103_MC bank_NN1 failures_NN2 only_RR the_AT beginning_NN1 ,_, analysts_NN2 say_VV0 NEW_NP1 YORK_NP1 Four_MC more_DAR banks_NN2 failed_VVD Friday_NPD1 ,_, pushing_VVG the_AT 2009_MC total_JJ to_II 103_MC and_CC marking_VVG the_AT first_MD year_NNT1 since_II 1992_MC that_CST at_RR21 least_RR22 100_MC have_VH0 gone_VVN under_RP ._. 
Experts_NN2 suggest_VV0 we_PPIS2 could_VM be_VBI no_AT more_DAR than_CSN 10_MC percent_NNU of_IO the_AT way_NN1 through_II this_DD1 cycle_NN1 of_IO bank_NN1 collapses_NN2 ,_, which_DDQ is_VBZ sure_JJ to_TO be_VBI the_AT worst_JJT run_NN1 of_IO closures_NN2 since_CS the_AT Great_JJ Depression_NN1 ._. 
CreditSights_NN2 ,_, which_DDQ tracks_VVZ the_AT dismal_JJ data_NN ,_, predicts_VVZ that_CST in_II the_AT current_JJ cycle_NN1 ,_, from_II 2008_MC through_II 2011_MC ,_, as_RG many_DA2 as_CSA 1,100_MC banks_NN2 will_VM fail_VVI ._. 
That_DD1 would_VM wipe_VVI out_RP 13.4_MC percent_NNU of_IO all_DB U.S._NP1 banks_NN2 ,_, representing_VVG 7_MC percent_NNU of_IO U.S._NP1 banking_NN1 assets_NN2 ._. 
The_AT last_MD year_NNT1 in_II which_DDQ the_AT Federal_JJ Deposit_NN1 Insurance_NN1 Corp_NN1 ._. 
had_VHD that_RG many_DA2 banks_NN2 to_TO deal_VVI with_IW was_VBDZ in_II 1992_MC ,_, at_II the_AT tail_NN1 end_NN1 of_IO the_AT last_MD real_JJ estate_NN1 crisis_NN1 ._. 
The_AT FDIC_NP1 rescued_VVD 122_MC in_II 1992_MC ,_, according_II21 to_II22 Keefe_NP1 ,_, Bruyette_NP1 &;_NULL Woods_NP1 researchers_NN2 ._. 
The_AT increasing_JJ stream_NN1 of_IO bank_NN1 failures_NN2 is_VBZ likely_JJ to_TO run_VVI through_II 2011_MC ,_, according_II21 to_II22 some_DD industry_NN1 experts_NN2 ,_, as_CSA the_AT fallout_NN1 from_II the_AT credit_NN1 crisis_NN1 continues_VVZ ._. 
The_AT panic_NN1 that_CST started_VVD in_II 2007_MC as_II a_AT1 credit_NN1 crisis_NN1 quickly_RR morphed_VVD into_II a_AT1 full-blown_JJ residential_JJ real_JJ estate_NN1 collapse_NN1 ._. 
The_AT problems_NN2 blossomed_VVD as_CSA prices_NN2 on_II mortgage_NN1 securities_NN2 backed_VVN by_II ill-conceived_JJ loans_NN2 then_RT collapsed_VVD ,_, triggering_VVG capital_NN1 destruction_NN1 at_II banks_NN2 and_CC a_AT1 fear_NN1 among_II firms_NN2 to_TO lend_VVI to_II each_PPX221 other_PPX222 ._. 
The_AT crisis_NN1 worsened_VVN as_CSA tighter_JJR credit_NN1 forced_JJ firms_NN2 to_TO lay_VVI off_RP millions_NNO2 of_IO workers_NN2 ,_, hitting_VVG retailers_NN2 hard_RR and_CC triggering_VVG further_JJR spikes_NN2 in_II credit_NN1 card_NN1 and_CC mortgage_NN1 defaults_NN2 ._. 
Most_DAT of_IO the_AT high-profile_JJ large_JJ banks_NN2 likely_JJ to_TO fail_VVI already_RR have_VH0 ,_, and_CC the_AT backlog_NN1 of_IO troubled_JJ banks_NN2 now_RT is_VBZ concentrated_VVN at_II the_AT regional_JJ and_CC community_NN1 level_NN1 ,_, and_CC is_VBZ weighed_VVN down_RP by_II commercial_JJ real_JJ estate_NN1 and_CC construction_NN1 loans_NN2 ._. 
Many_DA2 smaller_JJR banks_NN2 gorged_VVN on_II commercial_JJ real_JJ estate_NN1 lending_VVG in_II the_AT go-go_JJ 2000s_MC2 ,_, amid_II low_JJ interest_NN1 rates_NN2 and_CC rising_VVG property_NN1 values_NN2 ._. 
