About_II the_AT Conflict_NN1 &;_NULL Stabilization_NN1 Operations_NN2 2010_MC Year_NNT1 In_II Review_NN1 This_DD1 document_NN1 reviews_VVZ 2010_MC highlights_NN2 of_IO U.S._NP1 conflict_NN1 and_CC stabilization_NN1 operations_NN2 centered_VVD around_II the_AT State_NN1 Department_NN1 's_GE Office_NN1 of_IO the_AT Coordinator_NN1 for_IF Reconstruction_NN1 and_CC Stabilization_NN1 ._. 
The_AT Office_NN1 addresses_VVZ the_AT need_NN1 for_IF collaborative_JJ ,_, government-wide_JJ foreign_JJ policy_NN1 tools_NN2 to_TO address_VVI the_AT diverse_JJ stabilization_NN1 needs_NN2 of_IO the_AT global_JJ community_NN1 ._. 
Introduction_NN1 :_: News_NN1 of_IO political_JJ conflict_NN1 comes_VVZ from_II all_DB corners_NN2 of_IO the_AT globe_NN1 with_IW unsettling_VVG regularity_NN1 ._. 
In_II 2010_MC ,_, violence_NN1 continued_VVD in_II countries_NN2 such_II21 as_II22 Afghanistan_NP1 and_CC the_AT Democratic_JJ Republic_NN1 of_IO Congo_NP1 ._. 
Mozambique_NP1 saw_VVD food_NN1 riots_NN2 ,_, while_CS the_AT Kyrgyz_NP1 Republic_NN1 witnessed_VVD the_AT ouster_NN1 of_IO one_MC1 government_NN1 and_CC tensions_NN2 after_II an_AT1 outbreak_NN1 of_IO ethnic_JJ violence_NN1 ._. 
To_TO respond_VVI to_II complex_JJ situations_NN2 like_II these_DD2 ,_, Congress_NN1 created_VVD the_AT Office_NN1 of_IO the_AT Coordinator_NN1 for_IF Reconstruction_NN1 and_CC Stabilization_NN1 (_( S/CRS_FU )_) and_CC the_AT Civilian_JJ Response_NN1 Corps_NN ._. 
In_II 2010_MC ,_, S/CRS_FU and_CC the_AT Corps_NN worked_VVN on_II conflict_NN1 prevention_NN1 and_CC stabilization_NN1 in_II many_DA2 countries_NN2 central_JJ to_II national_JJ security_NN1 ._. 
This_DD1 work_NN1 expanded_VVD the_AT abilities_NN2 of_IO U.S._NP1 posts_NN2 to_TO address_VVI critical_JJ issues_NN2 ,_, uniting_JJ expertise_NN1 from_II across_II the_AT U.S._NP1 government_NN1 in_II31 support_II32 of_II33 U.S._NP1 foreign_JJ policy_NN1 ._. 
This_DD1 report_NN1 outlines_NN2 a_AT1 number_NN1 of_IO accomplishments_NN2 in_II bringing_VVG peace_NN1 and_CC stability_NN1 to_II countries_NN2 in_II crisis_NN1 ._. 
Efforts_NN2 included_VVD :_: Identifying_VVG a_AT1 country_NN1 's_GE conflict_NN1 drivers_NN2 and_CC resiliencies_NN2 and_CC developing_VVG the_AT U.S._NP1 response_NN1 ._. 
Training_NN1 and_CC partnering_VVG with_IW foreign_JJ governments_NN2 and_CC multilateral_JJ groups_NN2 ,_, leveraging_VVG expertise_NN1 across_II the_AT U.S._NP1 government_NN1 ,_, and_CC gathering_VVG lessons_NN2 from_II around_II the_AT world_NN1 ._. 
Message_NN1 from_II the_AT Ambassador_NN1 The_AT recent_JJ vote_NN1 for_IF self-determination_NN1 in_II Sudan_NP1 is_VBZ an_AT1 important_JJ step_NN1 toward_II the_AT full_JJ implementation_NN1 of_IO the_AT country_NN1 's_GE 2005_MC Comprehensive_JJ Peace_NN1 Agreement_NN1 ._. 
