International_JJ organizations_NN2 and_CC arrangements_NN2 :_: Pivotal_JJ countries_NN2 and_CC manipulations_NN2 1_MC1 ._. 
Introduction_NN1 International_JJ economic_JJ arrangements_NN2 or_CC organizations_NN2 in_II the_AT areas_NN2 of_IO trade_NN1 ,_, finance_VV0 ,_, or_CC development_NN1 are_VBR perceived_VVN to_TO be_VBI based_VVN on_II interests_NN2 of_IO all_DB countries_NN2 involved_VVD ._. 
In_II other_JJ words_NN2 a_AT1 country_NN1 will_VM become_VVI a_AT1 member_NN1 of_IO a_AT1 regional_JJ or_CC global_JJ arrangement_NN1 if_CS it_PPH1 perceives_VVZ its_APPGE membership_NN1 as_CSA welfare_NN1 enhancing_VVG ._. 
Each_DD1 individual_JJ issue_NN1 debated_VVN within_II any_DD of_IO these_DD2 arrangements_NN2 ,_, however_RR ,_, may_VM not_XX always_RR be_VBI resolved_VVN in_II a_AT1 way_NN1 that_CST is_VBZ either_RR welfare_NN1 enhancing_VVG or_CC simply_RR satisfactory_JJ to_II each_DD1 and_CC every_AT1 member_NN1 country_NN1 ._. 
Examples_NN2 which_DDQ illustrate_VV0 this_DD1 point_NN1 include_VV0 ,_, for_REX21 instance_REX22 ,_, the_AT side_NN1 agreements_NN2 on_II environmental_JJ and_CC labor_NN1 standards_NN2 within_II the_AT North_NP1 American_JJ Free_JJ Trade_NN1 Agreement_NN1 (_( NAFTA_NP1 )_) which_DDQ are_VBR favored_VVN by_II the_AT United_NP1 States_NP1 much_DA1 more_DAR than_CSN by_II Mexico_NP1 ,_, or_CC a_AT1 long-standing_JJ agricultural_JJ policy_NN1 debate_NN1 within_II the_AT European_JJ Union_NN1 countries_NN2 which_DDQ has_VHZ not_XX been_VBN resolved_VVN in_II a_AT1 manner_NN1 to_TO satisfy_VVI all_DB players_NN2 involved_VVD ._. 
This_DD1 paper_NN1 addresses_VVZ the_AT problem_NN1 of_IO mechanism_NN1 design_NN1 ,_, i.e._REX ,_, the_AT problem_NN1 of_IO how_RGQ individual_JJ countries_NN2 within_II an_AT1 international_JJ arrangement_NN1 make_VV0 their_APPGE decisions_NN2 when_CS facing_VVG a_AT1 set_NN1 of_IO criteria_NN2 to_II which_DDQ they_PPHS2 previously_RR agreed_VVN upon_II ._. 
Methodologically_RR this_DD1 paper_NN1 relies_VVZ on_II some_DD public_JJ choice_NN1 models_NN2 ,_, i.e._REX ,_, more_RGR specifically_RR it_PPH1 is_VBZ one_MC1 of_IO Clarke-Groves_NP1 mechanisms_NN2 ._. 
A_AT1 comprehensive_JJ review_NN1 of_IO this_DD1 type_NN1 of_IO mechanism_NN1 design_NN1 is_VBZ provided_VVN in_II Mas-Colell_NP1 et_RA21 al_RA22 .._... 
We_PPIS2 do_VD0 not_XX look_VVI for_IF an_AT1 "_" optimal_JJ mechanism_NN1 ,_, "_" according_II21 to_II22 the_AT interests_NN2 of_IO some_DD country_NN1 which_DDQ presumably_RR is_VBZ designing_VVG the_AT mechanism_NN1 with_IW its_APPGE own_DA interest_NN1 in_II mind_NN1 ._. 
