Most_DAT Iran_NP1 Election_NN1 Historical_JJ Analogies_NN2 Are_VBR Misleading_JJ and_CC Dangerous_JJ Situation_NN1 in_II Tehran_NP1 does_VDZ not_XX simply_RR mirror_VVI 1950s_MC2 Hungary_NP1 or_CC 1980s_MC2 Poland_NP1 ..._... or_CC even_RR 1979_MC Iran_NP1 Outrage_NN1 over_II the_AT Iranian_JJ government_NN1 's_GE violent_JJ suppression_NN1 and_CC intimidation_NN1 of_IO dissent_NN1 has_VHZ appropriately_RR produced_VVN considerable_JJ concern_NN1 in_II the_AT United_NP1 States_NP1 and_CC fueled_VVD a_AT1 debate_NN1 over_II U.S._NP1 policy_NN1 toward_II Tehran_NP1 ._. 
Many_DA2 political_JJ leaders_NN2 and_CC pundits_NN2 have_VH0 called_VVN for_IF more_RGR active_JJ and_CC vocal_JJ American_JJ support_NN1 of_IO the_AT Iranian_JJ opposition_NN1 ,_, typically_RR on_II the_AT basis_NN1 of_IO analogies_NN2 to_II oppressive_JJ regimes_NN2 of_IO the_AT twentieth_MD century_NNT1 ._. 
Unfortunately_RR ,_, the_AT vast_JJ majority_NN1 of_IO these_DD2 analogies_NN2 are_VBR misleading_JJ and_CC even_RR dangerous_JJ if_CS used_VVN as_CSA guides_NN2 to_II policy_NN1 ._. 
The_AT historical_JJ cases_NN2 most_RGT similar_JJ to_II present-day_JJ Iran_NP1 should_VM instill_VVI caution_NN1 ._. 
Some_DD have_VH0 compared_VVN Iran_NP1 to_II the_AT Philippines_NP2 in_II 1986_MC or_CC South_ND1 Korea_NP1 in_II 1987_MC ,_, both_DB2 cases_NN2 in_II which_DDQ the_AT Reagan_NP1 administration_NN1 lent_VVD support_NN1 to_II domestic_JJ groups_NN2 pressing_VVG for_IF greater_JJR democracy_NN1 (_( after_II a_AT1 stolen_JJ election_NN1 in_II the_AT Philippines_NP2 and_CC in_II restoring_VVG direct_JJ presidential_JJ elections_NN2 in_II Korea_NP1 )_) ._. 
These_DD2 two_MC analogies_NN2 are_VBR both_RR fundamentally_RR flawed_JJ because_CS both_DB2 countries_NN2 were_VBDR American_JJ allies_NN2 over_II which_DDQ the_AT United_NP1 States_NP1 had_VHD considerable_JJ leverage_NN1 ._. 
To_II the_AT extent_NN1 either_DD1 case_NN1 can_VM be_VBI compared_VVN to_II Iran_NP1 ,_, they_PPHS2 are_VBR more_RGR similar_JJ to_II the_AT Iran_NP1 of_IO 1979_MC than_CSN 2009_MC ._. 
Others_NN2 warn_VV0 that_CST Iran_NP1 is_VBZ headed_VVN toward_II a_AT1 situation_NN1 similar_JJ to_II 1989_MC 's_GE Tiananmen_NP1 Square_NN1 ._. 
This_DD1 implicitly_RR suggests_VVZ that_CST the_AT George_NP1 H._NP1 W._NP1 Bush_NP1 administration_NN1 could_VM have_VHI prevented_VVN the_AT Chinese_JJ government_NN1 's_GE decision_NN1 to_TO crack_VVI down_RP on_II China_NP1 's_GE pro-democracy_JJ protesters_NN2 ,_, which_DDQ seems_VVZ doubtful_JJ but_CCB is_VBZ ultimately_RR unknowable_JJ ._. 
However_RR ,_, the_AT focus_NN1 of_IO this_DD1 comparison_NN1 is_VBZ typically_RR criticism_NN1 of_IO the_AT Bush_NP1 administration_NN1 's_GE post-Tiananmen_JJ engagement_NN1 with_IW China_NP1 ._. 
Either_DD1 way_NN1 ,_, there_EX has_VHZ thankfully_RR been_VBN no_AT event_NN1 on_II this_DD1 scale_NN1 in_II Iran_NP1 ._. 
Partially_RR motivated_VVN by_II the_AT collapse_NN1 of_IO communism_NN1 in_II Central_JJ Europe_NP1 ,_, Tiananmen_NP1 also_RR demonstrates_VVZ the_AT potential_JJ danger_NN1 of_IO using_VVG strategies_NN2 that_CST were_VBDR successful_JJ in_II one_MC1 place_NN1 and_CC time_NNT1 in_II a_AT1 radically_RR different_JJ environment_NN1 ._. 