In_II 2010_MC ,_, the_AT U.S._NP1 supported_VVD this_DD1 move_NN1 toward_II stability_NN1 through_II its_APPGE Consulate_NN1 General_NN1 in_II Juba_NP1 ,_, the_AT capital_NN1 of_IO the_AT autonomous_JJ southern_JJ region_NN1 ._. 
S/CRS_FU sent_VVN teams_NN2 of_IO civilian_JJ experts_NN2 into_II and_CC beyond_II state_NN1 capitals_NN2 throughout_II Southern_JJ Sudan_NP1 to_TO establish_VVI relationships_NN2 with_IW local_JJ officials_NN2 ,_, monitor_NN1 and_CC prepare_VV0 for_IF the_AT referendum_NN1 ,_, and_CC to_TO support_VVI the_AT referendum_NN1 itself_PPX1 ._. 
We_PPIS2 provided_VVD experts_NN2 in_II security_NN1 ,_, rule_NN1 of_IO law_NN1 ,_, elections_NN2 ,_, and_CC development_NN1 ,_, working_VVG together_RL across_II traditional_JJ disciplines_NN2 to_TO expand_VVI the_AT U.S._NP1 government_NN1 's_GE presence_NN1 ._. 
This_DD1 expeditionary_JJ diplomacy_NN1 represents_VVZ a_AT1 new_JJ approach_NN1 to_II a_AT1 fragile_JJ ,_, conflict-plagued_JJ region_NN1 ._. 
It_PPH1 also_RR represents_VVZ a_AT1 view_NN1 of_IO the_AT future_NN1 of_IO U.S._NP1 foreign_JJ policy_NN1 ,_, leveraging_VVG civilian_JJ power_NN1 from_II across_II the_AT U.S._NP1 government_NN1 ,_, which_DDQ lies_VVZ at_II the_AT heart_NN1 of_IO the_AT Secretary_NN1 of_IO State_NN1 's_GE vision_NN1 for_IF 21st_MD century_NNT1 statecraft_NN1 ._. 
The_AT State_NN1 Department_NN1 's_VBZ recently_RR released_VVN Quadrennial_JJ Diplomacy_NN1 and_CC Development_NN1 Review_NN1 calls_VVZ on_II the_AT Department_NN1 to_TO make_VVI stabilization_NN1 and_CC conflict_NN1 prevention_NN1 and_CC response_NN1 part_NN1 of_IO its_APPGE core_NN1 missions_NN2 ,_, building_VVG on_II the_AT work_NN1 and_CC doctrine_NN1 developed_VVN by_II S/CRS_FU ._. 
Since_CS its_APPGE inception_NN1 ,_, S/CRS_FU has_VHZ served_VVN as_II a_AT1 laboratory_NN1 for_IF this_DD1 approach_NN1 to_II addressing_VVG complex_JJ political_JJ problems_NN2 before_CS they_PPHS2 turn_VV0 into_II crisis_NN1 ._. 
We_PPIS2 help_VV0 societies_NN2 prevent_VVI or_CC emerge_VVI from_II conflict_NN1 ,_, improve_VV0 the_AT U.S._NP1 ability_NN1 to_TO work_VVI in_II these_DD2 situations_NN2 and_CC forge_VVI international_JJ partnerships_NN2 ,_, and_CC develop_VV0 ways_NN2 to_TO improve_VVI our_APPGE ability_NN1 to_TO work_VVI in_II conflict_NN1 and_CC crisis_NN1 ._. 
We_PPIS2 bring_VV0 specialized_JJ skills_NN2 not_XX often_RR found_VVN in_II the_AT Department_NN1 ,_, but_CCB we_PPIS2 exist_VV0 to_TO advance_VVI the_AT work_NN1 of_IO the_AT U.S._NP1 embassies_NN2 and_CC posts_NN2 where_CS we_PPIS2 serve_VV0 ,_, as_II part_NN1 of_IO a_AT1 broader_JJR application_NN1 of_IO U.S._NP1 civilian_JJ power_NN1 worldwide_RL ._. 