Rather_RR ,_, we_PPIS2 will_VM look_VVI at_II a_AT1 mechanism_NN1 design_NN1 where_CS the_AT objective_NN1 is_VBZ to_TO satisfy_VVI a_AT1 set_NN1 of_IO criteria_NN2 ._. 
We_PPIS2 design_VV0 a_AT1 dominant_JJ strategy_NN1 mechanism_NN1 which_DDQ achieves_VVZ a_AT1 Pareto_NP1 optimal_JJ outcome_NN1 and_CC at_II the_AT same_DA time_NNT1 optimizes_VVZ the_AT organization_NN1 's_GE welfare_NN1 in_II a_AT1 hypothetical_JJ international_JJ arrangement_NN1 ._. 
More_RGR specifically_RR ,_, our_APPGE mechanism_NN1 is_VBZ an_AT1 extension_NN1 of_IO the_AT Clarke_NP1 pivotal_JJ mechanism_NN1 enriched_VVN with_IW the_AT addition_NN1 of_IO the_AT augmented_JJ revelation_NN1 mechanism_NN1 introduced_VVN by_II Mookherjee_NP1 and_CC Reichelstein._NP1 2_MC ._. 
Mechanism_NN1 design_NN1 Consider_VV0 the_AT following_JJ situation_NN1 ._. 
Several_DA2 developed_JJ countries_NN2 are_VBR members_NN2 of_IO some_DD international_JJ arrangement_NN1 which_DDQ we_PPIS2 will_VM call_VVI GROUP_NN1 ._. 
The_AT number_NN1 of_IO countries_NN2 is_VBZ I_MC1 ,_, and_CC we_PPIS2 index_VV0 them_PPHO2 by_II i_ZZ1 =_FO 1_MC1 ,_, 2_MC ,_, &hellip;_... 
,_, I._NP1 The_AT countries_NN2 in_II GROUP_NN1 consider_VV0 making_VVG a_AT1 joint_JJ major_JJ investment_NN1 (_( e.g._REX ,_, infrastructure_NN1 investment_NN1 such_II21 as_II22 major_JJ railroad_NN1 ,_, road_NN1 network_NN1 ,_, irrigation_NN1 system_NN1 ,_, power_NN1 plants_NN2 )_) in_II a_AT1 very_RG large_JJ developing_JJ or_CC transition_NN1 economy_NN1 ,_, which_DDQ is_VBZ not_XX a_AT1 member_NN1 of_IO GROUP_NN1 ._. 
This_DD1 large_JJ country_NN1 represents_VVZ potentially_RR a_AT1 large_JJ market_NN1 for_IF most_DAT countries_NN2 which_DDQ are_VBR members_NN2 of_IO the_AT GROUP_NN1 ._. 
Making_VVG this_DD1 investment_NN1 may_VM also_RR be_VBI a_AT1 good_JJ public_JJ relations_NN2 move_VV0 on_II41 the_II42 part_II43 of_II44 the_AT GROUP_NN1 in_BCL21 order_BCL22 to_TO enhance_VVI its_APPGE image_NN1 around_II the_AT world_NN1 ._. 
The_AT project_NN1 will_VM cost_VVI C_NP1 to_TO undertake_VVI and_CC ,_, if_CS the_AT GROUP_NN1 decides_VVZ to_TO make_VVI the_AT investment_NN1 ,_, the_AT funds_NN2 will_VM have_VHI to_TO come_VVI from_II the_AT member_NN1 countries_NN2 '_GE budgets_NN2 ._. 
Each_DD1 member_NN1 country_NN1 attaches_VVZ some_DD value_NN1 to_II having_VHG the_AT investment_NN1 made_VVN ,_, but_CCB none_PN is_VBZ sure_JJ what_DDQ value_VV0 the_AT other_JJ member_NN1 countries_NN2 attach_VV0 to_II it_PPH1 ._. 
Thus_RR ,_, the_AT GROUP_NN1 member_NN1 countries_NN2 must_VM decide_VVI whether_CSW31 or_CSW32 not_CSW33 to_TO make_VVI the_AT investment_NN1 ._. 