The_AT fallout_NN1 has_VHZ been_VBN fast_JJ and_CC furious_JJ ._. 
CreditSights_NP1 '_GE data_NN show_VV0 that_CST commercial_JJ real_JJ estate_NN1 loans_NN2 made_VVD up_RP almost_RR half_DB of_IO all_DB loans_NN2 at_RR21 most_RR22 (_( 80_MC percent_NNU )_) of_IO the_AT banks_NN2 the_AT research_NN1 firm_NN1 identified_VVN as_CSA troubled_VVN ._. 
"_" Another_DD1 wave_NN1 of_IO prolonged_JJ losses_NN2 driven_VVN by_II weakness_NN1 in_II commercial_JJ real_JJ estate_NN1 could_VM prove_VVI catastrophic_JJ to_II many_DA2 of_IO these_DD2 weakened_JJ banks_NN2 ,_, "_" CreditSights_NP1 said_VVD ._. 
FDIC-insured_JJ institutions_NN2 have_VH0 set_VVN aside_RL just_RR over_RG $338_NNU billion_NNO in_II provisions_NN2 for_IF loan_NN1 losses_NN2 during_II the_AT past_JJ six_MC quarters_NN2 ,_, an_AT1 amount_NN1 that_CST is_VBZ about_RG four_MC times_NNT2 larger_JJR than_CSN their_APPGE provisions_NN2 during_II the_AT prior_JJ six_MC quarter_NN1 period_NN1 ,_, FDIC_JJ data_NN show_VV0 ._. 
"_" While_CS banks_NN2 and_CC thrifts_NN2 are_VBR now_RT well_JJ along_RP in_II the_AT process_NN1 of_IO loss_NN1 recognition_NN1 and_CC balance_NN1 sheet_NN1 repair_NN1 ,_, the_AT process_NN1 will_VM continue_VVI well_RR into_II next_MD year_NNT1 ,_, especially_RR for_IF commercial_JJ real_JJ estate_NN1 ,_, "_" FDIC_JJ Chairwoman_NN1 Sheila_NP1 Bair_NP1 told_VVD Congress_NN1 last_MD week_NNT1 ._. 
As_II a_AT1 result_NN1 ,_, she_PPHS1 said_VVD ,_, the_AT number_NN1 of_IO problem_NN1 institutions_NN2 increased_VVD significantly_RR ,_, to_II more_DAR than_CSN 400_MC during_II the_AT second_MD quarter_NN1 ._. 
Now_RT ,_, with_IW unemployment_NN1 near_II 10_MC percent_NNU and_CC credit-card_NN1 default_NN1 rates_NN2 about_II the_AT same_DA ,_, prime_JJ mortgage_NN1 delinquencies_NN2 are_VBR rising_VVG ,_, stoking_VVG worries_NN2 among_II the_AT nation_NN1 's_GE banks_NN2 that_CST despite_II rising_VVG stock_NN1 markets_NN2 ,_, fundamental_JJ banking_NN1 industry_NN1 health_NN1 remains_VVZ elusive_JJ ._. 
Hundreds_NNO2 of_IO billions_NNO2 of_IO dollars_NNU2 of_IO government_NN1 support_NN1 is_VBZ helping_VVG to_TO keep_VVI the_AT biggest_JJT banks_NN2 afloat_JJ ,_, but_CCB many_DA2 of_IO the_AT nation_NN1 's_VBZ smaller_JJR regional_JJ and_CC community_NN1 banks_NN2 face_VV0 failure_NN1 ._. 
"_" We_PPIS2 expect_VV0 the_AT numbers_NN2 of_IO problem_NN1 institutions_NN2 to_TO increase_VVI and_CC bank_NN1 failures_NN2 to_TO remain_VVI high_JJ for_IF the_AT next_MD several_DA2 quarters_NN2 ,_, "_" Bair_NP1 said_VVD ._. 
That_DD1 's_VBZ created_VVN a_AT1 devilishly_RR vexing_VVG issue_NN1 for_IF the_AT FDIC_NP1 ,_, the_AT federal_JJ agency_NN1 charged_VVN with_IW making_VVG depositors_NN2 whole_NN1 ._. 
Before_II Friday_NPD1 's_GE bank_NN1 failures_NN2 ,_, the_AT year-to-date_JJ total_JJ assets_NN2 of_IO the_AT failed_JJ banks_NN2 was_VBDZ $107.14_NNU billion_NNO ._. 