The_AT Civilian_JJ Response_NN1 Corps_NN is_VBZ the_AT epitome_NN1 of_IO this_DD1 whole-of-government_JJ approach_NN1 ._. 
The_AT Corps_NN is_VBZ composed_VVN of_IO members_NN2 from_II across_II the_AT government_NN1 who_PNQS stand_VV0 ready_JJ to_TO deploy_VVI to_II fragile_JJ states_NN2 and_CC put_VVD their_APPGE skills_NN2 to_TO work_VVI ._. 
By_II virtue_NN1 of_IO the_AT Corps_NN ,_, we_PPIS2 can_VM draw_VVI on_II emergency_NN1 environmental_JJ health_NN1 experts_NN2 from_II the_AT Department_NN1 of_IO Health_NN1 and_CC Human_JJ Services_NN2 ;_; police_NN2 ,_, prosecution_NN1 ,_, and_CC detention_NN1 expertise_NN1 from_II the_AT Department_NN1 of_IO Justice_NN1 ;_; and_CC people_NN who_PNQS can_VM help_VVI build_VVI markets_NN2 from_II the_AT Commerce_NN1 Department_NN1 ,_, to_TO name_VVI just_RR a_AT1 few_DA2 of_IO our_APPGE capabilities_NN2 ._. 
In_II 2010_MC ,_, our_APPGE largest_JJT missions_NN2 were_VBDR in_II Sudan_NP1 ,_, Afghanistan_NP1 ,_, and_CC the_AT Kyrgyz_NP1 Republic_NN1 ,_, but_CCB we_PPIS2 operate_VV0 in_II every_AT1 region_NN1 of_IO the_AT world_NN1 ._. 
In_II Afghanistan_NP1 ,_, we_PPIS2 provided_VVD key_JJ planning_NN1 and_CC strategic_JJ communications_NN2 support_VV0 and_CC assistance_NN1 to_II a_AT1 program_NN1 that_CST rehabilitates_VVZ Afghan_JJ detainees_NN2 ._. 
In_II the_AT southern_JJ region_NN1 of_IO the_AT Kyrgyz_NP1 Republic_NN1 ,_, we_PPIS2 assisted_VVD U.S._NP1 efforts_NN2 to_TO help_VVI communities_NN2 in_II the_AT wake_NN1 of_IO civil_JJ unrest_NN1 ._. 
We_PPIS2 also_RR conducted_VVD interagency_NN1 conflict_NN1 assessments_NN2 in_II 10_MC countries_NN2 ,_, a_AT1 new_JJ experience_NN1 for_IF most_DAT U.S._NP1 personnel_NN2 at_II these_DD2 posts_NN2 ,_, to_TO increase_VVI the_AT U.S._NP1 focus_NN1 on_II the_AT drivers_NN2 of_IO conflict_NN1 ._. 
Our_APPGE office_NN1 has_VHZ done_VDN much_DA1 over_II the_AT past_JJ year_NNT1 ,_, but_CCB new_JJ challenges_NN2 lie_VV0 ahead_RL ._. 
As_CSA we_PPIS2 begin_VV0 a_AT1 new_JJ era_NN1 in_II conflict_NN1 prevention_NN1 and_CC stabilization_NN1 ,_, we_PPIS2 must_VM not_XX forget_VVI the_AT central_JJ purpose_NN1 of_IO our_APPGE work_NN1 :_: to_TO help_VVI countries_NN2 facing_VVG the_AT threat_NN1 of_IO conflict_NN1 find_VV0 and_CC implement_VV0 their_APPGE own_DA solutions_NN2 ,_, and_CC to_TO advance_VVI America_NP1 's_GE core_NN1 interests_NN2 :_: security_NN1 ,_, prosperity_NN1 ,_, universal_JJ values_NN2 of_IO democracy_NN1 and_CC human_JJ rights_NN2 ,_, and_CC a_AT1 just_RR international_JJ order_NN1 ._. 
