Some_DD 80_MC to_II 90_MC percent_NNU of_IO world_NN1 trade_NN1 relies_VVZ on_II some_DD form_NN1 of_IO trade_NN1 finance_NN1 ._. 
Since_CS the_AT first_MD half_NN1 of_IO 2008_MC ,_, there_EX has_VHZ been_VBN evidence_NN1 of_IO tightening_JJ market_NN1 conditions_NN2 for_IF trade_NN1 finance_NN1 ._. 
As_CSA expected_VVN by_II market_NN1 participants_NN2 ,_, the_AT situation_NN1 worsened_VVN in_II the_AT second_MD half_NN1 of_IO the_AT year_NNT1 ,_, and_CC even_RR further_RRR in_II the_AT first_MD quarter_NN1 of_IO 2009_MC ._. 
According_II21 to_II22 expecta-_JJ tions_NN2 revealed_VVN in_II market-based_JJ surveys_NN2 ,_, there_EX is_VBZ little_RR doubt_VV0 that_CST the_AT trade_NN1 finance_NN1 market_NN1 will_VM continue_VVI to_TO experience_VVI difficulties_NN2 throughout_II 2009_MC ._. 
This_DD1 situation_NN1 is_VBZ likely_JJ to_TO contribute_VVI to_II deepening_VVG the_AT global_JJ economic_JJ malaise_NN1 ._. 
Although_CS public-backed_JJ institutions_NN2 have_VH0 responded_VVN rapidly_RR to_II the_AT situation_NN1 over_II the_AT course_NN1 of_IO 2008_MC ,_, this_DD1 has_VHZ apparently_RR not_XX been_VBN enough_DD to_TO bridge_VVI the_AT gap_NN1 between_II supply_NN1 and_CC demand_NN1 of_IO trade_NN1 finance_VV0 worldwide_RL ._. 
This_DD1 is_VBZ why_RRQ the_AT G-20_FO adopted_VVD a_AT1 wider_JJR package_NN1 for_IF injecting_VVG some_DD US$250_FO billion_NNO in_II31 support_II32 of_II33 trade_NN1 finance_NN1 ._. 
Why_RRQ does_VDZ trade_VVI finance_NN1 matter_NN1 ?_? 
Part_NN1 of_IO the_AT reason_NN1 for_IF the_AT collapse_NN1 of_IO world_NN1 trade_NN1 concerns_VVZ problems_NN2 with_IW trade_NN1 credit_NN1 financing_NN1 ._. 
The_AT global_JJ market_NN1 for_IF trade_NN1 finance_NN1 (_( credit_NN1 and_CC insurance_NN1 )_) is_VBZ estimated_VVN at_II between_II US$10_FO and_CC US$12_FO trillion_NNO --_NN1 that_REX21 is_REX22 ,_, roughly_RR 67_MC to_II 80_MC percent_NNU of_IO 2008_MC trade_NN1 flows_VVZ that_CST are_VBR valued_VVN at_II US$15_FO trillion_NNO ._. 
The_AT World_NN1 Bank_NN1 estimates_VVZ that_CST 85_MC to_II 90_MC percent_NNU of_IO the_AT fall_NN1 in_II world_NN1 trade_NN1 since_CS the_AT second_MD half_NN1 of_IO 2008_MC is_VBZ due_II21 to_II22 falling_VVG international_JJ demand_NN1 ,_, and_CC the_AT rest_NN1 --_NN1 10_MC to_II 15_MC percent_NNU --_NN1 is_VBZ attributable_JJ to_II a_AT1 fall_NN1 in_II the_AT supply_NN1 of_IO trade_NN1 finance_NN1 ._. 
This_DD1 chapter_NN1 lays_VVZ out_RP some_DD recent_JJ developments_NN2 and_CC explains_VVZ decisions_NN2 made_VVN at_II the_AT G-20_FO London_NP1 Summit_NN1 regarding_II what_DDQ is_VBZ potentially_RR one_MC1 of_IO the_AT main_JJ sources_NN2 of_IO contagion_NN1 of_IO the_AT financial_JJ crisis_NN1 from_II a_AT1 trade_NN1 perspective_NN1 --_NN1 the_AT supply_NN1 of_IO trade_NN1 finance_NN1 ._. 