We_PPIS2 assume_VV0 that_CST if_CS the_AT investment_NN1 is_VBZ made_VVN ,_, each_DD1 GROUP_NN1 country_NN1 will_VM pay_VVI its_APPGE pro_JJ21 rata_JJ22 share_NN1 of_IO the_AT costs_NN2 of_IO undertaking_VVG the_AT project_NN1 which_DDQ we_PPIS2 denote_VV0 C/I_ZZ1 ._. 
In_II31 addition_II32 to_II33 this_DD1 GROUP_NN1 countries_NN2 are_VBR willing_JJ to_TO consider_VVI transfers_NN2 among_II themselves_PPX2 ._. 
They_PPHS2 can_VM take_VVI forms_NN2 of_IO either_RR tax_VV0 or_CC subsidy_NN1 ._. 
We_PPIS2 denote_VV0 them_PPHO2 by_II ti_NN2 N_ZZ1 0_MC and_CC ti_NN2 b0_FO for_IF a_AT1 tax_NN1 paid_VVN by_II country_NN1 i_ZZ1 and_CC subsidy_NN1 paid_VVN to_II country_NN1 i_ZZ1 espectively_RR ._. 
Country_NN1 I_ZZ1 's_VBZ social_JJ welfare_NN1 depends_VVZ on_II (_( a_ZZ1 )_) whether_CSW the_AT investment_NN1 is_VBZ made_VVN ,_, and_CC (_( b_ZZ1 )_) any_DD monetary_JJ transfer_NN1 ti_NN2 that_CST is_VBZ made_VVN to_II or_CC from_II it_PPH1 ._. 
Therefore_RR we_PPIS2 suppose_VV0 that_CST each_DD1 country_NN1 i_ZZ1 attaches_VVZ some_DD monetary_JJ value_NN1 Mi_NP1 to_II the_AT project_NN1 ._. 
Furthermore_RR ,_, we_PPIS2 allow_VV0 that_CST some_DD countries_NN2 do_VD0 not_XX have_VHI to_TO like_VVI having_VHG this_DD1 investment_NN1 made_VVN ,_, i.e._REX ,_, Mi_NP1 b_ZZ1 0_MC is_VBZ possible_JJ ._. 
We_PPIS2 also_RR permit_VV0 transfers_NN2 if_CS the_AT project_NN1 is_VBZ not_XX undertaken_VVN ._. 
Finally_RR ,_, to_TO make_VVI it_PPH1 more_RGR convenient_JJ to_TO work_VVI with_IW the_AT country_NN1 's_GE valuation_NN1 of_IO the_AT project_NN1 we_PPIS2 allow_VV0 it_PPH1 to_TO be_VBI net_JJ of_IO its_APPGE contribution_NN1 ,_, i.e._REX ,_, vi_MC =_FO Mi_NP1 --_NN1 C/I_ZZ1 ._. 
Thus_RR we_PPIS2 have_VH0 the_AT social_JJ welfare_NN1 function_NN1 for_IF country_NN1 i_ZZ1 defined_VVN as_CSA Wi_NP1 =_FO V_ZZ1 (_( vi_MC ,_, ti_NN2 )_) ._. 
Wi_NN2 is_VBZ strictly_RR increasing_VVG in_II vi_MC and_CC strictly_RR ecreasing_VVG in_II ti_NN2 ._. 
The_AT difficult_JJ issue_NN1 between_II the_AT GROUP_NN1 countries_NN2 is_VBZ a_AT1 potential_JJ dichotomy_NN1 of_IO the_AT GROUP_NN1 interests_NN2 and_CC individual_JJ member_NN1 country_NN1 interests_NN2 ._. 
One_MC1 obvious_JJ choice_NN1 of_IO decision_NN1 rule_NN1 would_VM be_VBI the_AT majority_NN1 rule_NN1 with_IW no_AT transfers_NN2 ._. 