(_( Though_CS the_AT blame_NN1 for_IF the_AT outcome_NN1 lies_VVZ overwhelmingly_RR with_IW the_AT Chinese_JJ government_NN1 ,_, not_XX the_AT protesters_NN2 ._. )_) 
The_AT bulk_NN1 of_IO the_AT history_NN1 lessons_NN2 filling_VVG editorial_JJ pages_NN2 have_VH0 to_TO do_VDI with_IW America_NP1 's_GE Cold_JJ War_NN1 and_CC modern_JJ policies_NN2 toward_II the_AT U.S.S.R._NP1 and_CC former_DA Soviet_JJ bloc_NN1 countries_NN2 ._. 
Some_DD mention_NN1 Hungary_NP1 in_II 1956_MC --_JJ when_CS the_AT U.S._NP1 essentially_RR encouraged_VVN a_AT1 revolt_NN1 via_II Radio_NN1 Free_JJ Europe_NP1 but_CCB was_VBDZ ultimately_RR unwilling_JJ to_TO come_VVI to_TO aid_VVI the_AT country_NN1 's_GE revolutionaries_NN2 --_NN1 or_CC the_AT Prague_NP1 Spring_NN1 in_II 1968_MC ,_, which_DDQ Washington_NP1 did_VDD not_XX particularly_RR encourage_VVI beforehand_RR or_CC support_VVI afterward_RL ._. 
Both_DB2 demonstrate_VV0 the_AT calculations_NN2 that_CST have_VH0 led_VVN past_II American_JJ leaders_NN2 ,_, Republican_NN1 and_CC Democratic_JJ ,_, to_TO shy_VVI away_II21 from_II22 active_JJ intervention_NN1 in_II such_DA circumstances_NN2 ._. 
Others_NN2 cite_VV0 the_AT Reagan_NP1 administration_NN1 's_GE support_NN1 for_IF Poland_NP1 's_GE Solidarity_NN1 trade_NN1 union_NN1 movement_NN1 in_II the_AT early_JJ 1980s_MC2 ,_, though_CS few_DA2 acknowledge_VV0 that_CST the_AT Solidarity_NN1 protests_NN2 led_VVN to_II the_AT imposition_NN1 of_IO martial_JJ law_NN1 and_CC considerably_RR greater_JJR repression_NN1 ._. 
Poland_NP1 did_VDD not_XX have_VHI a_AT1 non-communist_JJ government_NN1 until_II 1989_MC ,_, nine_MC years_NNT2 after_II the_AT first_MD Solidarity_NN1 strikes_NN2 ._. 
The_AT fact_NN1 that_CST Soviet_JJ leaders_NN2 --_NN1 and_CC Polish_JJ and_CC other_JJ Central_JJ European_JJ leaders_NN2 --_NN1 were_VBDR no_RR21 longer_RR22 prepared_VVN to_TO use_VVI large-scale_JJ violence_NN1 to_TO suppress_VVI opposition_NN1 was_VBDZ decisive_JJ in_II the_AT largely_RR peaceful_JJ revolutions_NN2 of_IO 1989_MC ._. 
Ukraine_NP1 's_GE 2004_MC Orange_JJ Revolution_NN1 is_VBZ another_DD1 popular_JJ case_NN1 ,_, doubtless_RR because_CS it_PPH1 is_VBZ a_AT1 recent_JJ example_NN1 of_IO electoral_JJ fraud_NN1 akin_JJ to_II Iran_NP1 's_GE and_CC because_CS American_JJ political_JJ intervention_NN1 was_VBDZ important_JJ to_II Viktor_NP1 Yushchenko_NP1 's_GE eventual_JJ installation_NN1 as_CSA president_NN1 ._. 
Yet_RR "_" revolution_NN1 "_" is_VBZ clearly_RR an_AT1 overstatement_NN1 of_IO the_AT degree_NN1 of_IO change_NN1 in_II Ukraine_NP1 and_CC its_APPGE subsequent_JJ governments_NN2 have_VH0 been_VBN quite_RG unstable_JJ ._. 
Actually_RR ,_, the_AT country_NN1 's_GE recent_JJ history_NN1 is_VBZ an_AT1 illustration_NN1 less_DAR of_IO the_AT success_NN1 of_IO U.S._NP1 pressure_NN1 in_II producing_VVG democracy_NN1 than_CSN of_IO the_AT fact_NN1 that_CST democracy_NN1 requires_VVZ much_DA1 more_DAR than_CSN the_AT 'right'_JJ election_NN1 outcome_NN1 ,_, especially_RR in_II a_AT1 divided_JJ country_NN1 ._. 
Finally_RR ,_, many_DA2 talk_NN1 of_IO the_AT Soviet_JJ Union_NN1 ,_, especially_RR of_IO President_NNB Reagan_NP1 standing_NN1 up_II21 to_II22 Soviet_JJ leaders_NN2 or_CC Reagan_NP1 and_CC others_NN2 supporting_VVG Soviet_JJ dissidents_NN2 ._. 