The_AT potential_JJ damage_NN1 to_II the_AT real_JJ economy_NN1 from_II shrinking_JJ trade_NN1 finance_NN1 is_VBZ enormous_JJ ._. 
International_JJ supply_NN1 chain_NN1 arrangements_NN2 have_VH0 globalized_VVN not_XX only_RR production_NN1 ,_, but_CCB also_RR trade_VV0 finance_NN1 ._. 
Sophisticated_JJ supply_NN1 chain_NN1 financing_NN1 operations_NN2 --_NN1 including_II those_DD2 for_IF small-_NN1 and_CC medium-sized_JJ enterprises_NN2 (_( SMEs_NN2 )_) --_NN1 place_VV0 a_AT1 high_JJ level_NN1 of_IO trust_NN1 and_CC confidence_NN1 in_II global_JJ suppliers_NN2 ,_, relying_VVG on_II their_APPGE delivery_NN1 of_IO their_APPGE share_NN1 of_IO value-added_JJ and_CC on_II their_APPGE financial_JJ ability_NN1 to_TO produce_VVI and_CC export_NN1 supplies_VVZ in_II a_AT1 timely_JJ manner_NN1 ._. 
The_AT institutional_JJ case_NN1 for_IF the_AT World_NN1 Trade_NN1 Organization_NN1 (_( WTO_NP1 )_) to_TO be_VBI concerned_JJ about_II the_AT scarcity_NN1 of_IO trade_NN1 finance_NN1 during_II periods_NN2 of_IO crisis_NN1 is_VBZ relatively_RR clear_JJ ._. 
In_II situations_NN2 of_IO extreme_JJ financial_JJ crises_NN2 ,_, such_II21 as_II22 those_DD2 experienced_VVN by_II emerging_JJ economies_NN2 in_II the_AT 1990s_MC2 ,_, the_AT credit_NN1 crunch_NN1 reduced_VVD access_NN1 to_TO trade_VVI finance_NN1 --_NN1 which_DDQ was_VBDZ already_RR the_AT short-term_JJ segment_NN1 of_IO the_AT market_NN1 --_NN1 and_CC hence_RR reduced_VVN trade_NN1 ,_, which_DDQ would_VM usually_RR be_VBI the_AT prime_JJ vector_NN1 of_IO balance_NN1 of_IO payments_NN2 '_GE recovery_NN1 ._. 
The_AT credit_NN1 crunch_NN1 also_RR affected_VVN some_DD countries_NN2 during_II the_AT Asian_JJ financial_JJ crisis_NN1 in_II 1997_MC to_II the_AT point_NN1 of_IO bringing_VVG the_AT affected_JJ economies_NN2 to_II a_AT1 halt_NN1 ._. 
In_II the_AT immediate_JJ after-math_NN1 of_IO the_AT Asian_JJ crisis_NN1 ,_, a_AT1 large_JJ amount_NN1 of_IO outstanding_JJ credit_NN1 lines_NN2 for_IF trade_NN1 had_VHD to_TO be_VBI rescheduled_VVN by_II creditors_NN2 and_CC debtors_NN2 to_TO re-ignite_VVI trade_NN1 flows_VVZ --_JJ and_CC hence_RR the_AT economy_NN1 --_NN1 as_II the_AT two_MC are_VBR inextricably_RR linked_VVN ._. 