By_II comparison_NN1 ,_, the_AT nation_NN1 's_GE four_MC largest_JJT banks_NN2 ,_, excluding_VVG former_DA investment_NN1 banks_VVZ Morgan_NP1 Stanley_NP1 and_CC Goldman_NP1 Sachs_NP1 ,_, Bank_NN1 of_IO America_NP1 ,_, JPMorgan_NP1 Chase_NN1 ,_, Citigroup_NP1 and_CC Wells_NP1 Fargo_NP1 ,_, have_VH0 average_JJ annual_JJ revenue_NN1 of_IO about_RG $100_NNU billion_NNO ._. 
According_II21 to_II22 the_AT FDIC_NP1 ,_, during_II the_AT Great_JJ Depression_NN1 ,_, about_RG 9,100_MC banks_NN2 failed_VVN between_II 1931_MC and_CC 1934_MC ._. 
But_CCB those_DD2 banks_NN2 represented_VVD a_AT1 full_JJ one-third_MF of_IO the_AT nation_NN1 's_GE then_RT total_JJ banking_NN1 system_NN1 ._. 
In_II modern_JJ times_NNT2 ,_, the_AT savings_NN2 and_CC loan_NN1 crisis_NN1 of_IO the_AT late_JJ 1980s_MC2 and_CC early_JJ 1990s_MC2 ,_, defined_VVN by_II the_AT years_NNT2 1988_MC through_II 1992_MC ,_, saw_VVD 818_MC banks_NN2 ,_, or_CC just_RR under_RG 5_MC percent_NNU of_IO the_AT industry_NN1 at_II the_AT time_NNT1 ._. 
The_AT 1988-1992_MCMC periods_NN2 saw_VVD 4.4_MC percent_NNU of_IO the_AT banking_NN1 industry_NN1 's_GE assets_NN2 lost_VVD ,_, according_II21 to_II22 data_NN from_II CreditSights_NP1 and_CC the_AT FDIC_JJ ._. 
As_CSA in_II all_DB crises_NN2 ,_, some_DD areas_NN2 fare_VV0 worse_JJR than_CSN others_NN2 for_IF various_JJ reasons_NN2 ._. 
In_II this_DD1 cycle_NN1 ,_, Georgia_NP1 has_VHZ been_VBN hit_VVN hardest_RRT ,_, with_IW 19_MC failures_NN2 ,_, followed_VVN by_II Illinois_NP1 with_IW 16_MC ,_, and_CC California_NP1 with_IW 10_MC ._. 
By_II CreditSights_NP1 estimates_VVZ ,_, Georgia_NP1 ,_, Florida_NP1 and_CC Illinois_NP1 have_VH0 the_AT most_RGT potentially_RR troubled_JJ banks_NN2 among_II the_AT states_NN2 ,_, followed_VVN by_II banks_NN2 ,_, followed_VVN by_II Texas_NP1 ,_, Minnesota_NP1 ,_, Washington_NP1 State_NN1 and_CC California_NP1 ._. 
But_CCB if_CS there_EX is_VBZ a_AT1 bright_JJ side_NN1 ,_, it_PPH1 's_VBZ that_CST some_DD of_IO the_AT nation_NN1 's_GE well-managed_NN1 smaller_JJR banks_NN2 stand_VV0 to_TO benefit_VVI from_II picking_VVG up_RP assets_NN2 on_II the_AT cheap_JJ ._. 
"_" We_PPIS2 continue_VV0 to_TO believe_VVI a_AT1 select_JJ group_NN1 of_IO regional_JJ banks_NN2 with_IW sufficient_JJ capital_NN1 ,_, credit_NN1 quality_NN1 ,_, and_CC management_NN1 talent_NN1 stand_VV0 to_TO benefit_VVI by_II expanding_VVG their_APPGE banking_NN1 franchise_NN1 through_II either_RR rolling_VVG up_RP failed_JJ institutions_NN2 or_CC acquiring_VVG market_NN1 share_NN1 and/or_CC key_JJ lenders_NN2 from_II the_AT dislocation_NN1 ,_, "_" analysts_NN2 at_II Keefe_NP1 Bruyette_NP1 &;_NULL Woods_NP1 said_VVD earlier_RRR this_DD1 month_NNT1 ._. 
The_AT FDIC_NP1 is_VBZ facing_VVG its_APPGE own_DA money_NN1 issues_NN2 ,_, as_CSA its_APPGE Deposit_NN1 Insurance_NN1 Fund_NN1 ,_, which_DDQ it_PPH1 uses_VVZ to_TO pay_VVI depositors_NN2 '_GE claims_NN2 ,_, fell_VVD to_II just_RR $10.4_NNU billion_NNO at_II the_AT end_NN1 of_IO the_AT second_MD quarter_NN1 ._. 