However_RR ,_, this_DD1 may_VM lead_VVI to_II the_AT situation_NN1 where_RRQ some_DD countries_NN2 (_( minority_NN1 )_) may_VM like_VVI making_VVG the_AT investment_NN1 very_RG much_DA1 while_CS the_AT others_NN2 (_( majority_NN1 )_) may_VM dislike_VVI or_CC be_VBI indifferent_JJ to_II the_AT idea_NN1 of_IO getting_VVG involved_JJ in_II the_AT project_NN1 ._. 
Then_RT even_CS21 if_CS22 the_AT overall_JJ GROUP_NN1 's_GE welfare_NN1 would_VM increase_VVI the_AT investment_NN1 is_VBZ not_XX going_VVGK to_TO be_VBI made_VVN ._. 
As_II a_AT1 corollary_NN1 some_DD countries_NN2 may_VM not_XX want_VVI the_AT project_NN1 to_TO begin_VVI ,_, and_CC yet_RR if_CS they_PPHS2 are_VBR "_" outvoted_VVN "_" they_PPHS2 will_VM be_VBI assessed_VVN the_AT fee_NN1 C/I_ZZ1 ._. 
Thus_RR a_AT1 mechanism_NN1 that_CST will_VM satisfy_VVI the_AT following_JJ set_NN1 of_IO conditions_NN2 is_VBZ proposed._NNU (_( i_ZZ1 )_) The_AT investment_NN1 will_VM be_VBI made_VVN only_RR if_CS it_PPH1 is_VBZ socially_RR efficient_JJ at_II the_AT aggregate_JJ GROUP_NN1 level_NN1 ,_, i.e._REX ,_, iff_CS &Sigma;_NULL i_ZZ1 vi_MC &ge;_FO 0._MC (_( ii_MC )_) The_AT optimal_JJ actions_NN2 of_IO each_DD1 member_NN1 country_NN1 in_II the_AT mechanism_NN1 are_VBR the_AT function_NN1 of_IO the_AT country_NN1 's_GE independent_JJ valuation_NN1 vi_MC ._. 
They_PPHS2 (_( the_AT optimal_JJ actions_NN2 )_) should_VM dominate_VVI any_DD other_JJ actions_NN2 the_AT countries_NN2 might_VM take_VVI ,_, no_DDQV31 matter_DDQV32 what_DDQV33 other_JJ member_NN1 countries_NN2 do._NNU (_( iii_MC )_) The_AT mechanism_NN1 should_VM not_XX be_VBI so_RG detrimental_JJ to_II the_AT welfare_NN1 of_IO the_AT country_NN1 that_CST it_PPH1 would_VM prefer_VVI that_CST the_AT decision_NN1 to_TO make_VVI the_AT investment_NN1 or_CC not_XX is_VBZ taken_VVN by_II decree_NN1 ._. 
In_II other_JJ words_NN2 ,_, the_AT social_JJ welfare_NN1 of_IO country_NN1 i_ZZ1 ,_, if_CS the_AT mechanism_NN1 is_VBZ played_VVN optimally_RR by_II the_AT country_NN1 ,_, should_VM never_RR be_VBI less_DAR than_CSN min_NNU vi_MC ,_, 0_MC ._. 
While_CS the_AT third_MD and_CC fourth_MD conditions_NN2 seem_VV0 to_TO be_VBI sufficiently_RR intuitive_JJ the_AT first_MD two_MC conditions_NN2 may_VM require_VVI some_DD explaining_NN1 ._. 
The_AT first_MD condition_NN1 can_VM be_VBI defended_VVN simply_RR by_II establishing_VVG that_CST we_PPIS2 are_VBR trying_VVG to_TO achieve_VVI an_AT1 organization_NN1 (_( the_AT GROUP_NN1 )_) optimum_JJ which_DDQ implies_VVZ maximizing_VVG the_AT sum_NN1 of_IO individual_JJ countries_NN2 welfare_NN1 ._. 
The_AT second_MD condition_NN1 can_VM be_VBI interpreted_VVN that_CST the_AT GROUP_NN1 countries_NN2 want_VV0 a_AT1 mechanism_NN1 in_II which_DDQ each_DD1 country_NN1 has_VHZ a_AT1 dominant_JJ strategy_NN1 to_TO play_VVI as_II a_AT1 function_NN1 of_IO its_APPGE valuation_NN1 vi_MC ._. 