Under_II the_AT umbrella_NN1 of_IO the_AT Marrakech_NN1 Mandate_NN1 on_II Coherence_NN1 ,_, in_II 2003_MC the_AT heads_NN2 of_IO the_AT WTO_NN1 ,_, the_AT International_JJ Monetary_JJ Fund_NN1 (_( IMF_NP1 )_) ,_, and_CC the_AT World_NN1 Bank_NN1 convened_VVD an_AT1 expert_NN1 group_NN1 of_IO trade_NN1 finance_NN1 practitioners_NN2 to_TO examine_VVI what_DDQ went_VVD wrong_RR in_II the_AT trade_NN1 finance_NN1 market_NN1 and_CC to_TO prepare_VVI contingencies_NN2 ._. 
The_AT conclusions_NN2 of_IO the_AT experts_NN2 were_VBDR summarized_VVN in_II two_MC reports_NN2 ._. 
The_AT economic_JJ case_NN1 for_IF the_AT involvement_NN1 of_IO international_JJ organizations_NN2 ,_, in_RR21 particular_RR22 the_AT WTO_NN1 ,_, has_VHZ been_VBN discussed_VVN ._. 
The_AT main_JJ arguments_NN2 are_VBR based_VVN on_II the_AT idea_NN1 that_CST trade_NN1 finance_NN1 is_VBZ ,_, to_II a_AT1 large_JJ extent_NN1 ,_, a_AT1 very_RG secure_JJ ,_, short-term_JJ ,_, self-liquidating_JJ form_NN1 of_IO finance_NN1 ._. 
Even_RR in_II some_DD of_IO the_AT most_RGT acute_JJ periods_NN2 of_IO financial_JJ crises_NN2 (_( 1825_MC ,_, 1930_MC )_) ,_, international_JJ credit_NN1 lines_NN2 have_VH0 never_RR been_VBN cut_VVN off_RP ._. 
For_IF centuries_NNT2 ,_, the_AT expansion_NN1 of_IO trade_NN1 has_VHZ depended_VVN on_II reliable_JJ and_CC cost-effective_JJ sources_NN2 of_IO finance_NN1 backed_VVN by_II a_AT1 deep_JJ ,_, global_JJ secondary_JJ market_NN1 of_IO fluid_NN1 and_CC secured_VVD financing_VVG instruments_NN2 and_CC a_AT1 wide_JJ range_NN1 of_IO credit_NN1 insurance_NN1 products_NN2 ,_, provided_VVN by_II private-_NN1 and_CC public-sector_JJ institutions_NN2 (_( including_II national_JJ export_NN1 credit_NN1 agencies_NN2 ,_, regional_JJ development_NN1 banks_NN2 ,_, and_CC the_AT World_NN1 Bank_NN1 Group_NN1 's_GE International_JJ Finance_NN1 Corporation_NN1 ,_, or_CC IFC_NP1 )_) ._. 
However_RR ,_, since_CS the_AT Asian_JJ crisis_NN1 ,_, the_AT trade_NN1 finance_NN1 market_NN1 has_VHZ not_XX been_VBN totally_RR immune_JJ from_II general_JJ reassessments_NN2 of_IO risk_NN1 ,_, sharp_RR squeezes_VVZ in_II overall_JJ market_NN1 liquidity_NN1 ,_, or_CC herd_NN1 behavior_NN1 as_CSA demonstrated_VVN by_II runs_NN2 on_II currencies_NN2 or_CC repatriation_NN1 of_IO foreign_JJ assets_NN2 ._. 
Such_DA reactions_NN2 might_VM happen_VVI again_RT in_II this_DD1 current_JJ turmoil_NN1 ._. 
Commercial_JJ risk_NN1 in_II trade_NN1 finance_NN1 normally_RR stems_VVZ from_II the_AT risk_NN1 of_IO non-payment_NN1 by_II the_AT counterparty_NN1 to_II the_AT trade_NN1 operation_NN1 (_( either_RR the_AT client_NN1 company_NN1 or_CC its_APPGE bank_NN1 )_) ._. 
The_AT perception_NN1 of_IO this_DD1 risk_NN1 obviously_RR has_VHZ changed_VVN with_IW exchange_NN1 rate_NN1 fluctuations_NN2 ,_, the_AT rise_NN1 in_II political_JJ risk_NN1 ,_, and_CC bank_NN1 failures_NN2 ,_, all_DB of_IO which_DDQ may_VM undermine_VVI the_AT profit-_JJ ability_NN1 of_IO trade_NN1 ._. 