Work_VV0 and_CC Accomplishments_NP1 The_AT United_NP1 States_NP1 promotes_VVZ sustainable_JJ peace_NN1 in_II fragile_JJ countries_NN2 by_II building_VVG a_AT1 government_NN1 's_GE ability_NN1 to_TO resolve_VVI conflicts_NN2 ,_, promote_VV0 development_NN1 ,_, and_CC provide_VV0 for_IF its_APPGE own_DA people_NN ._. 
The_AT core_NN1 of_IO the_AT mission_NN1 is_VBZ to_TO resolve_VVI underlying_JJ grievances_NN2 at_II the_AT national_JJ and_CC community_NN1 levels_NN2 and_CC support_VV0 host-country_JJ institutions_NN2 that_CST can_VM provide_VVI effective_JJ security_NN1 and_CC justice_NN1 ._. 
The_AT Office_NN1 's_GE Civilian_JJ Response_NN1 Corps_NN ,_, drawn_VVN from_II eight_MC government_NN1 agencies_NN2 ,_, stands_VVZ ready_JJ to_TO deploy_VVI to_II fragile_JJ states_NN2 ._. 
In_II 2010_MC ,_, it_PPH1 made_VVD 292_MC deployments_NN2 ,_, nearly_RR three_MC times_NNT2 the_AT number_NN1 in_II the_AT previous_JJ year_NNT1 ,_, to_II 28_MC posts_NN2 overseas_RL ._. 
The_AT Active_JJ component_NN1 of_IO the_AT Corps_NN grew_VVD to_II 131_MC members_NN2 ._. 
Here_RL are_VBR some_DD highlights_NN2 of_IO that_DD1 work_NN1 ._. 
Afghanistan_NP1 At_II the_AT U.S._NP1 Embassy_NN1 in_II Kabul_NP1 ,_, S/CRS_FU supported_VVN the_AT strategic_JJ planning_NN1 and_CC assessment_NN1 section_NN1 ._. 
This_DD1 office_NN1 and_CC its_APPGE predecessor_NN1 worked_VVN with_IW Afghan_JJ partners_NN2 to_TO develop_VVI geographically_RR focused_VVN plans_NN2 ,_, including_II the_AT overarching_JJ guide_NN1 to_II civilian-military_JJ coordination_NN1 in_II Afghanistan_NP1 ,_, and_CC it_PPH1 supports_VVZ production_NN1 of_IO the_AT National_JJ Security_NN1 Council_NN1 's_GE quarterly_JJ progress_NN1 reports_NN2 ._. 
S/CRS-supported_NP1 teams_NN2 in_II Kabul_NP1 and_CC in_II Afghan_JJ Regional_JJ Commands_NN2 in_II the_AT East_ND1 ,_, South_ND1 ,_, and_CC Southwest_ND1 worked_VVN with_IW the_AT district_NN1 and_CC provincial_JJ institutions_NN2 to_TO build_VVI effective_JJ government_NN1 ._. 
Through_II the_AT Afghan_JJ Ministry_NN1 of_IO Finance_NN1 ,_, an_AT1 Embassy_NN1 team_NN1 of_IO S/CRS_FU experts_NN2 worked_VVN with_IW the_AT Afghan_JJ government_NN1 to_TO turn_VVI the_AT Afghan_JJ National_JJ Development_NN1 Strategy_NN1 into_II workable_JJ plans_NN2 that_CST international_JJ donors_NN2 can_VM support_VVI ,_, and_CC coordinated_VVD a_AT1 historic_JJ donors_NN2 '_GE conference_NN1 in_II Kabul_NP1 in_II July_NPM1 ._. 
Corps_NN members_NN2 from_II USAID_NP1 are_VBR providing_VVG contract_NN1 management_NN1 ,_, environmental_JJ ,_, and_CC engineering_NN1 advice_NN1 to_II understaffed_JJ and_CC underfunded_JJ Afghan_JJ ministries_NN2 on_II how_RRQ to_TO respond_VVI to_II crisis_NN1 and_CC improve_VVI service_NN1 delivery_NN1 ._. 
Corps_NN members_NN2 also_RR were_VBDR part_NN1 of_IO an_AT1 interagency_NN1 task_NN1 force_NN1 responsible_JJ for_IF rehabilitating_VVG Afghan_JJ insurgents_NN2 for_IF reintegration_NN1 into_II society_NN1 ._. 