Having_VHG said_VVN this_DD1 we_PPIS2 refer_VV0 to_II the_AT revelation_NN1 principle_NN1 for_IF dominant_JJ strategy_NN1 mechanisms_NN2 which_DDQ states_VVZ that_CST the_AT outcome_NN1 of_IO any_DD dominant_JJ strategy_NN1 mechanism_NN1 can_VM be_VBI achieved_VVN in_II a_AT1 direct_JJ revelation_NN1 mechanism_NN1 for_IF which_DDQ truth-telling_NN1 and_CC participation_NN1 is_VBZ a_AT1 dominant_JJ strategy._NNU 2_MC ._. 
Mechanism_NN1 design_NN1 Let_VV0 us_PPIO2 start_VVI with_IW considering_VVG the_AT assertion_NN1 that_CST if_CS there_EX is_VBZ a_AT1 pivotal_JJ country_NN1 within_II an_AT1 international_JJ organization_NN1 ,_, not_XX all_DB of_IO our_APPGE conditions_NN2 can_VM be_VBI satisfied_VVN ._. 
Condition_NN1 (_( i_ZZ1 )_) is_VBZ justified_VVN by_II concluding_VVG that_CST we_PPIS2 wish_VV0 to_TO achieve_VVI an_AT1 organizational_JJ optimum_JJ which_DDQ in_II this_DD1 setting_NN1 ,_, with_IW organizational_JJ welfare_NN1 linear_JJ in_II money_NN1 ,_, means_NN maximizing_VVG the_AT sum_NN1 of_IO individual_JJ countries_NN2 welfare_NN1 ._. 
Remember_VV0 that_CST transfers_NN2 are_VBR all_DB nonnegative_JJ in_II our_APPGE model_NN1 ._. 
Moreover_RR the_AT transfers_NN2 are_VBR all_DB zero_MC only_JJ if_CS there_EX are_VBR no_AT pivotal_JJ countries_NN2 ._. 
However_RR ,_, if_CS there_EX are_VBR pivotal_JJ countries_NN2 ,_, we_PPIS2 have_VH0 a_AT1 positive_JJ net_JJ collection_NN1 of_IO taxes_NN2 ._. 
Thus_RR the_AT mechanism_NN1 does_VDZ not_XX achieve_VVI an_AT1 organizational_JJ optimum_JJ ._. 
We_PPIS2 ultimately_RR must_VM ask_VVI a_AT1 follow-up_JJ question_NN1 :_: what_DDQ will_VM the_AT GROUP_NN1 do_VDI with_IW a_AT1 net_JJ surplus_NN1 of_IO funds_NN2 collected_VVN if_CS there_EX are_VBR pivotal_JJ countries_NN2 ?_? 
If_CS the_AT surplus_NN1 is_VBZ used_VVN in_II any_DD way_NN1 that_CST increases_VVZ the_AT social_JJ welfare_NN1 of_IO some_DD or_CC all_DB GROUP_NN1 countries_NN2 ,_, and_CC if_CS the_AT GROUP_NN1 countries_NN2 anticipate_VV0 this_DD1 ,_, then_RT it_PPH1 would_VM be_VBI the_AT violation_NN1 of_IO the_AT direct_JJ revelation_NN1 mechanism_NN1 which_DDQ we_PPIS2 described_VVD ._. 
We_PPIS2 would_VM have_VHI to_TO include_VVI in_II the_AT country_NN1 's_GE social_JJ welfare_NN1 the_AT value_NN1 they_PPHS2 assign_VV0 to_II the_AT utilizations_NN2 in_II which_DDQ this_DD1 surplus_NN1 is_VBZ put_VVN ._. 
