The evolution of sex ratios has produced, in most plants and animals with separate sexes, approximately equal numbers of males and females. Why should this be so? Two main kinds of answers have been offered. One is couched in terms of advantage to population. It is argued that the sex ratio will evolve so as to maximize the number of meetings between individuals of the opposite sex. This is essentially a group selection argument. The other, and in my view correct, type of answer was first put forward by Fisher in 1930. This genetic argument starts from the assumption that genes can influence the relative numbers of male and female offspring produced by an individual carrying the genes. That sex ratio will be favored which maximizes the number of descendants an individual will have and hence the number of gene copies transmitted. Suppose that the population consisted mostly of females: then an individual who produced sons only would have more grand children. In contrast, if the population consisted mostly of males, it would pay to have daughters. If, however, the population consisted of equal numbers of males and females, sons and daughters would be equally valuable. Thus a one-to-one sex ratio is the only stable ratio; it is an evolutionarily stable strategy. Although Fisher wrote before the mathematical theory of games had been developed, his theory incorporates the essential feature of a gamethat the best strategy to adopt depends on what others are doing.