This_DD1 partnership_NN1 with_IW the_AT State_NN1 Department_NN1 ,_, including_II members_NN2 of_IO the_AT Corps_NN ,_, and_CC the_AT Department_NN1 of_IO Defense_NN1 brought_VVD together_RL Afghan_JJ citizens_NN2 and_CC coalition_NN1 military_JJ partners_NN2 ._. 
The_AT task_NN1 force_NN1 created_VVD detainee_NN1 review_NN1 boards_NN2 ,_, developed_VVD educational_JJ programs_NN2 and_CC ensured_VVD that_CST U.S._NP1 detainee_NN1 systems_NN2 aligned_VVN with_IW the_AT Afghan_JJ criminal_JJ justice_NN1 system_NN1 ._. 
In_II May_NPM1 ,_, the_AT team_NN1 opened_VVD a_AT1 modern_JJ detention_NN1 facility_NN1 in_II Parwan_NP1 ,_, where_RRQ prisoners_NN2 are_VBR educated_VVN and_CC returned_VVN to_II Afghan_JJ society_NN1 ._. 
The_AT program_NN1 seeks_VVZ to_TO reduce_VVI insurgents_NN2 '_GE incentives_NN2 for_IF violence_NN1 ,_, prepare_VV0 them_PPHO2 to_TO become_VVI productive_JJ members_NN2 of_IO the_AT workforce_NN1 ,_, and_CC thereby_RR lower_JJR the_AT risk_NN1 that_CST they_PPHS2 will_VM return_VVI to_TO conflict_VVI ._. 
Corps_NN members_NN2 from_II the_AT Department_NN1 of_IO Justice_NN1 provided_CS corrections_NN2 support_VV0 and_CC prosecutorial_JJ expertise_NN1 ,_, USAID_NP1 Corps_NN members_NN2 met_VVN with_IW local_JJ leaders_NN2 to_TO prepare_VVI communities_NN2 to_TO receive_VVI detainees_NN2 ,_, and_CC Department_NN1 of_IO Agriculture_NN1 Corps_NN members_NN2 implemented_VVN farm_NN1 training_NN1 programs_NN2 at_II the_AT detention_NN1 facility_NN1 ._. 
Elsewhere_RL ,_, Corps_NN members_NN2 assisted_VVD the_AT Embassy_NN1 's_GE Strategic_JJ Communications_NN2 office_NN1 with_IW a_AT1 campaign_NN1 to_TO counter_VVI extremist_JJ voices_NN2 and_CC to_TO construct_VVI secure_JJ communications_NN2 towers_NN2 ._. 
The_AT Corps_NN also_RR assisted_VVD the_AT U.S._NP1 Embassy_NN1 's_GE elections_NN2 observation_NN1 work_NN1 in_II the_AT fall_NN1 of_IO 2010_MC ._. 
S/CRS_FU has_VHZ sent_VVN more_DAR than_CSN 100_MC people_NN from_II six_MC U.S._NP1 agencies_NN2 and_CC departments_NN2 to_II Afghanistan_NP1 ,_, including_II 70_MC in_II 2010_MC ._. 
Kyrgyz_VV0 Republic_NN1 Civilian_NN1 Response_NN1 Corps_NN members_NN2 from_II four_MC U.S._NP1 agencies_NN2 went_VVD to_II the_AT Kyrgyz_NP1 Republic_NN1 to_II further_JJR efforts_NN2 to_TO reduce_VVI potential_JJ conflict_NN1 and_CC support_VVI the_AT transition_NN1 to_II a_AT1 new_JJ government_NN1 ._. 
After_CS the_AT Kyrgyz_NP1 government_NN1 fell_VVD in_II April_NPM1 ,_, Corps_NN experts_NN2 offered_VVD conflict_NN1 prevention_NN1 expertise_NN1 ,_, reported_VVN on_II political_JJ and_CC economic_JJ conditions_NN2 ,_, assisted_VVN with_IW strategic_JJ communications_NN2 and_CC aid_NN1 coordination_NN1 ,_, and_CC served_VVD as_CSA election_NN1 advisers_NN2 ._. 