Such_DA rapid_JJ change_NN1 in_II risk_NN1 perception_NN1 has_VHZ happened_VVN abruptly_RR --_JJ for_REX21 example_REX22 ,_, through_II the_AT Fall_NN1 of_IO 2008_MC --_JJ with_II31 respect_II32 to_II33 certain_JJ Eastern_JJ European_JJ countries_NN2 ._. 
At_II the_AT present_JJ moment_NN1 ,_, many_DA2 lenders_NN2 have_VH0 adopted_VVN a_AT1 wait-and-see_VV0 attitude_NN1 triggered_VVD by_II doubts_NN2 about_II the_AT creditworthiness_NN1 of_IO banks_NN2 in_II a_AT1 number_NN1 of_IO regions_NN2 in_II the_AT world_NN1 ,_, including_II developing_JJ countries_NN2 ,_, as_RG well_RR as_CSA by_II the_AT increase_NN1 in_II the_AT balance_NN1 of_IO payments_NN2 risk_VV0 ._. 
What_DDQ aggravates_VVZ the_AT situation_NN1 is_VBZ that_CST the_AT secondary_JJ market_NN1 has_VHZ also_RR dried_VVN up_RP ._. 
Just_RR as_CSA lending_NN1 seems_VVZ to_TO be_VBI directly_RR affected_VVN by_II the_AT tight_JJ liquidity_NN1 situation_NN1 world-wide_JJ ,_, the_AT re-insurance_NN1 market_NN1 has_VHZ suffered_VVN from_II the_AT dif-ficulties_NN2 faced_VVN by_II American_JJ International_JJ Group_NN1 ,_, Inc_JJ ._. 
(_( AIG_NP1 )_) and_CC Lloyds_NP1 ._. 
Of_RR21 course_RR22 ,_, it_PPH1 can_VM be_VBI argued_VVN that_CST such_DA exogenous_JJ factors_NN2 as_CSA liquidity_NN1 squeeze_VV0 ,_, exchange_NN1 rate_NN1 fluctuations_NN2 ,_, and_CC other_JJ components_NN2 impacting_VVG risk_NN1 are_VBR not_XX specific_JJ to_TO trade_VVI finance_NN1 ._. 
Any_DD un-hedged_VVD cross-border_JJ flow_NN1 would_VM most_RGT likely_RR be_VBI affected_VVN by_II these_DD2 elements_NN2 ._. 
Likewise_RR ,_, the_AT supply_NN1 of_IO credit_NN1 would_VM be_VBI affected_VVN by_II the_AT greater_JJR scarcity_NN1 of_IO liquidity_NN1 available_JJ to_II some_DD banks_NN2 in_II the_AT inter-bank_JJ market_NN1 ._. 
Yet_RR ,_, since_CS trade_NN1 finance_NN1 has_VHZ to_TO compete_VVI for_IF an_AT1 equal_JJ or_CC reduced_JJ amount_NN1 of_IO liquidity_NN1 like_II any_DD other_JJ segment_NN1 of_IO the_AT credit_NN1 market_NN1 ,_, the_AT price_NN1 of_IO transactions_NN2 has_VHZ increased_VVN sharply_RR under_II the_AT combined_JJ effects_NN2 of_IO scarce_JJ liquidity_NN1 to_TO back_VVI up_RP loans_NN2 and_CC a_AT1 re-assessment_NN1 of_IO customer_NN1 and_CC country_NN1 risks_NN2 ._. 
Spreads_VVZ on_II 90-day_JJ letters_NN2 of_IO credit_NN1 have_VH0 gone_VVN through_II the_AT roof_NN1 over_II the_AT course_NN1 of_IO 2008_MC (_( rising_VVG from_II 10_MC -_- 16_MC basis_NN1 points_VVZ to_II 250_MC -_- 500_MC basis_NN1 points_VVZ on_II a_AT1 normal_JJ basis_NN1 for_IF letters_NN2 of_IO credit_NN1 issued_VVN by_II emerging_VVG and_CC developing_JJ economies_NN2 )_) ._. 