However_RR ,_, our_APPGE uniqueness_NN1 result_NN1 is_VBZ that_CST the_AT only_JJ mechanism_NN1 that_CST will_VM achieve_VVI (_( i_ZZ1 )_) -(iv)_MC is_VBZ the_AT one_MC1 described_VVD ._. 
In_II other_JJ words_NN2 if_CS we_PPIS2 want_VV0 to_TO achieve_VVI (_( i_ZZ1 )_) -(iv)_MC ,_, we_PPIS2 have_VH0 to_TO find_VVI a_AT1 use_NN1 for_IF the_AT surplus_NN1 that_CST is_VBZ of_IO neither_RR benefit_VV0 or_CC detriment_NN1 to_II GROUP_NN1 countries_NN2 ._. 
Possibilities_NN2 ,_, although_CS unlikely_JJ ,_, include_VV0 destroying_VVG the_AT surplus_NN1 ,_, or_CC giving_VVG it_PPH1 as_II a_AT1 gift_NN1 or_CC aid_NN1 to_II some_DD other_JJ countries_NN2 for_IF unknown_JJ causes_NN2 which_DDQ would_VM leave_VVI all_DB of_IO the_AT GROUP_NN1 countries_NN2 completely_RR indifferent_JJ ._. 
We_PPIS2 can_VM easily_RR conclude_VVI that_CST these_DD2 options_NN2 are_VBR extremely_RR unlikely_JJ if_CS not_XX impossible_JJ ._. 
Even_CS21 if_CS22 these_DD2 actions_NN2 are_VBR taken_VVN and_CC the_AT surplus_NN1 is_VBZ disposed_VVN in_II one_MC1 of_IO the_AT suggested_JJ ways_NN2 ,_, then_RT condition_NN1 (_( i_ZZ1 )_) can_VM be_VBI challenged_VVN on_II the_AT grounds_NN2 that_CST it_PPH1 does_VDZ not_XX guarantee_VVI that_CST an_AT1 organizational_JJ optimum_JJ is_VBZ reached_VVN ._. 
The_AT decision_NN1 whether_CSW to_TO make_VVI an_AT1 investment_NN1 or_CC not_XX will_VM be_VBI done_VDN optimally_RR if_CS there_EX are_VBR any_DD pivotal_JJ countries_NN2 ,_, but_CCB at_II the_AT expense_NN1 of_IO other_JJ GROUP_NN1 countries_NN2 resources._NNU 3_MC ._. 
Implications_NN2 Our_APPGE mechanism_NN1 is_VBZ the_AT only_JJ mechanism_NN1 that_CST satisfies_VVZ conditions_NN2 (_( i_ZZ1 )_) through_II (_( iv_MC )_) ._. 
Country_NN1 i_ZZ1 will_VM pay_VVI a_AT1 tax_NN1 only_RR if_CS its_APPGE valuation_NN1 vi_MC is_VBZ pivotal_JJ ,_, i.e._REX ,_, only_RR if_CS its_APPGE valuation_NN1 vi_MC changes_VVZ the_AT outcome_NN1 from_II what_DDQ it_PPH1 would_VM be_VBI if_CSW it_PPH1 reported_VVD zero_MC ._. 
If_CS country_NN1 i_ZZ221 's_ZZ222 valuation_NN1 vi_MC is_VBZ pivotal_JJ ,_, then_RT the_AT country_NN1 is_VBZ taxed_VVN only_RR for_IF the_AT amount_NN1 equal_JJ to_II the_AT level_NN1 of_IO the_AT "_" organizational_JJ disturbance_NN1 ._. "_" 
For_REX21 instance_REX22 ,_, if_CS it_PPH1 causes_VVZ the_AT investment_NN1 to_TO be_VBI made_VVN when_CS it_PPH1 otherwise_RR would_VM not_XX be_VBI ,_, it_PPH1 will_VM pay_VVI the_AT monetary_JJ cost_NN1 --_NN1 &Sigma;_NULL i_MC1 v-_NN1 i_ZZ1 to_II other_JJ GROUP_NN1 countries_NN2 ._. 
