President_NNB Obama_NP1 in_II China_NP1 Ever_RR since_CS Richard_NP1 Nixon_NP1 opened_VVD the_AT door_NN1 in_II 1972_MC ,_, all_DB presidents_NN2 have_VH0 faced_VVN a_AT1 balancing_NN1 act_NN1 with_IW China_NP1 ._. 
For_IF President_NNB Obama_NP1 ,_, who_PNQS arrived_VVD in_II China_NP1 on_II Sunday_NPD1 ,_, the_AT challenge_NN1 is_VBZ even_RR tougher_JJR and_CC more_RGR urgent_JJ ._. 
He_PPHS1 needs_VVZ Beijing_NP1 's_GE help_NN1 on_II a_AT1 host_NN1 of_IO hugely_RR important_JJ and_CC extremely_RR difficult_JJ problems_NN2 ,_, including_II stabilizing_VVG the_AT global_JJ financial_JJ system_NN1 ,_, curbing_VVG global_JJ warming_NN1 ,_, prying_VVG away_RL North_NP1 Korea_NP1 's_GE nuclear_JJ weapons_NN2 ,_, and_CC ensuring_VVG that_CST Iran_NP1 does_VDZ n't_XX get_VVI to_TO build_VVI any_DD ._. 
To_TO do_VDI that_DD1 he_PPHS1 needs_VVZ to_TO encourage_VVI China_NP1 to_TO play_VVI an_AT1 even_RR stronger_JJR international_JJ role_NN1 --_NN1 but_CCB also_RR curb_VV0 some_DD of_IO its_APPGE darker_JJR instincts_NN2 ,_, including_II its_APPGE mistreatment_NN1 of_IO its_APPGE own_DA citizens_NN2 ,_, its_APPGE less_RGR than_CSN savory_JJ relationships_NN2 with_IW countries_NN2 like_II Sudan_NP1 and_CC its_APPGE tendency_NN1 to_TO bully_VVI its_APPGE neighbors_NN2 ._. 
Mr._NNB Obama_NP1 has_VHZ already_RR acknowledged_VVN China_NP1 's_GE growing_JJ clout_NN1 (_( and_CC that_DD1 of_IO other_JJ fast-growing_JJ economies_NN2 )_) ,_, when_CS he_PPHS1 made_VVD the_AT G-20_FO instead_II21 of_II22 the_AT G-8_FO the_AT main_JJ forum_NN1 for_IF global_JJ economic_JJ issues_NN2 ._. 
We_PPIS2 hope_VV0 that_CST will_VM pay_VVI off_RP in_II more_RGR responsible_JJ behavior_NN1 from_II Beijing_NP1 ._. 
Still_RR in_II the_AT search_NN1 for_IF common_JJ ground_NN1 ,_, Mr._NNB Obama_NP1 has_VHZ his_APPGE work_NN1 cut_VVN out_RP for_IF him_PPHO1 ._. 
While_CS the_AT two_MC countries_NN2 have_VH0 enacted_VVN huge_JJ stimulus_NN1 packages_NN2 ,_, profound_JJ tensions_NN2 remain_VV0 over_II China_NP1 's_GE exchange-rate_NN1 policy_NN1 ._. 
On_II the_AT security_NN1 side_NN1 ,_, China_NP1 joined_VVD America_NP1 and_CC other_JJ major_JJ powers_NN2 in_II imposing_VVG tougher_JJR nuclear-related_NN1 sanctions_NN2 on_II North_NP1 Korea_NP1 ._. 
But_CCB it_PPH1 is_VBZ still_RR Pyongyang_NP1 's_GE main_JJ economic_JJ benefactor_NN1 and_CC has_VHZ shown_VVN a_AT1 willingness_NN1 to_TO exploit_VVI loopholes_NN2 in_II the_AT sanctions_NN2 ._. 
Beijing_NP1 also_RR evinces_VVZ concern_NN1 about_II Iran_NP1 's_GE nuclear_JJ program_NN1 ._. 
But_CCB it_PPH1 seems_VVZ more_RGR concerned_JJ about_II its_APPGE own_DA voracious_JJ energy_NN1 needs_NN2 ,_, and_CC Iran_NP1 's_GE ability_NN1 to_TO satisfy_VVI them_PPHO2 ._. 
