5. Divine Perfection and Goodness
So, is God good at all if he is not morally good? Classical theists not only answer with a resounding yes, but they also say God is good in a perfect and unlimited way, and he is the only being to be so. Regarding his perfection, Aquinas says "the first active principle must needs be most actual, and therefore most perfect; for a thing is perfect in proportion to its state of actuality, because we call that perfect which lacks nothing of the mode of its perfection." In other words, a thing can be perfected or perfect if it has the potential to be so; however, if that potential has been fully realized, then that being is perfect. There is no more room or potential for betterment or perfection. However, Aquinas argues that God has not realized his potential, but has no potential since he is a being of Pure Act. Thus, he is inherently perfect. This perfection is a metaphysical one, having to do with being or existence. So, according to Aquinas, God is perfect, but is he good? He first discusses the notion of goodness in general and then applies that notion to God.
First, Aquinas explains the relationship between goodness and being. According to him, they are really the same, but differ in how they are thought. Quoting Aristotle (Ethics i), Aquinas says that goodness is what is desirable to all. A thing, he says, is desirable if it is perfect, and perfect if it is actual. So, a thing is more perfect the more it is actual. "Therefore," he says, "it is clear that a thing is perfect so far as it exists; for it is existence that makes all things actual ... Hence it is clear that goodness and being are the same really. But goodness presents the aspect of desirableness, which being does not present." In this sense, being, or existence, is the same as goodness and are only different in the aspect of desirability.
Regarding the goodness of God, since all things seek their own perfection, and since a thing's perfection is somehow first in the efficient cause (God), the agent is also desirable, having fullness of being and perfection. Thus, God is good. This does not in any way say that God is morally good; this speaks to a metaphysical notion of goodness that is tied to being.
This notion of goodness can be compared to the typical medieval view of evil—one still in vogue today in many circles. Augustine and Aquinas after him, argued that evil is not a thing in itself, but a corruption of good. If being and actuality are good, then evil cannot be a being or an actuality, or it would be good. However, that would be a contradiction. Hence, evil is not a thing in itself, but a corruption of a thing. In other words, it is a reversal of a thing's goodness or perfection. Thus, goodness is equitable to being and evil is simply a corruption of that being, not a being in itself.
6. Moral Virtues and the Divine Essence
Is there any way that moral virtue can be ascribed to God? The answer is, "in a way". That is, analogously. Aquinas states that it is proper to call God "just", "merciful", and the like. (It would be hard to deny that since the Scriptures do so.) Yet, in what way can this be done and does that not invalidate what has been said?
Aquinas says that since God is perfect and good, and since he is the efficient cause of all that exists (besides himself), then there is some way in which all effects reside in him. Since virtues are found in God's effects, then there must be a way in which such virtues pre-exist in God as their cause. Aquinas is quick to point out that whatever this means has to first be understood in light of what he has said before about God's nature, viz., that he is simple. Thus, in whatever way he contains virtue is not in the same way as man does, for man is virtuous through habits and becoming virtuous, while whatever God "has" he simply is essentially.
God, Aquinas says, can be said to be just. However, he cannot be just in every respect, for commutative justice is where things are exchanged between persons, such as in a business transaction. As such requires a debt and since God does not owe a debt, he cannot be just in this way. He can be said to be just in another way, viz., by distributive justice. Such justice is when someone provides for others what they deserve. This is not meant to be seen as a debt since it is clearly contrasted with commutative justice; rather, it is seen between rulers and the ruled, and between a parent and his children. Aquinas has in mind the entire ordering "of the universe" as God's effects, "both in effects of nature and effects of will" which "shows forth the justice of God". Of this type of justice, Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange states, "Experience clearly shows that God distributes to all creatures what is necessary so that they can attain their end, although all do not actually do so." In other words, since God created, he gave his creatures what they needed per their natures to attain their final cause, or their ultimate goal (which for humans is ultimately God himself).
God is under no obligation to create or to create certain things; however, since he did, he created his effects to have certain natures and gave them what they needed to be what they are. This is a distinction that Aquinas makes in the context of God's will. Aquinas is here answering the question as to whether what God wills he must will necessarily. His answer lies in a distinction between absolute necessity and suppositional necessity. The former is what must be willed either by definition (such as analytic statements), or God willing himself or his own goodness. Anything else is willed suppositionally. In other words, he does not have to will x, but supposing that he wills x, then he wills it necessarily (in a suppositional way). This is because, per simplicity, the divine will is not distinct from the divine essence. Thus, it is eternal and necessary. However, God's will is free in that he did not have to create anything, but supposing that he did, he did so eternally and necessarily since there is no contingency in his being. Since he did not have to will, but rather did so freely, Aquinas says that he did so suppositionally.