The_AT FDIC_NP1 estimates_VVZ that_CST its_APPGE total_JJ cost_NN1 for_IF the_AT 98_MC bank_NN1 closings_NN2 through_II Friday_NPD1 at_II $26.44_NNU billion_NNO ._. 
The_AT problem_NN1 the_AT FDIC_JJ faces_NN2 is_VBZ that_CST none_PN of_IO its_APPGE options_NN2 to_TO raise_VVI money_NN1 to_TO fund_VVI its_APPGE Deposit_NN1 Insurance_NN1 Fund_NN1 are_VBR too_RG appealing_JJ ._. 
On_II the_AT one_MC1 hand_NN1 ,_, the_AT FDIC_NP1 has_VHZ already_RR hit_VVN banks_NN2 with_IW a_AT1 special_JJ assessment_NN1 earlier_RRR this_DD1 year_NNT1 to_II beef_NN1 up_II the_AT fund_NN1 ,_, but_CCB that_DD1 's_VBZ not_XX nearly_RR enough_RR to_TO fill_VVI the_AT expected_JJ void_NN1 ._. 
Also_RR earlier_RRR this_DD1 year_NNT1 ,_, the_AT agency_NN1 's_GE board_NN1 approved_VVD a_AT1 proposal_NN1 to_TO have_VHI the_AT nation_NN1 's_GE banks_NN2 prepay_VV0 3_MC three_MC years_NNT2 of_IO insurance_NN1 premiums_NN2 ,_, but_CCB that_DD1 too_RR is_VBZ unlikely_JJ to_TO fill_VVI the_AT gap_NN1 the_AT fund_NN1 faces_VVZ under_II CreditSights_NP1 worst-case_JJ scenario_NN1 ._. 
And_CC ,_, while_CS the_AT FDIC_NP1 could_VM tap_VVI an_AT1 emergency_NN1 $500_NNU billion_NNO line_NN1 of_IO credit_NN1 from_II the_AT U.S._NP1 Treasury_NN1 ,_, the_AT agency_NN1 appears_VVZ loath_JJ to_TO do_VDI that_DD1 ,_, given_VVN the_AT likely_JJ political_JJ backlash_NN1 ._. 
"_" In_II the_AT FDIC_NP1 's_GE view_NN1 ,_, requiring_VVG that_CST institutions_NN2 prepay_VV0 assessments_NN2 is_VBZ also_RR preferable_JJ to_II borrowing_VVG from_II the_AT U.S._NP1 Treasury_NN1 ._. 
Prepayment_NN1 of_IO assessments_NN2 ensures_VVZ that_CST the_AT deposit_NN1 insurance_NN1 system_NN1 remains_VVZ directly_RR industry-funded_JJ and_CC it_PPH1 preserves_VVZ Treasury_NN1 borrowing_NN1 for_IF emergency_NN1 situations_NN2 ,_, "_" the_AT FDIC_NP1 's_GE Bair_NN1 told_VVD Congress_NN1 in_II last_MD week_NNT1 's_GE testimony_NN1 ._. 
"_" Additionally_RR ,_, "_" she_PPHS1 said_VVD ,_, "_" the_AT FDIC_NP1 believes_VVZ that_CST ,_, unlike_JJ borrowing_NN1 from_II the_AT Treasury_NN1 or_CC the_AT FFB_NP1 ,_, requiring_VVG prepaid_JJ assessments_NN2 would_VM not_XX count_VVI toward_II the_AT public_JJ debt_NN1 limit_NN1 ._. "_" 
CreditSights_NP1 '_GE analysts_NN2 agreed_VVD that_CST a_AT1 Treasury_NN1 deal_NN1 could_VM prove_VVI politically_RR tricky_JJ ,_, and_CC the_AT debate_NN1 sure_JJ to_TO surround_VVI it_PPH1 could_VM actually_RR prolong_VVI the_AT crisis_NN1 ,_, "_" A_ZZ1 request_VV0 to_TO draw_VVI down_RP on_II the_AT Treasury_NN1 line_NN1 may_VM become_VVI yet_RR another_DD1 political_JJ football_NN1 pitting_NN1 banking_NN1 interests_NN2 versus_II small_JJ business_NN1 interests_NN2 ._. 
These_DD2 types_NN2 of_IO debates_NN2 seem_VV0 to_TO have_VHI in_II the_AT past_NN1 delayed_VVD regulatory_JJ action_NN1 and_CC this_DD1 could_VM be_VBI the_AT case_NN1 as_RR21 well_RR22 with_IW an_AT1 undercapitalized_JJ FDIC_NP1 ,_, "_" the_AT firm_NN1 said_VVD ._. 