Likewise_RR ,_, if_CS it_PPH1 causes_VVZ the_AT investment_NN1 not_XX to_TO be_VBI made_VVN when_CS it_PPH1 otherwise_RR would_VM be_VBI ,_, it_PPH1 will_VM pay_VVI the_AT monetary_JJ benefit_NN1 equal_JJ to_II &Sigma;_NULL i_MC1 v-_NN1 i_ZZ1 to_II other_JJ GROUP_NN1 countries_NN2 ._. 
Our_APPGE example_NN1 is_VBZ just_RR one_PN1 that_CST can_VM be_VBI generalized_VVN to_II almost_RR any_DD decision_NN1 making_VVG situation_NN1 at_II the_AT level_NN1 of_IO an_AT1 international_JJ organization_NN1 including_II multiple_JJ players_NN2 ._. 
Thus_RR the_AT implications_NN2 of_IO this_DD1 type_NN1 of_IO model_NN1 may_VM have_VHI broader_JJR consequences_NN2 in_II the_AT international_JJ setting_NN1 ._. 
The_AT question_NN1 to_TO ask_VVI here_RL is_VBZ then_RT how_RRQ realistically_RR our_APPGE conditions_NN2 picture_VV0 the_AT real_JJ world_NN1 ?_? 
If_CS there_EX is_VBZ a_AT1 pivotal_JJ country_NN1 within_II an_AT1 international_JJ organization_NN1 our_APPGE conditions_NN2 (_( i_ZZ1 )_) through_II (_( iv_MC )_) can_VM not_XX be_VBI all_RR satisfied_JJ ._. 
And_CC if_CS this_DD1 assertion_NN1 is_VBZ true_JJ ,_, the_AT questions_NN2 become_VV0 :_: (_( 1_MC1 )_) is_VBZ there_EX a_AT1 pivotal_JJ country_NN1 within_II an_AT1 international_JJ organization_NN1 or_CC arrangement_NN1 ,_, and_CC if_CS the_AT answer_NN1 to_II the_AT first_MD question_NN1 is_VBZ yes_UH ,_, (_( 2_MC )_) can_VM manipulation_NN1 done_VDN by_II misrepresenting_VVG its_APPGE real_JJ preferences_NN2 secure_VV0 an_AT1 outcome_NN1 the_AT pivotal_JJ country_NN1 prefers_VVZ to_II the_AT "_" honest_JJ "_" outcome_NN1 (_( the_AT choice_NN1 the_AT international_JJ organization_NN1 would_VM make_VVI if_CSW the_AT pivotal_JJ country_NN1 expressed_VVD its_APPGE true_JJ preferences_NN2 )_) ?_? 
Let_VV0 us_PPIO2 start_VVI with_IW considering_VVG the_AT assertion_NN1 that_CST if_CS there_EX is_VBZ a_AT1 pivotal_JJ country_NN1 within_II an_AT1 international_JJ organization_NN1 ,_, not_XX all_DB of_IO our_APPGE conditions_NN2 can_VM be_VBI satisfied_VVN ._. 
Condition_NN1 (_( i_ZZ1 )_) is_VBZ justified_VVN by_II concluding_VVG that_CST we_PPIS2 wish_VV0 to_TO achieve_VVI an_AT1 organizational_JJ optimum_JJ which_DDQ in_II this_DD1 setting_NN1 ,_, with_IW organizational_JJ welfare_NN1 linear_JJ in_II money_NN1 ,_, means_NN maximizing_VVG the_AT sum_NN1 of_IO individual_JJ countries_NN2 welfare_NN1 ._. 
Remember_VV0 that_CST transfers_NN2 are_VBR all_DB nonnegative_JJ in_II our_APPGE model_NN1 ._. 
Moreover_RR the_AT transfers_NN2 are_VBR all_DB zero_MC only_JJ if_CS there_EX are_VBR no_AT pivotal_JJ countries_NN2 ._. 
However_RR ,_, if_CS there_EX are_VBR pivotal_JJ countries_NN2 ,_, we_PPIS2 have_VH0 a_AT1 positive_JJ net_JJ collection_NN1 of_IO taxes_NN2 ._. 