It_PPH1 is_VBZ hard_JJ to_TO believe_VVI that_CST the_AT safest_JJT and_CC most_RGT self-liquidating_JJ form_NN1 of_IO finance_NN1 ,_, with_IW strong_JJ receivables_NN2 and_CC marketable_JJ collaterals_NN2 ,_, could_VM see_VVI its_APPGE price_NN1 increase_NN1 by_II a_AT1 factor_NN1 of_IO 10_MC to_II 50_MC even_CS21 when_CS22 it_PPH1 is_VBZ under_RG severe_JJ stress_NN1 ._. 
Indeed_RR ,_, this_DD1 segment_NN1 of_IO the_AT credit_NN1 market_NN1 has_VHZ been_VBN by_RR21 far_RR22 the_AT most_RGT resilient_JJ since_CS the_AT sub-prime_JJ crisis_NN1 began_VVD in_II mid_JJ 2007_MC ,_, before_CS signs_NN2 of_IO market_NN1 gaps_NN2 at_II a_AT1 global_JJ scale_NN1 appeared_VVD in_II the_AT Fall_NN1 of_IO 2008_MC ,_, well_RR after_CS they_PPHS2 emerged_VVD in_II other_JJ segments_NN2 of_IO the_AT credit_NN1 market_NN1 ._. 
This_DD1 strong_JJ resilience_NN1 can_VM be_VBI partially_RR attributed_VVN to_II facilitation_NN1 devices_NN2 developed_VVN by_II public-backed_JJ regional_JJ or_CC multi-_JJ lateral_JJ financial_JJ institutions_NN2 after_II the_AT Asian_JJ financial_JJ crisis_NN1 ._. 
Trade_NN1 finance_NN1 facilitation_NN1 programs_NN2 that_CST provide_VV0 for_IF risk_NN1 mitigation_NN1 between_II banks_NN2 issuing_VVG and_CC those_DD2 receiving_VVG trade_NN1 finance_NN1 instruments_NN2 have_VH0 been_VBN developed_VVN into_II a_AT1 worldwide_JJ network_NN1 ,_, in_II which_DDQ the_AT IFC_NP1 ,_, the_AT European_JJ Bank_NN1 for_IF Reconstruction_NN1 and_CC Development_NN1 (_( EBRD_NP1 )_) ,_, the_AT Asian_JJ Development_NN1 Bank_NN1 (_( ADB_NP1 )_) ,_, and_CC the_AT Inter-_JJ American_JJ Development_NN1 Bank_NN1 (_( IADB_NP1 )_) participate_VV0 ._. 
Institutions_NN2 such_II21 as_II22 the_AT Organization_NN1 of_IO the_AT Petroleum_NN1 Exporting_NN1 Countries_NN2 (_( OPEC_NP1 )_) Fund_NN1 ,_, the_AT Islamic_JJ Development_NN1 Bank_NN1 ,_, and_CC the_AT African_JJ Development_NN1 Bank_NN1 have_VH0 also_RR developed_VVN or_CC are_VBR developing_VVG similar_JJ instruments_NN2 ._. 
In_RR21 addition_RR22 ,_, national_JJ export_NN1 credit_NN1 agencies_NN2 have_VH0 expanded_VVN short-term_JJ trade_NN1 finance_NN1 operations_NN2 and_CC added_VVN considerable_JJ liquidity_NN1 to_II the_AT markets_NN2 in_II recent_JJ years_NNT2 ,_, according_II21 to_II22 Berne_NP1 Union_NP1 statistics_NN ._. 