Mr._NNB Obama_NP1 will_VM have_VHI to_TO work_VVI harder_JJR to_TO persuade_VVI China_NN1 of_IO the_AT dangers_NN2 out_RP there_RL ,_, and_CC of_IO the_AT need_NN1 for_IF tough_JJ United_JJ Nations_NN2 sanctions_VVZ to_TO curb_VVI the_AT nuclear_JJ appetites_NN2 of_IO Tehran_NP1 and_CC Pyongyang_NP1 ._. 
China_NP1 has_VHZ long_RR and_CC close_JJ ties_NN2 with_IW Pakistan_NP1 ._. 
We_PPIS2 hope_VV0 Mr._NNB Obama_NP1 will_VM urge_VVI China_NP1 's_GE president_NN1 ,_, Hu_NP1 Jintao_NP1 ,_, to_TO provide_VVI more_RGR economic_JJ assistance_NN1 for_IF Islamabad_NP1 and_CC press_VV0 its_APPGE leaders_NN2 to_TO keep_VVI fighting_VVG the_AT Taliban_JJ insurgency_NN1 ._. 
While_CS China-Taiwan_NP1 relations_NN2 are_VBR improving_VVG ,_, Mr._NNB Obama_NP1 should_VM still_RR press_VVI Beijing_NP1 to_TO remove_VVI hundreds_NNO2 of_IO missiles_NN2 it_PPH1 has_VHZ aimed_VVN at_II the_AT island_NN1 ._. 
Some_DD activists_NN2 worry_VV0 that_CST the_AT Obama_NP1 administration_NN1 has_VHZ been_VBN too_RG muted_JJ in_II its_APPGE criticism_NN1 of_IO China_NP1 's_GE abysmal_JJ human_JJ rights_NN2 ._. 
Mr._NNB Obama_NP1 postponed_VVD a_AT1 meeting_NN1 with_IW the_AT Dalai_NP1 Lama_NP1 until_CS after_CS this_DD1 summit_NN1 meeting_NN1 ._. 
But_CCB trying_VVG a_AT1 less_RGR confrontational_JJ approach_NN1 ,_, for_IF a_AT1 while_NNT1 ,_, is_VBZ n't_XX unreasonable_JJ ._. 
China_NP1 's_GE success_NN1 as_II a_AT1 modern_JJ superpower_NN1 is_VBZ not_XX guaranteed_VVN ._. 
Job_NN1 shortages_NN2 and_CC worker_NN1 malcontent_NN1 pose_VV0 a_AT1 huge_JJ challenge_NN1 ,_, as_CSA do_VD0 separatist_JJ movements_NN2 in_II Tibet_NP1 and_CC Xinjiang_NP1 ._. 
Mr._NNB Obama_NP1 needs_VVZ to_TO find_VVI a_AT1 way_NN1 to_TO subtly_RR remind_VVI his_APPGE hosts_NN2 of_IO those_DD2 vulnerabilities_NN2 --_NN1 and_CC the_AT fact_NN1 that_CST they_PPHS2 are_VBR better_RRR dealt_VVN with_IW through_II more_RGR political_JJ openness_NN1 rather_II21 than_II22 more_DAR repression_NN1 ._. 
A_AT1 China_NN1 that_CST respected_VVD its_APPGE own_DA people_NN and_CC its_APPGE neighbors_NN2 would_VM be_VBI more_RGR stable_JJ ,_, economically_RR stronger_JJR ,_, have_VH0 more_RGR international_JJ influence_NN1 and_CC be_VBI a_AT1 much_RR better_JJR American_JJ partner_NN1 ._. 
From_II Beijing_NP1 to_II Copenhagen_NP1 What_DDQ everyone_PN1 has_VHZ suspected_VVN for_IF weeks_NNT2 has_VHZ now_RT been_VBN made_VVN more_RGR or_CC less_RGR official_JJ by_II President_NNB Obama_NP1 and_CC other_JJ world_NN1 leaders_NN2 :_: no_AT new_JJ legally_RR binding_JJ climate_NN1 treaty_NN1 will_VM emerge_VVI at_II discussions_NN2 in_II Copenhagen_NP1 next_MD month_NNT1 ._. 