Thus_RR the_AT mechanism_NN1 does_VDZ not_XX achieve_VVI an_AT1 organizational_JJ optimum_JJ ._. 
We_PPIS2 ultimately_RR must_VM ask_VVI a_AT1 follow-up_JJ question_NN1 :_: what_DDQ will_VM the_AT GROUP_NN1 do_VDI with_IW a_AT1 net_JJ surplus_NN1 of_IO funds_NN2 collected_VVN if_CS there_EX are_VBR pivotal_JJ countries_NN2 ?_? 
If_CS the_AT surplus_NN1 is_VBZ used_VVN in_II any_DD way_NN1 that_CST increases_VVZ the_AT social_JJ welfare_NN1 of_IO some_DD or_CC all_DB GROUP_NN1 countries_NN2 ,_, and_CC if_CS the_AT GROUP_NN1 countries_NN2 anticipate_VV0 this_DD1 ,_, then_RT it_PPH1 would_VM be_VBI the_AT violation_NN1 of_IO the_AT direct_JJ revelation_NN1 mechanism_NN1 which_DDQ we_PPIS2 described_VVD ._. 
We_PPIS2 would_VM have_VHI to_TO include_VVI in_II the_AT country_NN1 's_GE social_JJ welfare_NN1 the_AT value_NN1 they_PPHS2 assign_VV0 to_II the_AT utilizations_NN2 in_II which_DDQ this_DD1 surplus_NN1 is_VBZ put_VVN ._. 
However_RR ,_, our_APPGE uniqueness_NN1 result_NN1 is_VBZ that_CST the_AT only_JJ mechanism_NN1 that_CST will_VM achieve_VVI (_( i_ZZ1 )_) -(iv)_MC is_VBZ the_AT one_MC1 described_VVD ._. 
In_II other_JJ words_NN2 if_CS we_PPIS2 want_VV0 to_TO achieve_VVI (_( i_ZZ1 )_) -(iv)_MC ,_, we_PPIS2 have_VH0 to_TO find_VVI a_AT1 use_NN1 for_IF the_AT surplus_NN1 that_CST is_VBZ of_IO neither_RR benefit_VV0 or_CC detriment_NN1 to_II GROUP_NN1 countries_NN2 ._. 
Possibilities_NN2 ,_, although_CS unlikely_JJ ,_, include_VV0 destroying_VVG the_AT surplus_NN1 ,_, or_CC giving_VVG it_PPH1 as_II a_AT1 gift_NN1 or_CC aid_NN1 to_II some_DD other_JJ countries_NN2 for_IF unknown_JJ causes_NN2 which_DDQ would_VM leave_VVI all_DB of_IO the_AT GROUP_NN1 countries_NN2 completely_RR indifferent_JJ ._. 
We_PPIS2 can_VM easily_RR conclude_VVI that_CST these_DD2 options_NN2 are_VBR extremely_RR unlikely_JJ if_CS not_XX impossible_JJ ._. 
Even_CS21 if_CS22 these_DD2 actions_NN2 are_VBR taken_VVN and_CC the_AT surplus_NN1 is_VBZ disposed_VVN in_II one_MC1 of_IO the_AT suggested_JJ ways_NN2 ,_, then_RT condition_NN1 (_( i_ZZ1 )_) can_VM be_VBI challenged_VVN on_II the_AT grounds_NN2 that_CST it_PPH1 does_VDZ not_XX guarantee_VVI that_CST an_AT1 organizational_JJ optimum_JJ is_VBZ reached_VVN ._. 
The_AT decision_NN1 whether_CSW to_TO make_VVI an_AT1 investment_NN1 or_CC not_XX will_VM be_VBI done_VDN optimally_RR if_CS there_EX are_VBR any_DD pivotal_JJ countries_NN2 ,_, but_CCB at_II the_AT expense_NN1 of_IO other_JJ GROUP_NN1 countries_NN2 resources_NN2 ._. 