Both_DB2 types_NN2 of_IO institutions_NN2 have_VH0 hence_RR recently_RR developed_VVN a_AT1 unique_JJ savoir-faire_NN1 and_CC are_VBR potentially_RR ready_JJ to_TO add_VVI further_JJR liquidity_NN1 and_CC expand_VVI their_APPGE risk_NN1 mitigation_NN1 capacity_NN1 should_VM the_AT need_NN1 arise_VVI ._. 
The_AT current_JJ situation_NN1 Despite_II the_AT relatively_RR strong_JJ resilience_NN1 of_IO the_AT trade_NN1 finance_NN1 markets_NN2 ,_, the_AT global_JJ liquidity_NN1 situation_NN1 --_NN1 along_II21 with_II22 a_AT1 general_JJ re-assessment_NN1 of_IO counterparty_NN1 risk_NN1 and_CC an_AT1 expected_JJ increase_NN1 in_II payment_NN1 defaults_NN2 on_II trade_NN1 operations_NN2 --_NN1 was_VBDZ a_AT1 major_JJ constraint_NN1 in_II 2008_MC for_IF the_AT largest_JJT suppliers_NN2 of_IO trade_NN1 finance_NN1 ._. 
The_AT market_NN1 gap_NN1 initially_RR appeared_VVD on_II Wall_NP1 Street_NNL1 and_CC in_II London_NP1 ,_, as_CSA US-_JJ and_CC UK-based_JJ global_JJ banks_NN2 --_NN1 particularly_RR those_DD2 with_IW deteri-_JJ orated_JJ balance_NN1 sheets_NN2 --_NN1 could_VM not_XX off-load_VVI or_CC refinance_VVI their_APPGE excess_JJ exposure_NN1 in_II trade_NN1 credits_VVZ on_II the_AT secondary_JJ market_NN1 ._. 
The_AT situation_NN1 spread_VVN to_II developing_JJ countries'markets_NN2 in_II the_AT second_MD part_NN1 of_IO 2008_MC ._. 
As_II a_AT1 result_NN1 ,_, some_DD banks_NN2 were_VBDR unable_JK to_TO meet_VVI the_AT demand_NN1 from_II their_APPGE customers_NN2 for_IF new_JJ trade_NN1 operations_NN2 ,_, leaving_VVG a_AT1 market_NN1 gap_NN1 estimated_VVN at_II around_II US$25_FO billion_NNO in_II November_NPM1 2008_MC out_II21 of_II22 the_AT global_JJ market_NN1 for_IF trade_NN1 finance_NN1 estimated_VVN at_II some_DD US$10_FO -_- 12_MC trillion_NNO a_AT1 year_NNT1 ._. 
Some_DD very_RG large_JJ banks_NN2 used_VMK to_TO roll_VVI over_RP up_II21 to_II22 US$20_FO billion_NNO per_II month_NNT1 into_II the_AT secondary_JJ market_NN1 ;_; this_DD1 amount_NN1 is_VBZ down_RP to_II US$200_FO million_NNO or_CC less_RGR right_RR now_RT because_CS there_EX is_VBZ no_AT counter-_JJ party_NN1 ._. 
Demand_VV0 for_IF trade_NN1 credit_NN1 is_VBZ far_RR from_II being_VBG satisfied_VVN ,_, and_CC ,_, according_II21 to_II22 market_NN1 specialists_NN2 ,_, the_AT rise_NN1 in_II prices_NN2 for_IF opening_VVG letters_NN2 of_IO credit_NN1 by_RR21 far_RR22 outweighs_VVZ the_AT normal_JJ reassessment_NN1 of_IO risk_NN1 ._. 
More_RGR disturbing_JJ is_VBZ the_AT fact_NN1 that_CST large_JJ banks_NN2 have_VH0 reported_VVN on_II several_DA2 occasions_NN2 that_CST the_AT lack_NN1 of_IO financing_VVG capacity_NN1 has_VHZ made_VVN them_PPHO2 unable_JK to_TO finance_VVI trade_NN1 operations_NN2 ._. 