U.S.-Soviet_JJ relations_NN2 are_VBR mostly_RR irrelevant_JJ to_II Iran_NP1 ,_, however_RR ._. 
At_II the_AT time_NNT1 of_IO the_AT Cold_JJ War_NN1 ,_, the_AT U.S.S.R._NP1 was_VBDZ the_AT pre-eminent_JJ threat_NN1 the_AT American_JJ national_JJ security_NN1 and_CC was_VBDZ a_AT1 global_JJ competitor_NN1 ._. 
The_AT United_NP1 States_NP1 subordinated_VVD much_DA1 of_IO its_APPGE foreign_JJ policy_NN1 to_II the_AT U.S.-Soviet_JJ rivalry_NN1 ._. 
Few_DA2 today_RT seem_VV0 prepared_JJ to_TO afford_VVI Tehran_NP1 the_AT same_DA role_NN1 in_II shaping_VVG U.S._NP1 global_JJ policy_NN1 and_CC strategy_NN1 ,_, notwithstanding_II the_AT real_JJ danger_NN1 of_IO Iran_NP1 's_GE nuclear_JJ ambitions_NN2 and_CC its_APPGE regional_JJ support_NN1 for_IF terrorism_NN1 ._. 
Moreover_RR ,_, America_NP1 's_GE defense_NN1 of_IO Soviet_JJ dissidents_NN2 was_VBDZ a_AT1 long-term_JJ strategy_NN1 ,_, like_II support_NN1 for_IF Solidarity_NN1 ,_, not_XX one_PN1 expected_VVD to_TO produce_VVI the_AT immediate_JJ results_NN2 for_IF which_DDQ today_RT 's_GE observers_NN2 appear_VV0 to_TO hope_VVI ._. 
One_MC1 of_IO the_AT most_RGT wrong-headed_JJ comparisons_NN2 between_II Iran_NP1 and_CC the_AT former_DA U.S.S.R._NP1 is_VBZ the_AT comparison_NN1 to_II the_AT August_NPM1 1991_MC coup_NN1 against_II Mikhail_NP1 Gorbachev_NP1 and_CC Boris_NP1 Yeltsin_NP1 's_GE iconic_JJ image_NN1 resisting_VVG the_AT coup_NN1 atop_II a_AT1 tank_NN1 ,_, which_DDQ has_VHZ led_VVN some_DD to_TO complain_VVI that_CST Mir_NP1 Hossein_NP1 Mousavi_NP1 lacks_VVZ Yeltsin_NP1 's_GE courage_NN1 ._. 
The_AT problem_NN1 with_IW this_DD1 line_NN1 of_IO thinking_NN1 is_VBZ that_CST Yeltsin_NP1 was_VBDZ already_RR the_AT president_NN1 of_IO the_AT Russian_JJ Federation_NN1 at_II that_DD1 time_NNT1 and_CC had_VHD the_AT backing_NN1 of_IO Russia_NP1 's_GE parliament_NN1 ._. 
Perhaps_RR even_RR more_RGR important_JJ ,_, there_EX was_VBDZ a_AT1 tank_NN1 in_II31 front_II32 of_II33 the_AT parliament_NN1 for_IF him_PPHO1 to_TO stand_VVI on_RP because_CS the_AT Soviet_JJ armed_JJ forces_NN2 were_VBDR divided_VVN ._. 
There_EX is_VBZ scant_JJ evidence_NN1 of_IO such_DA divisions_NN2 in_II Iran_NP1 ._. 
Historical_JJ patterns_NN2 can_VM clearly_RR be_VBI useful_JJ tools_NN2 for_IF thought_NN1 and_CC action_NN1 in_II shaping_JJ policy_NN1 ,_, but_CCB in_II using_VVG them_PPHO2 it_PPH1 is_VBZ essential_JJ to_TO avoid_VVI becoming_VVG locked_VVN in_RP to_II psychologically_RR appealing_JJ narratives_NN2 that_CST can_VM skew_VVI expectations_NN2 ._. 
It_PPH1 is_VBZ likewise_RR important_JJ to_TO remember_VVI that_DD1 history_NN1 took_VVD a_AT1 long_JJ time_NNT1 to_TO happen_VVI and_CC that_CST most_DAT of_IO the_AT decisive_JJ events_NN2 to_II which_DDQ we_PPIS2 look_VV0 back_RP were_VBDR the_AT final_JJ stages_NN2 of_IO extended_JJ processes_NN2 ._. 
What_DDQ does_VDZ this_DD1 mean_VVI for_IF U.S._NP1 policy_NN1 toward_II Iran_NP1 ?_? 
Stay_VV0 calm_JJ --_NN1 and_CC do_VD0 n't_XX try_VVI to_TO turn_VVI today_RT 's_GE events_NN2 into_II something_PN1 they_PPHS2 are_VBR not_XX ._. 