The point of this distinction as applied here is that God is under no obligation to create or to create certain things. However, since he did, he also justly willed that they have certain natures and ways of fulfilling those natures. This is what Aquinas has in mind regarding distributive justice. He had no obligation to create humans; however, supposing he did, he also necessarily willed their good, and part of that good is to will them to fulfill their natures.
As Davies maintains, however, such does not make God a moral being like humans. Unlike humans, who are just in reference to a law, God, says Aquinas, has no law that is "external" to him. He says, "Since good as perceived by intellect is the object of the will, it is impossible for God to will anything but what His wisdom approves. This is, as it were, His law of justice, in accordance with which His will is right and just. Hence, what he does according to His will He does justly: as we do justly what we do according to law. But whereas law comes to us from some higher power God is a law unto Himself." In other words, God acts justly per his nature, viz., his will and intellect, which are really the same in God. However, Davies argues that one should not take Aquinas as meaning that God is just or moral in a univocal way as those terms are applied to humans. Aquinas explicitly writes, "Univocal predication is impossible between God and creatures". Further, since one cannot know the divine essence in itself, one cannot know the exact meaning of such terms as "just". Aquinas further notes that terms such "as good, wise, and the like" can be predicated of God substantially, "although they fall short of a full representation of Him". Such is the case because creatures know God indirectly via creation. Further, Aquinas thinks that all creaturely perfections pre-exist in God as their cause, but in a more perfect way (if such perfections are properly said of God). Thus, when it is said that "God is just", it should not be taken univocally as when it is said "John is just". There is a similarity, that is analogy, but not an exact meaning. Since to be just in the way creatures are is to say that the creature is living up to a standard imposed on him, then such cannot be the understanding of justice applied to God.
In short, God can be said to contain the moral virtues of his creatures; however, Aquinas thinks that all virtues contained in creatures in a way pre-exist in God. However, they do not pre-exist in God as the efficient cause as they do in the effects. Terms such as "justice" are to be taken analogously and not univocally. While we can rightly apply such terms to God, they do not have the same exact meaning as they do for creatures. Further, one cannot know what God is in himself. Lastly, one should not take such virtues as God having obligations to fulfill.
7. Sterba's Objections and Responses
In chapter six of Is a Good God Logically Possible?, Sterba offers a critique of Davies' view and the view offered here. The preceding chapters of his book take God to be a moral agent, but here, he addresses Davies' contention that God is not a moral agent.
One of the objections that Sterba presents against Davies is that since God is a rational agent, then he has moral obligations. However, that was discussed above, so it will not be revisited here.
After the discussion on God being a rational agent, Sterba contends "that the real problem with Davies [sic] account is not so much with his denial that God is subject to moral requirements. Rather, the real problem is that God, if he exists, and were not subject to such requirements, would still admittedly be permitting the horrendous evil consequences of all the immoral actions in the world when he could easily have prevented them without either permitting a greater evil or failing to secure a greater good, which is far more evil than that has been produced by all the great villains among us. That is the real problem." However, it seems that "the real problem" is just that God would be immoral for allowing such evils. There does not seem to be anything else to charge God with. If he could not be charged with immorality, what is Sterba charging him with? Clearly, there would be some imperfection, according to Sterba, in such an account. Yet, what would that imperfection be if not God being immoral? It seems, then, that "the real problem" is that God would not be adhering to moral standards that rational beings should adhere to, according to Sterba. However, that is the very thing Davies is objecting to.
Next, Sterba claims that if Davies is going to reject the idea of God being morally good, then he would need to demonstrate how else God is said to be good. The notion of how God is perfect and good was discussed above. Sterba at this point puts the basic idea into an argument:
All things seek their good (that which attracts).
All things seeking their good are effects of God (things made to be by God).
Effects are somehow like their causes.
Therefore, the goodness which creatures are drawn to is like God who can therefore be thought of as attractive (or good) like the goods to which creatures are attracted.