It_PPH1 has_VHZ ,_, however_RR ,_, been_VBN argued_VVN by_II relatively_RR profitable_JJ banks_NN2 that_CST the_AT situation_NN1 --_NN1 particularly_RR in_II the_AT secondary_JJ market_NN1 --_NN1 has_VHZ softened_VVN recently_RR ,_, although_CS not_XX for_IF everyone_PN1 ._. 
In_II the_AT course_NN1 of_IO 2008_MC ,_, the_AT liquidity_NN1 problem_NN1 has_VHZ spread_VVN to_II other_JJ developing_JJ countries_NN2 '_GE money_NN1 markets_NN2 ,_, with_IW the_AT poorer_JJR countries_NN2 in_II Asia_NP1 ,_, Latin_JJ America_NP1 ,_, and_CC Africa_NP1 being_VBG particularly_RR affected_VVN ._. 
This_DD1 adds_VVZ to_II the_AT prob-_JJ lems_NN2 faced_VVN by_II local_JJ banks_NN2 in_II such_DA developing_JJ countries_NN2 in_II normal_JJ circumstances_NN2 :_: the_AT relative_JJ lack_NN1 of_IO depth_NN1 of_IO money_NN1 markets_NN2 ,_, the_AT lack_NN1 of_IO capacity_NN1 to_TO handle_VVI large_JJ vol-umes_NN2 of_IO trade_NN1 credit_NN1 ,_, and_CC the_AT lack_NN1 of_IO reliable_JJ information_NN1 on_II the_AT creditworthiness_NN1 of_IO customers_NN2 ,_, to_TO name_VVI only_RR a_AT1 few_DA2 specific_JJ issues_NN2 confronting_VVG these_DD2 banks_NN2 ._. 
In_II periods_NN2 of_IO crisis_NN1 ,_, such_II21 as_II22 the_AT one_PN1 we_PPIS2 are_VBR in_II now_RT ,_, these_DD2 issues_NN2 lead_VV0 to_II difficulties_NN2 in_II finding_VVG partners_NN2 in_II developed_JJ countries_NN2 to_TO accept_VVI the_AT counterparty_NN1 risk_NN1 ._. 
According_II21 to_II22 the_AT joint_JJ IMF-Bankers'Association_NN1 for_IF Finance_NN1 and_CC Trade_NN1 (_( BAFT_NP1 )_) survey_NN1 ,_, flows_NN2 of_IO trade_NN1 finance_NN1 from_II developing_JJ countries_NN2 '_GE banks_NN2 seem_VV0 to_TO have_VHI fallen_VVN by_II some_DD 6_MC percent_NNU or_CC more_RGR year-on-year_JJ (_( from_II the_AT end_NN1 of_IO the_AT 3rd_MD quarter_NN1 2007_MC through_II the_AT end_NN1 of_IO the_AT 3rd_MD quarter_NN1 2008_MC )_) ._. 
This_DD1 is_VBZ more_DAR than_CSN the_AT reduction_NN1 in_II trade_NN1 flows_VVZ from_II and_CC to_II developing_JJ countries_NN2 during_II the_AT same_DA period_NN1 ,_, implying_VVG that_CST the_AT lack_NN1 of_IO trade_NN1 finance_NN1 is_VBZ indeed_RR an_AT1 issue_NN1 for_IF these_DD2 countries_NN2 ._. 
In_II late_JJ 2008_MC ,_, it_PPH1 was_VBDZ expected_VVN that_DD1 trade_NN1 finance_NN1 flows_VVZ for_IF developing-country_JJ banks_NN2 would_VM fall_VVI by_II a_AT1 further_JJR 10_MC percent_NNU in_II 2009_MC ._. 
If_CS such_DA numbers_NN2 were_VBDR to_TO be_VBI confirmed_VVN (_( at_RR21 least_RR22 developing-country_JJ banks_NN2 seem_VV0 to_TO agree_VVI with_IW this_DD1 estimate_NN1 ,_, according_II21 to_II22 the_AT survey_NN1 )_) ,_, this_DD1 would_VM mean_VVI that_CST the_AT market_NN1 gap_NN1 could_VM be_VBI well_JJ over_II the_AT US$25_FO billion_NNO estimate_NN1 mentioned_VVN above_RL --_JJ higher_JJR even_RR than_CSN US$100_FO billion_NNO ,_, up_II21 to_II22 US$300_FO billion_NNO ._. 