The_AT Corps_NN helped_VVN produce_VVI a_AT1 six-month_JJ U.S._NP1 strategy_NN1 to_TO help_VVI a_AT1 new_JJ ,_, more_RGR broad-based_JJ government_NN1 quickly_RR stand_VV0 up_RP and_CC provide_VV0 essential_JJ services_NN2 ._. 
After_CS ethnic_JJ violence_NN1 in_II June_NPM1 left_VVD hundreds_NNO2 dead_JJ and_CC hundreds_NNO2 of_IO thousands_NNO2 displaced_VVD ,_, Corps_NN members_NN2 established_VVD a_AT1 temporary_JJ U.S._NP1 office_NN1 in_II the_AT south_ND1 ._. 
From_II there_RL the_AT Corps_NN assisted_VVN in_II the_AT coordination_NN1 of_IO humanitarian_JJ and_CC disaster_NN1 response_NN1 and_CC improved_JJ reporting_NN1 from_II the_AT region_NN1 ._. 
Sudan_NP1 In_II anticipation_NN1 of_IO Southern_JJ Sudan_NP1 's_GE January_NPM1 2011_MC referendum_NN1 on_II self_NN1 determination_NN1 ,_, S/CRS_FU expanded_VVN its_APPGE involvement_NN1 significantly_RR in_II 2010_MC ._. 
S/CRS_FU 's_VBZ support_NN1 for_IF the_AT U.S._NP1 Special_JJ Envoy_NN1 for_IF Sudan_NP1 and_CC the_AT U.S._NP1 Consulate_NP1 General_NN1 in_II Juba_NP1 ,_, the_AT capital_NN1 of_IO Southern_JJ Sudan_NP1 ,_, enabled_VVD the_AT U.S._NP1 government_NN1 to_TO operate_VVI better_RRR in_II a_AT1 region_NN1 facing_VVG poverty_NN1 ,_, a_AT1 history_NN1 of_IO conflict_NN1 ,_, and_CC little_RR established_VVN governance_NN1 or_CC infrastructure_NN1 ._. 
The_AT Civilian_JJ Response_NN1 Corps_NN deployed_VVN officers_NN2 skilled_JJ at_II establishing_VVG operations_NN2 in_II austere_JJ and_CC remote_JJ locations_NN2 as_II31 well_II32 as_II33 interagency_NN1 experts_NN2 in_II rule_NN1 of_IO law_NN1 ,_, conflict_NN1 mitigation_NN1 ,_, and_CC governance_NN1 ._. 
The_AT Corps_NN 's_GE work_NN1 in_II Juba_NP1 improved_JJ relations_NN2 with_IW the_AT government_NN1 of_IO Southern_JJ Sudan_NP1 and_CC improved_VVD U.S._NP1 awareness_NN1 there_RL ,_, a_AT1 role_NN1 that_CST evolved_VVD out_II21 of_II22 earlier_JJR election_NN1 observation_NN1 work_NN1 during_II national_JJ elections_NN2 in_II April_NPM1 ._. 
The_AT Corps_NN 's_GE presence_NN1 also_RR gave_VVD the_AT United_NP1 States_NP1 a_AT1 stronger_JJR voice_NN1 in_II discussions_NN2 with_IW groups_NN2 such_II21 as_II22 the_AT United_JJ Nations_NN2 ,_, the_AT African_JJ Union_NN1 ,_, bilateral_JJ partners_NN2 ,_, and_CC local_JJ NGOs_NP2 ._. 
Additionally_RR ,_, S/CRS_FU deployed_VVN five_MC Corps_NN teams_NN2 to_TO partner_VVI with_IW the_AT government_NN1 and_CC people_NN of_IO Southern_JJ Sudan_NP1 ._. 
Traveling_VVG to_II remote_JJ areas_NN2 and_CC operating_VVG alongside_II local_JJ populations_NN2 ,_, these_DD2 teams_NN2 worked_VVD to_TO prevent_VVI violence_NN1 and_CC monitor_VVI local_JJ disputes_NN2 over_II issues_NN2 such_II21 as_II22 cattle_NN2 theft_NN1 and_CC access_NN1 to_II water_NN1 ._. 
