPHS2 were_VBDR held_VVN for_IF 140_MC days_NNT2 and_CC sentenced_VVN to_II 12_MC years_NNT2 of_IO hard_JJ labor_NN1 for_IF illegal_JJ entry_NN1 into_II North_NP1 Korea_NP1 but_CCB returned_VVD to_II the_AT US_NP1 on_II a_AT1 private_JJ plane_NN1 with_IW the_AT former_DA president_NN1 ,_, Bill_NP1 Clinton_NP1 ._. 
North_NP1 Korea_NP1 's_GE leader_NN1 ,_, Kim_NP1 Jong-il_FW ,_, reported_VVD to_TO have_VHI suffered_VVN a_AT1 stroke_NN1 more_RRR than_CSN a_AT1 year_NNT1 ago_RA ,_, met_VVN with_IW Mr._NNB Clinton_NP1 ,_, in_II conversation_NN1 and_CC then_RT over_II lunch_NN1 ,_, for_IF more_DAR than_CSN three_MC hours_NNT2 ._. 
The_AT visit_NN1 was_VBDZ described_VVN as_II "_" unofficial_JJ ,_, "_" but_CCB Clinton_NP1 briefed_VVD President_NNB Barack_NP1 Obama_NP1 extensively_RR on_II what_DDQ was_VBDZ said_VVN ._. 
So_RG far_RR ,_, though_CS ,_, North_NP1 Korea_NP1 has_VHZ not_XX succeeded_VVN in_II bringing_VVG the_AT US_NP1 into_II the_AT two-sided_JJ dialogue_NN1 it_PPH1 wants_VVZ ._. 
David_NP1 Straub_NP1 ,_, a_AT1 former_DA senior_JJ diplomat_NN1 with_IW the_AT US_NP1 Embassy_NN1 in_II Seoul_NP1 ,_, who_PNQS was_VBDZ with_IW Clinton_NP1 on_II his_APPGE Pyongyang_NP1 venture_NN1 ,_, has_VHZ written_VVN that_CST North_NP1 Korea_NP1 's_GE "_" conciliatory_JJ steps_NN2 may_VM very_RG well_RR be_VBI nothing_PN1 more_DAR than_CSN yet_RR another_DD1 'charm_NN1 offensive'_NN1 intended_VVD to_TO deflect_VVI international_JJ pressure_NN1 to_TO abandon_VVI its_APPGE nuclear_JJ weapons_NN2 ._. "_" 