Such_DA scarcity_NN1 of_IO trade_NN1 finance_NN1 is_VBZ very_RG likely_JJ to_TO accelerate_VVI the_AT slowdown_NN1 of_IO world_NN1 trade_NN1 and_CC output_NN1 ._. 
Ahead_II21 of_II22 the_AT G-20_FO Summit_NN1 in_II London_NP1 ,_, the_AT IMF_NP1 and_CC BAFT_NP1 provided_VVD an_AT1 update_NN1 of_IO their_APPGE survey_NN1 ,_, which_DDQ indicated_VVD that_CST the_AT decrease_NN1 in_II the_AT value_NN1 of_IO trade_NN1 finance_NN1 accelerated_VVD between_II October_NPM1 2008_MC and_CC January_NPM1 2009_MC in_II almost_RR all_DB regions_NN2 ._. 
While_CS more_DAR than_CSN 70_MC percent_NNU of_IO the_AT respondents_NN2 attributed_VVD this_DD1 further_RRR decline_VV0 to_II the_AT fall_NN1 in_II demand_NN1 for_IF trade_NN1 activities_NN2 ,_, six_MC in_II ten_MC respondents_NN2 attributed_VVD it_PPH1 to_II restrained_JJ credit_NN1 availability_NN1 ,_, thereby_RR pointing_VVG to_II the_AT increased_JJ difficulties_NN2 of_IO banks_NN2 in_II supplying_VVG trade_NN1 credit_NN1 --_NN1 an_AT1 escalation_NN1 caused_VVN by_II the_AT general_JJ liquidity_NN1 squeeze_NN1 and_CC the_AT amplified_JJ risk_NN1 aversion_NN1 to_TO finance_VVI cross-border_JJ trade_NN1 operations_NN2 ._. 
Spreads_VVZ (_( prices_NN2 )_) on_II the_AT open-ing_NN1 up_RP of_IO letters_NN2 of_IO credit_NN1 were_VBDR up_RP ,_, from_II 10_MC to_II 15_MC basis_NN1 points_VVZ above_II LIBOR_NP1 up_RG21 to_RG22 300_MC basis_NN1 points_VVZ in_II some_DD emerging_JJ economies_NN2 ._. 
Some_DD banks_NN2 even_RR reported_VVN 600_MC basis_NN1 points_NN2 for_IF particular_JJ destinations_NN2 ._. 
Results_NN2 from_II a_AT1 survey_NN1 undertaken_VVN by_II the_AT International_JJ Chamber_NN1 of_IO Commerce_NN1 (_( ICC_NP1 )_) broadly_RR confirmed_VVD the_AT conclusions_NN2 drawn_VVN by_II the_AT IMF-BAFT_JJ analysis_NN1 ,_, albeit_CS relying_VVG on_II a_AT1 wider_JJR panel_NN1 of_IO banks_NN2 and_CC countries_NN2 (_( 122_MC banks_NN2 in_II 59_MC countries_NN2 )_) ._. 
The_AT results_NN2 of_IO the_AT ICC_NP1 survey_NN1 were_VBDR also_RR released_VVN for_IF the_AT WTO_NN1 Expert_NN1 Group_NN1 of_IO March_NPM1 18_MC ,_, 2009_MC ,_, and_CC further_RRR updated_VVN before_II the_AT G-20_FO Summit_NN1 in_II London_NP1 ._. 
It_PPH1 is_VBZ obvious_JJ that_CST trade_NN1 decreased_VVN as_II a_AT1 result_NN1 of_IO both_DB2 the_AT recession_NN1 and_CC tight_JJ credit_NN1 conditions_NN2 ._. 