Corps_NN members_NN2 also_RR identified_VVN and_CC helped_VVN alleviate_VVI voter_NN1 registration_NN1 issues_NN2 ._. 
Through_II the_AT U.S._NP1 Special_JJ Envoy_NN1 to_II Sudan_NP1 ,_, S/CRS_FU helped_VVN identify_VVI risks_NN2 and_CC set_VV0 goals_NN2 for_IF longer-term_JJ U.S._NP1 efforts_NN2 ._. 
S/CRS_FU planners_NN2 supported_VVD these_DD2 efforts_NN2 to_TO strengthen_VVI the_AT government_NN1 of_IO Southern_JJ Sudan_NP1 ,_, enhance_VV0 local_JJ reconciliation_NN1 efforts_NN2 ,_, improve_VV0 humanitarian_JJ assistance_NN1 ,_, and_CC prepare_VV0 for_IF the_AT referendum_NN1 ._. 
Haiti_NP1 After_II the_AT January_NPM1 2010_MC earthquake_NN1 ,_, S/CRS_FU helped_VVN mobilize_VVI a_AT1 government-wide_JJ effort_NN1 to_TO develop_VVI a_AT1 strategy_NN1 to_TO bring_VVI together_RL people_NN and_CC funding_NN1 to_TO respond_VVI to_II the_AT crisis_NN1 ._. 
The_AT U.S._NP1 task_NN1 force_NN1 included_VVD 45_MC offices_NN2 and_CC agencies_NN2 working_VVG on_II issues_NN2 including_II economic_JJ security_NN1 ,_, provision_NN1 of_IO essential_JJ services_NN2 ,_, rule_NN1 of_IO law_NN1 ,_, and_CC response_NN1 to_II vulnerable_JJ children_NN2 ._. 
The_AT resulting_JJ plan_NN1 ,_, which_DDQ USAID_NP1 used_VMK to_TO guide_VVI long-term_JJ post-emergency_NN1 relief_NN1 efforts_NN2 ,_, laid_VVD out_RP the_AT work_NN1 necessary_JJ to_TO ensure_VVI that_CST a_AT1 fragile_JJ state_NN1 did_VDD not_XX fall_VVI into_II chaos_NN1 once_RR immediate_JJ humanitarian_JJ efforts_NN2 subsided_VVD ._. 
The_AT earthquake_NN1 shattered_VVD Port-au-Prince_NP1 ,_, but_CCB a_AT1 stabilization_NN1 project_NN1 that_DD1 S/CRS_FU oversees_VVZ helped_VVN keep_VVI peace_NN1 in_II Cite_NP1 Soleil_NP1 ,_, one_PN1 particularly_RR volatile_JJ neighborhood_NN1 ._. 
In_II 2007_MC ,_, U.S._NP1 civilian_JJ organizations_NN2 ,_, including_II USAID_NP1 and_CC the_AT State_NN1 Department_NN1 's_GE Bureau_NN1 of_IO International_JJ Narcotics_NN2 and_CC Law_NN1 Enforcement_NN1 Affairs_NN2 and_CC Bureau_NN1 of_IO Western_JJ Hemisphere_NN1 Affairs_NN2 ,_, began_VVD working_VVG together_RL in_II Cite_NP1 Soleil_NP1 to_TO implement_VVI a_AT1 whole-of-government_JJ plan_NN1 that_DD1 S/CRS_FU designed_VVN ,_, focused_VVN on_II job_NN1 creation_NN1 in_II infrastructure_NN1 ,_, the_AT judicial_JJ system_NN1 ,_, and_CC community_NN1 policing_NN1 ._. 
After_CS the_AT earthquake_NN1 ,_, Cite_NP1 Soleil_NP1 remained_VVD relatively_RR stable_JJ ._. 
U.S.-supported_JJ police_NN2 stations_NN2 remained_VVD standing_NN1 ,_, and_CC residents_NN2 rejected_VVD a_AT1 return_NN1 of_IO gang_NN1 activity_NN1 ._. 
The_AT success_NN1 of_IO the_AT plan_NN1 led_VVD the_AT State_NN1 Department_NN1 to_TO replicate_VVI the_AT program_NN1 in_II another_DD1 hot-spot_JJ neighborhood_NN1 ,_, Martissant_NP1 ,_, where_CS residents_NN2 are_VBR clearing_VVG the_AT way_NN1 for_IF a_AT1 new_JJ road_NN1 and_CC construction_NN1 has_VHZ begun_VVN on_II new_JJ police_NN2 substations_NN2 ._. 
In_II December_NPM1 ,_, amid_II civil_JJ unrest_NN1 following_VVG the_AT release_NN1 of_IO preliminary_JJ election_NN1 results_NN2 ,_, S/CRS_FU helped_VVN the_AT U.S._NP1 Embassy_NN1 review_VV0 the_AT election_NN1 results_NN2 to_TO identify_VVI irregularities_NN2 and_CC areas_NN2 of_IO potential_JJ fraud_NN1 ._. 
Democratic_JJ Republic_NN1 of_IO the_AT Congo_NP1 S/CRS_FU played_VVN a_AT1 large_JJ role_NN1 in_II implementing_VVG a_AT1 stabilization_NN1 initiative_NN1 forged_VVN by_II Congolese_JJ President_NNB Joseph_NP1 Kabila_NP1 and_CC Secretary_NN1 of_IO State_NN1 Hillary_NP1 Rodham_NP1 Clinton_NP1 during_II her_APPGE visit_NN1 to_II the_AT DRC_NP1 in_II 2009_MC ._. 
The_AT Office_NN1 trained_VVN and_CC deployed_VVN interagency_NN1 assessment_NN1 teams_NN2 to_TO examine_VVI five_MC sectors_NN2 :_: gender-based_JJ violence_NN1 ;_; security_NN1 sector_NN1 reform_NN1 ;_; food_NN1 security_NN1 ;_; corruption_NN1 ;_; and_CC minerals_NN2 management_NN1 ._. 
Corps_NN members_NN2 from_II six_MC agencies_NN2 made_VVD up_RP more_DAR than_CSN a_AT1 third_MD of_IO the_AT 30_MC team_NN1 members_NN2 ,_, and_CC managed_VVD all_DB logistics_NN1 and_CC security_NN1 ._. 
Recommendations_NN2 from_II this_DD1 work_NN1 now_RT guide_VV0 the_AT U.S._NP1 and_CC Congolese_JJ efforts_NN2 to_TO address_VVI these_DD2 issues_NN2 ._. 
S/CRS_FU supported_VVN one_MC1 of_IO the_AT assessments_NN2 '_GE key_JJ recommendations_NN2 ,_, the_AT development_NN1 of_IO a_AT1 mobile_JJ banking_NN1 system_NN1 to_TO combat_VVI corruption_NN1 ,_, through_II the_AT Congolese_JJ Central_JJ Bank_NN1 and_CC the_AT Ministries_NN2 of_IO Finance_NN1 and_CC Telecommunications_NN2 ._. 
The_AT Corps_NN deployed_VVN a_AT1 French-speaking_JJ security_NN1 expert_NN1 to_II the_AT capital_NN1 of_IO Kinshasa_NP1 to_TO enhance_VVI UN_NP1 efforts_NN2 to_TO coordinate_VVI international_JJ assistance_NN1 to_II the_AT DRC_NP1 's_GE army_NN1 and_CC establish_VV0 reliable_JJ security_NN1 forces_NN2 ,_, a_AT1 key_NN1 to_II peace_NN1 and_CC stability_NN1 ._. 
S/CRS_FU also_RR oversaw_VV0 ongoing_JJ projects_NN2 in_II eastern_JJ DRC_NP1 to_TO counter_VVI illegal_JJ armed_JJ groups_NN2 ,_, establish_VV0 justice_NN1 and_CC governance_NN1 systems_NN2 and_CC train_VV0 civilian_JJ police_NN2 to_TO respond_VVI to_II cases_NN2 of_IO sexual_JJ and_CC gender-based_JJ violence_NN1 ._. 
